Annual Japanese defence white paper reveals continued focus on Indo-Pacific

Japan has closely followed the modernisation of the Chinese armed forces and raised concerns about the nation’s defence capabilities. The pre-war power has long sought to shake off the chains of the pacifist constitution enforced upon it by the US, UK, Australia and other allies following the end of the war in the Pacific.

However, Japan's geo-strategic realities have rapidly evolved since the end of the Cold War, when the US could effectively guarantee the security of the island nation.  

Growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and modernisation efforts resulting in the fielding of key power projection capabilities, including aircraft carriers and supporting strike groups, fifth-generation combat aircraft, modernised land forces, area-access denial and strategic nuclear forces, combined with growing political and financial influence throughout the region is serving to shake Japan's confidence. 

In response, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has repeatedly earmarked increased funding for the nation's defence budget, expanding the capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to operate independently of direct US support – establishing the nation as an emerging great power with traditional great power style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capabilities. 

Accordingly, the latest incarnation of the annual defence white paper (DWP) process, 'Defense of Japan 2020', has built on the success of the 2019 Defense White Paper to include a range of assessments of the geo-strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific, Japan's place in the world and critically, the nation's capability development and acquisition plans in response. 

Alliances and the changing geo-strategic environment

Strategic partnerships and alliances form the basis of Japan's post-war international engagement. Particularly the relationship with the US, but increasingly, regional powers like Australia and India are playing larger roles in the nation's strategic calculus. 

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Recognising these factors, the DWP states the continued importance the US plays in Japans planning and the its response to the broader evolution of the Indo-Pacific region's geo-strategic paradigm: "The United States recognises strategic competition with revisionist powers, namely China and Russia, as the central challenge to US security.

"Especially, the United States ranks China at the top of its list of priorities and places the greatest emphasis on the security of the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen deterrence against China.

"Under the recognition that nuclear capabilities of North Korea, classified as 'rogue regimes' in its strategic documents, constitute an extraordinary threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues to pursue de-nuclearisation of North Korea, while maintaining strong military readiness of the US forces including US Forces Korea.

"The United States prioritises the allocation of military forces to the Indo-Pacific region and Europe while reducing forces in the Middle East and Africa. The United States, however, still needs to deal with security issues in the latter regions, which makes it difficult to describe that such transition of the US force posture is smoothly progressing."

Regional alliances are central to Japan's strategic security and stability and provide additional support and capability aggregation among the allies as the US continues to rebalance its forces around the world. 

Accordingly, the Japanese DWP identifies: "The Indo-Pacific region is the core of the world’s vitality, supporting more than half the world’s population. It is important to establish this region as a free and open global commons to secure peace and prosperity in the region as a whole.

"In order to promote a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific', the MOD/SDF will strengthen defence co-operation and exchanges with countries in the region."

Supporting this, the Japanese white paper expands its focus on enhancing relationships with regional and global security partners, including Australia, India, the ASEAN nations, South Korea, the European Union, Canada and New Zealand. 

The Australia-Japan relationship is the nation's closest and most mature in Asia and is underpinned by the strategic, economic, political and legal interests of both countries. The countries work closely in strategic alliance with the US, and lead in critical regional partnerships with countries such as India and the Republic of Korea.

Enhancing capabilities 

The rate of technological evolution has reshaped the field of warfare and the weapons and platforms that will be used. Japan's proximity to China and developments in the ballistic missile, force projection, cyber capability and anti-space domains has prompted a growing response from Japan across a number of domains.  

In particular, the Japanese 2020 DWP focuses on developing the capacity of the nation to respond to "inter-state competition" with key focal points of capability developments, including: 

• Continued development of the future Japanese F-X fighter aircraft, improving the technological reliability and reducing development costs, leveraging Japanese led development and international cooperation;
• Extensive investment in the Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) particularly in the surface fleet, including reinforced destroyer units with a new class of destroyers, minesweeper units and new patrol ships supporting "steady-state ISR" in Japan's territorial waters;
• The Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and mobile operating units equipped with specialised functions. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including persistent steady-state manoeuvres;
• To be able to counter an invasion of remote islands, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defence;
• The JSDF will also establish new units in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, strengthen its posture, build comprehensive air and missile defence capability, and maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit; and
• The Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) will maintain ground-based warning and control units capable of conducting sustained surveillance in the airspace around Japan, and air warning and control units capable of conducting airborne warning, surveillance and control also during situations with heightened tensions, such as “gray-zone” situations – including fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft, and aerial refueling and transport units.

Your thoughts

The rapidly developing qualitative and quantitative capabilities of regional surface warship and submarine fleets, namely by Russia and China – combined with the increasing proliferation of surface vessels and submarines designed and built by the aforementioned nations by emerging peer competitors – serves to stretch the tactical and strategic capabilities of the RAN.

Additionally, the increasing proliferation of advanced anti-ship ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, combined with the growing prominence of naval aviation – again led by China but also pursued by Japan and India – is serving to raise questions about the size and the specialised area-air defence, ballistic missile defence, power projection and sea control capabilities of the RAN.

Australia is defined by its relationship and access to the ocean, with strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.

Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.

The Indian Ocean and its critical global sea lines of communication are responsible for more than 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade in critical energy supplies, namely, oil and natural gas, which serve as the lifeblood of any advanced economy.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. 

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch with This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..