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Should developments in eastern Europe shape Australia’s geostrategic policy in the Indo-Pacific?
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Last Thursday evening (31 March), Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed a joint sitting of the federal parliament via a live virtual broadcast.
The president thanked Australia for its military and humanitarian support, and called for further assistance, including the supply of Thales Australia-built Bushmaster armoured personnel carriers – since actioned by the Commonwealth government.
President Zelenskyy also warned lawmakers about the growing threat posed by authoritarian regimes, claiming the precedent set by Russia’s assault on Ukraine could undermine Australia’s security.
“The distance between our states is great, thousands of kilometres. We are divided by the seas and oceans, the territories of dozens of other countries, time zones,” he said.
“But this distance simply does not exist for the cruelty and chaos that Russia has brought to eastern Europe, to the region of our Black and Azov Seas, to our Ukrainian land.
“Everything that is happening in our region due to Russia’s aggression and that is destroying the lives of our people has already become a real threat to your state and your people. Because this is the nature of evil – it can instantly overcome any distance and any barriers. Destroy life.”
He went on to stress that if Russia is not stopped and brought to justice, its aggression could inspire “some other countries in the world”, which “dream of a similar war against their neighbours”.
“The fate of global security is being decided now,” he added.
But according to Susannah Patton, research fellow and project director, power and diplomacy program at the Lowy Institute, Australian policymakers should refrain from linking the nation’s geostrategic challenges to developments in eastern Europe.
Patton acknowledges Zelenskyy’s address was “characteristically courageous, forthright and powerful”, helping to reinforce the importance of collective efforts to respond to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “disastrous and illegal invasion”.
“Australia has interests that go beyond our immediate geographic neighbourhood – such as the maintenance of an international order in which actions like Russia’s are unacceptable,” she writes in a piece originally published by The Australian Financial Review.
“The broader global ramifications of the crisis – from the humanitarian impact to the impact on the global economy – will also affect Australia.”
However, Patton warns Australia must tread carefully when evaluating the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on its own strategic outlook.
“Zelensky’s claim that Russia’s aggression threatens Australia too, because evil can ‘instantly cross any distance, any barriers’, should be taken with a grain of salt,” she continues.
“The crisis has not changed Australia’s geography, nor altered many of the key facts about our major international relationships.”
Patton argues there’s no clear indication of a shift in the global order favouring authoritarian regimes like Russia and China, particularly in light of Putin’s failure to swiftly seize control of Kyiv.
“European countries have rallied in response to the crisis, going much further than analysts expected to bolster their own defences, support Ukraine, and punish Russia,” she adds.
“The overwhelming support for resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly that condemn Russia and call for the protection of civilians has been described by the US ambassador to the UN as an ‘outstanding success’.”
The Lowy Institute analyst goes on to claim that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine does not signal “imminent peril” in the Indo-Pacific, stating China’s ambitions are more “nuanced”.
“Beijing’s criticism of Washington and its allegation that the United States’ policy sowed the seeds of the conflict has been much louder and clearer than its support for Russia,” Patton adds.
She stresses no clear link can be demonstrated between Russia’s assault and the potential for further territorial aggression from Beijing, despite Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s attempt to draw the line in his address to the Lowy Institute by stating “this is what autocrats do”.
Patton continues: “This kind of generalisation does not aid our understanding of the different challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific, highlighted most recently by evidence of its intent to seek a military foothold in Solomon Islands.
“China’s economic influence continues to expand; in much of Asia it could feel reasonably confident that time is on its side. In relation to Taiwan, most experts judge that China would prefer to win without fighting, and that its timeline will be set by domestic factors rather than events in Europe.”
Moreover, she contends it is wrong to assume Russia’s actions have helped heighten awareness of Chinese ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.
“It is too early to know for sure how China’s reputation will emerge from the current crisis. But it is far from certain that attempts by the US and its allies to pinpoint China for its advance knowledge of the invasion or subsequent support for Russia will gain traction outside the West – for example, in key regions such as south-east Asia,” Patton writes.
“Russia’s invasion has consumed Washington’s focus for months, raising fresh questions about US commitment to Asia. Yet here too, Australia is contending with more continuity than change.”
According to the analyst, the US pivot to Asia was “doubtful before this crisis”, with the onus still on Australia to “embed the US in Asia” through bilateral relations and other regional frameworks.
Patton goes to cast doubt over Europe and the Quad’s capacity to derail China’s bold plan for Asia.
“European countries were never going to play a decisive role in balancing China in Asia; their renewed focus on security at home merely brings this into relief,” she adds.
“The Quad, too, has come in for scrutiny, given that New Delhi’s approach to Russia diverges sharply from that of the other three members, leading India to be described unhelpfully by President Joe Biden as ‘somewhat shaky’.
“Yet the Quad is knit together by interests in Asia, not global values. Its ability to issue strong statements on events in Europe should not alter our judgments about its capacity to present a credible alternative vision for the Indo-Pacific.”
Patton concludes it’s “too soon to tell” how Europe, Russia, China and the US will emerge from the Russia-Ukraine crisis.
“Australia will need to navigate great turbulence in international affairs. But even in turbulent times, some things are constant, and Australia should not lose sight of them,” she writes.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Charbel Kadib
News Editor – Defence and Security, Momentum Media
Prior to joining the defence and aerospace team in 2020, Charbel was news editor of The Adviser and Mortgage Business, where he covered developments in the banking and financial services sector for three years. Charbel has a keen interest in geopolitics and international relations, graduating from the University of Notre Dame with a double major in politics and journalism. Charbel has also completed internships with The Australian Department of Communications and the Arts and public relations agency Fifty Acres.
