Indo-Pacific needs to prepare for further instability: CSBA experts

Australia as both a continent and a nation is unique in its position, enjoying relative geographic isolation from the flash points of global and regional conflagration of the 20th century. 

Blessed with unrivalled resource wealth and industrial potential, the nation has been able to embrace vastly different approaches to the nation’s strategic role and responsibilities.

However, the growing conventional and hybrid capabilities of peer and near-peer competitors – namely Russia and China – combined with the growing modernisation, capability enhancements and reorganisation of force structures in the armies of nations, including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, all contribute to the changing nature of contemporary warfare.

This perfect storm of factors, swirling like a maelstrom across Australia’s northern borders, has largely gone unnoticed by the Australian public, beyond the odd port visit by American or, as recently happened, Chinese naval vessels that seem to cause momentary flurries of concern.

Australia’s strategic and political leaders appear to be caught in an increasingly dangerous paradigm of thinking, one of continuing US-led dominance and Australia maintaining its position as a supplementary power.

Prior to establishing a new paradigm and priorities, it is critical to understand the nation’s history of strategic policy making and the key priorities that have defined Australia's position in the Indo-Pacific since federation – traditionally, Australia’s strategic and defence planning has been intrinsically defined and impacted by a number of different yet interconnected and increasingly complex factors, namely:

• Guaranteeing the enduring benevolence and continuing stability of its primary strategic partner – via continued support of their strategic ambitions;
• The geographic isolation of the continent, highlighted by the 'tyranny of distance';
• A relatively small population in comparison with its neighbours; and
• Increasingly, the geopolitical, economic and strategic ambition and capabilities of Australia’s Indo-Pacific Asian neighbours.

This state of 'strategic dependence' has placed Australia at a disadvantage and entrenched a belief that the nation is both incapable of greater independent tactical and strategic action and must consistently support the designs and ambitions of great powers, with little concern for the broader impact on Australia and its national interests as a form of insurance.  

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Australia is not alone in facing down the barrel of increased Chinese aggression and attempted economic, political and strategic coercion as the rising superpower leverages the opportunities provided by the impact of COVID-19 to flex its muscle and expand its interests throughout the Indo-Pacific. 

These ambitions have brought Beijing into direct confrontation with a range of powers throughout the region, including India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, directly threatening Taiwan and risking the intervention of the US.

However, while many nations, including Australia, continue to be concerned about Beijing's increased adventurism and seeming willingness to coerce and intimidate, some strategic policy experts have raised important questions about whether China is as robust as it seems.  

In light of these factors, the Washington-based Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), drawing on expert research from the likes of Ross Babbage, Jack Bianchi, Julian Snelder, Toshi Yoshihara, Aaron Friedberg and Nadege Rolland, has released an in-depth report, titled Which Way the Dragon? Sharpening Allied Perceptions of China's Strategic Trajectory. 

In highlighting this, the CSBA report establishes a confronting reality for Australia, the US and key regional nations as they struggle to adapt to this new geo-strategic, economic and political reality, stating: 

"This report argues that China’s future trajectory and that of the broader Indo-Pacific region are inherently unstable. There is a strong possibility, maybe a probability, of major changes in the strategic landscape by 2035. In the face of these great uncertainties, the strategic assessment and capability development systems the United States and its allies have inherited from the twentieth century are inadequate."

A house of cards built on pillars of sand?

The climate of disruption across the spectrum of contemporary power relations in the Indo-Pacific, which have been further exacerbated by the impact of COVID-19, serves as the principle focus for CSBA, which recognises that China in particular is not invulnerable, despite the widely held belief that China's rise to superpower status is all but guaranteed. 

The CSBA expands on this position, highlighting the apparent fragility of Beijing, the potential for increased instability and disruption, which could in turn make the rising power increasingly unpredictable and dangerous. 

