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China responds with renewed A2/AD missile tests

China responds with renewed A2/AD missile tests
An artists impression of a DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile attack on a US Carrier Strike Group (Source Xinhua)

While the US, Australian and Japanese militaries conduct high intensity combat operations in and around north Queensland, rising power China has responded with a series of anti-ship, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) tests in the western Pacific – raising the stakes for the allied nations.

While the US, Australian and Japanese militaries conduct high intensity combat operations in and around north Queensland, rising power China has responded with a series of anti-ship, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) tests in the western Pacific – raising the stakes for the allied nations.

Since the end of the Second World War, Western power has been dominated heavily by maritime power projection assets like the aircraft carrier and their supporting strike groups – recognising this, particularly following the unhindered US intervention in the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the mid-1990s, China sought a number of ways to level the playing field – A2/AD technologies have emerged as one the key spears in China's phalanx. 

Contemporary A2/AD doctrine leverages both offensive and defensive platforms, ranging from integrated command and control, long-range land, air and sea-based precision fire and ballistic missile capabilities to, as Dr Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) summarises: prevent the uncontested access to its air and maritime approaches by potential adversaries.

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Successfully developing a capable A2/AD system requires an intimate understanding of a potential adversary’s strengths and weaknesses, while maximising one’s own key technological, geographic and doctrine advantages to dictate the momentum of a confrontation.

In response, China redoubled efforts throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s with a two-pronged approach to military modernisation and capability development:

  1. The development of high-intensity, force projection focused conventional capabilities supported by a growing nuclear triad; and
  2. A strategic A2/AD capability to establish a defensive buffer in the western Pacific and into south-east Asia.

Rounding out China's phalanx is the growing carrier-based power projection force structures and large-deck amphibious warfare ships currently in service and under construction by China – seemingly challenging the theories of many Western strategists regarding the demise of the aircraft carrier and major surface-based power projection platforms. 

Responding to Exercise Talisman Sabre 

Exercise Talisman Sabre 2019 has served as a powerful demonstration of the conventional power projection capabilities of the US, Australia and Japan – centred on the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier and amphibious force structures operated by all three nations – while China's deployment of an electronic monitoring "spy ship" to monitor the exercises has been well documented, recent anti-ship ballistic and cruise missile tests conducted in the South China Sea (SCS) serves as a potent reminder that the potential adversary is always watching. 

Concerningly these tests have only served to double down on China's positioning within both the SCS and the broader Indo-Pacific as a whole – this is echoed by a statement made by Pentagon spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Dave Eastburn, who expressed US concern, saying, "What’s truly disturbing about this act is that it’s in direct contradiction to President Xi’s statement in the Rose Garden in 2015 when he pledged to the US, the Asia-Pacific region and the world that he would not militarise those man-made outposts."

This latest comes following a range of recent developments made by China and its efforts to effectively muscle out smaller regional powers, while moving to assert dominance over regional powers like the US, Japan and to a lesser extent Australia – each of which are nations that have vested economic, political and strategic interests in maintaining the post-Second World War order. 

China’s island-building program, while according to Beijing is peaceful, has drawn international condemnation, particularly following the militarisation of facilities and increasing hostility by the Chinese Armed Forces in recent years.

Developments at both the Spratly Islands and Fiery Cross Reef have seen the construction of immense military facilities, accommodating nuclear bomber capable airfields, deep water ports for Chinese naval vessels, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance facilities and batteries of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and advanced integrated air and missile defence systems.

Dr Davis explained to Defence Connect, "2018 has been an interesting year in the South China Sea. It started fairly early on with the basing of anti-ship cruise missiles on reclaimed islands in the SCS, the basing of the upgraded, H-6K nuclear capable bomber on Woody Island and more recently the USS Decatur (DDG-73) incident really reinforces that China is not backing down from its territorial ambitions."

"China's recent forward deployment of the J-10s to Woody Island will enable China to more broadly extend their control of the airspace over the South China Sea. Woody Island enables an expanded air control capacity over aircraft based at Hainan Island and could potential preclude a Chinese push toward the Spratly Islands, challenging Vietnam's interests," Dr Davis added

This rapidly evolving regional environment is emerging as a direct tactical and strategic hurdle for Australia, the US and Japan as China continues to get increasingly assertive, confident and belligerent towards the post-war order, something echoed by LTCOL Eastburn: "I’m not going to speak on behalf of all the sovereign nations in the region, but I’m sure they agree that the PRC’s behaviour is contrary to its claim to want to bring peace to the region and obviously actions like this are coercive acts meant to intimidate other South China Sea claimants."

Dug in like a tick – A ship is a fool to fight a fort, or is it? 

These fortress islands and their combination of capabilities present a series of challenges for US and allied forces, including Australia. With direct threats to forward bases in both Guam and Japan, and potentially both Hawaii and northern Australia, China’s introduction of an effective A2/AD perimeter appears to severely limit, if not completely negate, the effectiveness of traditional force projection and long-range strike doctrines.

With the walls manned, the gates closing and the moat increasingly filled with crocodiles, tipping these scales back in the favour of the attacker in the event of the unthinkable is a major challenge.

This challenge is one that will require both the US and regional allies like Australia and Japan to adapt traditional capabilities and doctrines, while developing and introducing new ones to counter the mounting challenges.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually. Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean and its critical global sea-lines-of-communication, are responsible for more than 80 per cent of the world's seaborne trade in critical energy supplies, namely oil and natural gas, which serve as the lifeblood of any advanced economy. 

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of increasing both the budget and manpower available to the ADF in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. r at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.