Is ‘democracy at all costs’ hindering Biden’s strategic efforts?

No matter where one looks, it would appear as though the democratic world is besieged at best, or in retreat at worst. At home, we face the challenges of increasingly polarised populations, abroad, we face the growing question of the multipolar world and the impact of a competitive world.

On the global stage, this confluence of domestic challenges is exacerbated by the increasingly subversive and predatory behaviours of global totalitarian leaders eager to supplant the United States, and more broadly, the West.

These leaders are seemingly circling the declining democratic world the way wolves circle wounded prey before striking the killing blow and are taking great pride in their designs for global domination and the undermining of institutional legitimacy, economic and political stability, and social cohesiveness.

Many a pundit will cite the US-led response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that there is hope yet for the post-Second World War order that Australia has invested heavily in and in some ways, they’re correct — the rallying behind Ukraine has revealed a glimmer of hope for the democratic world.

However, for some, like Professor Walter Russell Mead, the James Clarke Chace Professor for Foreign Affairs at Bard College, the West’s myopic view of furthering the unrelenting expansion of democratic values, spearheaded by US President Joe Biden may, in fact, be causing trouble as the US seeks to maintain global stability in an increasingly multipolar world.

In a piece for The Wall Street Journal, titled, “The Cost of Biden’s ‘Democracy’ fixation”, Professor Mead presents a unique and thought-provoking thesis behind what is broadly a contentious statement to make in the modern world.

“From his 2021 address through the Munich Security Conference to last week’s Summit for Democracy, President Biden has been clear. He wants to frame world politics as a contest between liberal democracy and autocracy. That’s unfortunate. While not completely misguided, this approach hampers America’s diplomacy overseas and further erodes the weak consensus at home behind a strong American foreign policy around the world," Professor Mead states.

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Invoking the titans of the past

Despite your political persuasion, there can be little doubt that President Biden’s foreign policy legacy has largely been a failure. Whether correct or not, his failure to deter the Russian invasion of Ukraine echoes the failures of his predecessor Barack Obama both in Ukraine and in the Middle East, while his disastrous evacuation of Afghanistan has echoes of Gerald Ford’s equally chaotic evacuation of Vietnam in 1975.

These foreign policy blunders have been further hindered by domestic disasters, frequent gaffes, and odd televised moments of the President's childlike fixation on chocolate chip ice cream during times of national mourning which have raised questions about the position and capacity of the United States if the vibrancy of the nation is reflected in the commander-in-chief.

Nevertheless, President Biden has sought to position himself and his administration in the vein of some of America’s foreign policy titans of the past, as Professor Mead explains, “Mr Biden is invoking an old American tradition here. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D Roosevelt framed the world wars as conflicts between democracy and dictatorship. And from Harry S Truman to Ronald Reagan, America’s Cold War presidents used similar language.”

In doing so, President Biden seeks to add further heft to his administration’s foreign policy agenda in the face of mounting antagonism, aggression and open coercion from the likes of China’s President Xi and Russia’s President Putin, something Professor Mead warns against, stating, “Mr Biden isn’t all wrong. If the US and its allies lose the contest, and people like Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and their hangers-on in countries like North Korea and Nicaragua get to determine the world’s future, democracy isn’t going to flourish.”

This point is particularly important as the United States and countries like Australia face down increasing grey zone tactics which seek to subvert and undermine the principles, values, and the central commandments of the social contract that the last century’s worth of social cohesion, economic prosperity, and stability have been largely built on, the same central commandments which imbue democracy with the legitimacy of the concept of “by the people, for the people”.

Not everyone views democracy the same

Despite the challenges arrayed against the United States and allies like Australia, it is critical to understand that our modern conceptualisation of liberal democracy isn’t a universal concept, particularly in parts of the developing world. This is only becoming more noticeable as a suite of niche social issues undermine the social cohesion of society and culture across the West.

One area this is particularly noticeable is where fringe social issues in West have become part and parcel of foreign and strategic policy that is now exported around the world, often coming into direct confrontation with traditional cultures, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, South America, and parts of the Indo-Pacific.

Professor Mead believes this emphasis on social issues as part of a democratic lens represents a major flaw in President Biden’s foreign policy, stating, “Nevertheless, the president and his team need to think again. Defining the current contest as one between democracies and autocracies is a flawed strategy. Abroad, this approach weakens America’s ties with key allies and exposes us to devastating charges of systemic hypocrisy.

“At home and abroad, the widespread unpopularity of the expanded version of democracy Mr Biden expounds — including controversial stands on issues like trans rights — is too polarising and divisive to support the long-term consensus American foreign policy needs for success.”

This emphasis on contentious social issues often brings the US into direct conflict with nations it seeks to court to counter the authoritarian march of Beijing and Moscow, presenting major challenges not just for the United States, but equally for countries like Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and many European nations which struggle to balance their own domestic policies for the broader strategic chess match.