"The rapid pace of change in the Indo-Pacific is bringing significant developments almost every month and sometimes more often. In the health area alone, 2019 saw China struggling to deal with a massive outbreak of swine flu fever. In 2020, the coronavirus brought most of the country to a halt. The prospects of further natural disasters, economic disruptions, military reverses and significant political shifts cannot be ruled out but the specifics are also impossible to predict.

"In this fast-moving environment, expert reviews published every few years as national defence strategies, defence white papers and national defence guidelines are rarely useful in providing more than short-term insights."

However, for each of the aforementioned experts, the response of Indo-Pacific allies seeking to counter the increased belligerence of Beijing need to fully understand and account for the future trajectory of China as it grapples with domestic and international challenges, namely: 

"A key conclusion of these expert contributions is that the geographic and demographic features of China 15-20 years hence are relatively easy to discern. However, many other factors are much more dynamic and could shift in multiple directions in the period ahead. These important but very uncertain variables include: 

1. The power, performance, and durability of the Chinese Communist Party regime;
2. The economic, technological, and corporate progress of the country;
3. The extent to which the regime employs the country’s modernised military aggressively beyond China’s borders;
4. The level of international cooperation or resistance that confronts China;
5. Whether the Chinese regime will seek to rally the country by adopting highly nationalistic rhetoric and international stances; and
6. The extent to which the Chinese regime moves to expand its international political, economic and military footprint in key parts of the Indo-Pacific region and beyond." 

Each of these factors present significant challenge, and equal opportunity for the US-led alliance to respond to these challenges, as well as manoeuvring to de-escalate the potential for conflict through unified, considered and targeted managing of any potential instability and subsequent lashing out by Beijing in the region. 

Adapt and overcome 

In response to these potential realities, CSBA identifies a number of primary recommendations that identify and outline a number of responses for the US-led alliance to maintain regional stability and peace, namely: 

1. The Western allies should give greater consideration to the prospect that China will depart from its current trajectory in coming years. The potential implications of these anticipated shifts in one or more domains could have profound strategic consequences. The allies should strive to develop a deeper understanding of potential changes and consider those they wish to encourage and those they wish to thwart;
2. In order to deal with the multi-disciplinary challenges that are likely to be posed by the Chinese regime in coming decades, the Western allies and their security partners should critically review their current systems for strategic assessment, developing strategy and for planning and managing rapidly-paced operations across multiple agencies and non-government entities;
3. Allied defence and security organisations should avoid the use of single-scenario analyses when considering major defence investments for future operations in the Indo-Pacific theatre;
4. Allied defence organisations should trial a process of scenario development and continuous lead indicator tracking. This should provide clear guidance on the region’s security trajectory, permit early consideration of alternative strategy, operational concept, and capability mixes and facilitate timely decision-making;
5. The Western allies and their partners should consult more extensively on the challenges posed by the Chinese Communist regime and the most appropriate strategies and operational plans to deter and, if necessary, confront Beijing. Current mechanisms for consultation, co-ordinated planning, and combined action may sub-optimal for the current situation and warrant careful review;
6. There would be value in using competitive analytical processes to identify one or more strategic or operational concepts that could ‘change the game’ in the Indo-Pacific in the same way that the assault breaker and follow-on forces attack concepts changed the deterrence and defensive balance in Europe in the 1980s; and
7. The US and its allies should consider the potential impact of the reforms proposed in this report to strengthen Western resilience and endurance, particularly in the event of an extended period of tension or conflict.

In light of the constantly evolving reality changing the face of the Indo-Pacific, is the $270 billion recently announced by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister enough as Australia seeks to navigate a period of growing geo-political, economic, political and strategic competition?

Your thoughts

Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically.

Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.

However, as events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

Further complicating the nation’s calculations is the declining diversity of the national economy, the ever present challenge of climate change impacting droughts, bushfires and floods, Australia’s energy security and the infrastructure needed to ensure national resilience. 

Let us know your thoughts and ideas about the development of a holistic national security strategy and the role of a minister for national security to co-ordinate the nation’s response to mounting pressure from nation-state and asymmetric challenges in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..