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With a little over a month until the US election, many allies wait with baited breath. Germany is no different, with many in the European power’s political and strategic policy communities urging the nation to be prepared for a declining US presence, regardless of a Biden or Trump victory.
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Much like the rest of the world, Europe’s post-war security has been disproportionately guaranteed by the US – as the US continues to embrace isolationism and buckle under the weight of COVID, great power competition and domestic social issues, many US allies will be following the European experience more closely.
Across the globe, the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order appears to be in tatters. Rising great power competition, economic decline and the impact of COVID-19, combined with domestic social and political unrest, is serving to impact the security and sovereignty of many nations.
However, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War cementing America's position as the pre-eminent world power – this period was relatively short lived as costly engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, peace-keeping interventions in southern Europe and enduring global security responsibilities have drained American 'blood' and 'treasure'.
Further compounding matters is the renewed assertiveness and ambitions of the 'traditional' European enemy, Russia, as President Vladimir Putin seeks to maximise the economic, political and strategic malaise in the western European powers and more broadly the Western world to re-establish its position on the global stage.
As the threads of the post-Second World War economic, political and geo-strategic order continue to unravel, many emerging and re-emerging peer competitors are leveraging 'whole-of-government' approaches to maximise their influence, prosperity and security in an increasingly troubling period of time.
Adding further fuel to the fire is the increasing unpredictability and 'isolationism' of Europe's security benefactor: the US, which under both former president Barack Obama and current President Donald Trump has pressured the Europeans to take a greater hand in their own security.
Recognising this, continental Europe's industrial and economic powerhouse, Germany, is seeking to push ahead with developing and implementing policy and doctrine rationalisation as the US seeks to draw down its presence on the continent, shifting its focus at least in part towards the Indo-Pacific.
German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, speaking to the European Parliament, explained growing rationale behind consolidating and collaborating on collective defence post-US draw down in the region, stating, "If that is the case, it means we Europeans must become able to act more so than is the case today."
Building on this, a growing number of German policy makers are preparing for what will become the "new normal" in the aftermath of the US federal election scheduled for early-November.
While much has been made of the disruptive presidential career of Donald Trump, many within Europe are preparing for an equally disruptive Biden administration.
The message has been received, Germany is preparing to pull its weight
Defense News European associate editor, Sebastian Sprenger, has detailed the shift in thinking, both in Washington and in Berlin as the European power prepares for disruption, no matter the result.
"No matter who wins the upcoming US presidential election, German defence officials have telegraphed in recent months that they regard America’s retreat from Europe a challenge they can try to manage, but not avoid," Sprenger explains. .
"The assumption has major consequences, potentially throwing the European economic powerhouse into the kind of geopolitical driver’s seat that leaders here have long sought to avoid, and for which the country is ill prepared.
"On the one hand, the message of America losing interest in the continent has given fresh impetus to the defense ministry’s plea of keeping defence spending up despite the economic hardship wrought by the coronavirus pandemic.
"But Berlin’s judgment also has darker undertones, reflecting a mistrust towards Washington nursed from years of abrasive relations with US President Donald Trump and his emissaries. While another Trump term would likely continue to shake the traditional liberal world order, the idea that Democratic challenger Joe Biden could clinch the presidency and remake US-German bonds is met here mostly with shrugs."
Expanding on this, Sprenger speaking to Carlo Masala, a professor for international relations at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, unpacks the growing bipartisan recognition that Germany and Europe as a whole needs to do more in order to take responsibility for its own security, financially, materially and operationally.
"There is a bipartisan consensus that Germany and Europe don’t invest enough in their own security, and that they are free riders unable to adequately support the United States in its role as a global superpower," Masala explained.
While it could be argued that many of the problems faced by the US on the world stage, particularly those of a security nature, are as a result of its own interventionist nature, the US involvement in Europe served as an important guarantor for continued European stability post-Second World War.