“If the US is serious about an Indo-Pacific strategy, it is going to have to assemble and cultivate a coalition of countries that are anything but liberal and democratic ... if we want any kind of Southeast Asian strategy at all, we will have to work with countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, all of which count as ‘not free’ on the Freedom House scale. And without as many ‘partly free’ countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Nepal, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka as we can bring into our network, we have zero chance of holding the balance against China,” Professor Mead explains, placing a number of these nations directly in Australia’s sphere of influence, and thus, the responsibility to woo them over in our realm as well.

Expanding the emphasis to beyond the immediate Indo-Pacific, to the realms of Central Asia and Africa, we see the US approach facing similar challenges to those in the Indo-Pacific, with Professor Mead explaining, “It goes further. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan all rate as ‘not free.’ Do we write off this part of the world? If we want to keep Middle East oil producers from aligning with our enemies, we need to work with some very undemocratic governments. And if we want to counter China in Africa, there are very imperfect governments in Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sudan that we can’t afford to ignore.”

This, it is believed by Professor Mead, will present significant challenges in the years and decades ahead, “To alienate these countries through vacuous posturing about our sincerity as human-rights crusaders would be stupid. To spurn their aid because we dislike their human-rights and democracy policies would be suicidal.”

A divided house cannot stand

As previously mentioned, the increasing grey zone tactics which have served to erode and undermine much of the social cohesion in the United States, and to a lesser extent, across the Western world, is serving to rapidly deteriorate the levels of trust amid the domestic population, presents significant challenges to the strategic response from the US and its allies.

Nevertheless, Professor Mead believes that the threat posed by Beijing, in particular, presents a significant enough threat to begin reuniting the disparate and divided communities in the United States, but, more broadly the West, where he states, “At home, it is easier to show people that China under its current policies poses a direct threat to American security and prosperity than it is to energise people for a democracy crusade in East Asia. Worse, by conflating its international fight for liberal democracy with its internal struggle against the populist GOP, the Biden administration is undercutting the domestic foreign-policy consensus it seeks to build.”

This domestic ideological battle which is, to a far lesser extent, taking place in pockets across the West is as equally corrosive domestically, as it is abroad, something that despite the media hysteria would have you believe, particularly when it is spelled out, something Professor Mead explains, “most Republicans don’t want to build a ‘democracy’ at home that guarantees extreme versions of transgender ideology and abortion on demand through the ninth month of pregnancy. They certainly won’t want to help the Biden administration build such a democracy overseas. The more Mr Biden beats this drum, the more isolationist Republican opinion is likely to become.”

In order to avoid further reluctance, hesitation and downright resistance to US and Western diplomatic efforts to build, at least, a semi-democratic network committed to maintaining the post-Second World War order of economic, political and strategic stability, our approach needs to become less ideological.

Professor Mead explains, “To win support at home and abroad, American foreign policy needs to become less ideological. Common perceptions of common threats will do more to build the kind of international and domestic coalition that American foreign policy needs than democracy-vamping speeches from the bully pulpit.”

We need to be pragmatic

If we’re going to reclaim the initiative on the global stage, this shift away from ideology needs to be emulated across the Western alliance network for without coherence and consistency, there will remain chinks in the armour.

Failing to do so glosses over the very real concerns many established and emerging nations have about the rise of Beijing and the resurgence of a contrarian, multipolar world that is committed to undermining and supplanting the post-Second World War order many have to thank for their own economic, political and strategic security and prosperity.

Professor Mead details this, “Many countries share America’s concerns about Chinese, Russian and Iranian expansionism. China’s abuse of the World Trade Organization harms the whole world. The American-led global system that Russia and China want to break brought many countries unprecedented prosperity and security. These arguments carry more weight than abstract democracy talking points, even in Europe. Concerns about the Uyghurs did less to change German thinking about China than worries about China’s economic designs on the German automobile and capital-goods industries.”

Viewing the world as we wish it to be, rather than as it is, leaves us precariously exposed in an increasingly dangerous world, something all the best intentions in the world cannot fix. The events of the past five years have demonstrated this more effectively than any strategic thinker or policymaker could have imagined and requires a realist response.

Something, Professor Mead articulates, outlining a particular poignant reminder for policymakers in both the US and at home here in Australia, “Mr Biden should remember that his global coalition is held together more by common interests and common sense than by common values. And he should never underestimate the domestic and the international cost of overhyped, underthought democracy rhetoric.”

Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning

There is no doubt that Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically in the face of rising regional and global competition.

Despite our nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.

While contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.

Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia, this is particularly well explained by Peter Zeihan, who explains:

“A deglobalised world doesn’t simply have a different economic geography, it has thousands of different and separate geographies. Economically speaking, the whole was stronger for the inclusion of all its parts. It is where we have gotten our wealth and pace of improvement and speed. Now the parts will be weaker for their separation.”

As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?

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