A core component of this guarantee is the NATO alliance, which mandates that at a minimum, members must meet the target spending of 2 per cent of GDP on defence — a figure Australia's own political leaders frequently cite as the ideal of the nation's own defence spending — this figure has emerged as a major battleground for US and European leaders.
Explaining this, former British diplomat and director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform think tank, Ian Bond, said, "Trump may not understand how NATO works or the value to the US of having troops in Germany, but it is true that the US carries a disproportionately large share of the financial burden of defending Europe.
"During his presidency, Barack Obama also accused Europe of being 'complacent' about its own defence — though he was rather more diplomatic."
Bond explains, saying, "In recent weeks Trump announced without warning that the US will withdraw 9,500 — more than one quarter — of the 34,500 troops it has stationed in Germany because the German government is not spending enough on defence.
"Then at a Washington press conference with Polish President Andrzej Duda, Trump said a large number of NATO countries were 'delinquent' and declared that Europe was taking 'tremendous advantage of the United States on trade'."
Expanding on this, Bond states, "Only a handful of European NATO members have met the alliance’s target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence over the past 20 years, while the US has consistently exceeded it, spending 3.1-4.9 per cent.
This war of words has been a long-standing issue for the current US administration which has expressed frequent frustrations between the two nations' leaders, Sprenger adds further, "That image is partly of Germany’s own making, robbing Berlin of a substantive comeback to Trump’s tirades. With roughly 1.2 per cent of its gross national product spent on defence, the country is far from meeting the NATO-wide spending target of 2 per cent by 2024.
"Germans will have plenty of time to debate their trans-Atlantic vision in the 2021 election year, when the era of Chancellor Angela Merkel comes to an end. There is every expectation in Berlin that relations will go from bad to worse if Trump remains president, and such a scenario could quickly sideline Germany’s scrappy cadre of trans-Atlantic optimists.
"If Biden wins in November, however, he could face a Berlin government so set on the expectation of an American withdrawal that it crowds out any potential to imagine another trajectory."
While Australia enjoys a robust and largely cordial relationship with the US, particularly at a military-to-military level, the increasing reluctance of the US to engage on the behalf of 'allies' particularly at the expense of US 'blood' and 'treasure' is a concerning development.
Lessons to be learned
Australia has taken proactive steps, particularly following the announcement of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and supporting Force Structure Plan backed by a record $270 billion worth of funding over the next decade, the limitations of US power and resolve are increasingly being revealed and clearly cannot be taken for granted.
However, these capabilities are still framed within the lens of a largely defensive conflict scenario, whereby Australia's critical economic, political and strategic interests in the region, namely the critical sea lines of communication, are still at the mercy of regional partners and a limited level of Australian area-denial, while Australia's major military platforms remain committed to the defence of the continent.
This approach fails to acknowledge that Australia's limited military capabilities, largely limited as a result of the budgetary and doctrinal constraints established by dogmatic adherence to the now clearly outdated 'Defence of Australia' doctrine and the arbitrary 2 per cent of GDP defence expenditure rate, relegate Australia to a protracted period of isolation, until larger allies either in the region or beyond come to our aid.
In doing so, this not only leaves Australia at the mercy of these 'great and powerful friends', who may have conflicting tactical and strategic interests thus stretching their capabilities and means, Australia's 'commitment' to the Indo-Pacific once again defers all the heavy lifting in the region to other nations, while we continue to believe that we can dictate the balance of power, economic relationships and security partnerships for our own interest and benefit without any real skin in the game.
Your thoughts
Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically.
Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.
However, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Further complicating the nation’s calculations is the declining diversity of the national economy, the ever-present challenge of climate change impacting droughts, bushfires and floods, Australia’s energy security and the infrastructure needed to ensure national resilience.
Let us know your thoughts and ideas about the Prime Minister's $270 billion announcement and the Force Structure Plan and Defence Strategy Update in response to Beijing's economic and strategic coercion and ambitions, and what you would like to see from the nation's leaders in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
