No stranger to controversy, US President Donald Trump set a cat among the pigeons with statements about the development of an upgraded F-35, a dual-engine variant, the F-55 and a “Raptor Super”. In light of recent adversarial developments, is he on to something with that last one?
The development of the F‑22 Raptor represents a watershed in modern air superiority, marrying stealth, supercruise capability and sensor fusion in a single platform.
Born out of the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) competition of the 1980s, the program sought to counter ever more sophisticated Soviet fighters and the increasing proliferation of integrated air defence networks that has only accelerated in the past couple of decades.
Through rigorous wind‑tunnel testing, materials research and digital design tools seldom seen at that time, the Raptor emerged as the first operational fifth‑generation fighter. Blending a low‑observable airframe, thrust‑vectoring engines and integrated avionics delivered unmatched agility, survivability and situational awareness, attributes that would define air dominance for decades to come.
Yet the F‑22’s path was not without hard‑won lessons. Its prodigious development cost and demanding maintenance requirements highlighted the need for more sustainable life cycle management, meanwhile complex proprietary software baselines underlined the importance of modular, open system architectures.
Moreover, the Raptor’s seemingly singular emphasis on air‑to‑air engagement (which has been increasingly dispelled) and its relatively small production run revealed the value of designing a family of systems capable of distributed lethality across multiple domains, eventually giving rise to the F-35 Lightning II as a “cheaper”, more “flexible” alternative.
Fast forward a number of decades and the United States, in response to the small number of Raptors in service – coupled with the development of advanced adversarial aircraft in Russia’s Su‑57 Felon and China’s J‑20 Mighty Dragon and the J-35 – have called into question the enduring air dominance capability of the US and its allies.
This has prompted the US Air Force to begin development of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), now F-47 program, which envisions a “system of systems” approach: pairing a manned crew module with attritable unmanned wingmen, linked by resilient data networks and powered by next‑generation propulsion.
The NGAD program also provides emphasis on digital engineering promises to compress design cycles and facilitate rapid upgrades, while open mission systems allow for plug‑and‑play enhancements as threats evolve. Additionally, software‑defined radios, artificial intelligence‑driven decision aids and collaborative tactics mark a shift towards network‑centric operations that extend well beyond the cockpit.
Meanwhile the development of enhanced surface‑to‑air missile systems, long‑range anti‑ship ballistic missiles and integrated air defence networks add layers of complexity to future battlefields. These capabilities will be further enhanced by the proliferation of unmanned combat air vehicles and sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities that are emerging to reshape the character of aerial combat, demanding ever more adaptable platforms and tactics.
Bringing me conveniently to comments from two separate individuals. The first is the firebrand US President Donald Trump, who, during a trip to the Middle East, announced to the shock of aeronautical engineers, strategic and defence analysis when he announced, “I think the most beautiful fighter jet in the world is the F-22 but we’re going to do an F-22 Super and it’ll be a very modern version of the F-22 fighter jet. We’re going to be going with it pretty quickly.”
The second comment comes from Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet, who, during a recent earnings call, elaborated on the company’s plans to leverage critical technologies developed for the company’s unsuccessful bid for the NGAD program to enhance the capability of fifth-generation aircraft like the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II.
Taiclet said during the call, “Our next-generation air dominance efforts advance many classified technologies that were aligned to this strategy and we plan on applying those technologies to our current systems, making our already proven products even more relevant to the future as well as enhancing the capabilities we provide in ongoing and future development.”
The most interesting part comes where Taiclet said, “the knowledge and technology development gained from our investments in the NGAD competition strengthened our conviction to enhance the F-35 to a fifth-generation-plus capability ... I challenged the team to deliver 80 per cent of sixth-gen capability at 50 per cent of the cost”.
And herein lies an interesting proposition for the US, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan and other “trusted” American allies eager to maximise the capability of their respective air forces, while balancing costs.
80 per cent of the capability, for half the price
Given the initial production of the F-47 NGAD program is still conservatively a decade away, the development of a Super Raptor would provide an interim “fifth-gen+” capability while NGAD matures, while also leveraging technologies developed as part of the NGAD to be implemented into a proven platform.
Drawing on the experience and precedent established by the US Navy’s Super Hornet which wasn’t just a traditional “upgrade”, rather it resulted in a new “airframe” that was approximately 35 per cent larger and a 25 per cent more capable airframe, with enhanced avionics, survivability and endurance. Accordingly, a Super Raptor proposal should involve at a minimum:
- Airframe redesign using new materials.
- Engine upgrades for range/supercruise.
- Expanded avionics and sensor fusion.
- Reduced radar cross-section and improved stealth coatings.
- Increased ease of maintenance and mission readiness.
Here is where technologies developed for NGAD, the B-21 Raider and experiences and technology developed for the F-35 Lightning II will come into play, including the integration of artificial intelligence, updated avionics, radar-absorbing materials, avionics and sensor fusion technologies, proven F-35-based logistics technologies, policies and procedures to deliver a “new” but “proven” platform.
Additional technology areas include the integration of full open mission systems architecture (like F-35 Block 4), advanced sensor fusion, AI-assisted targeting and electronic warfare, Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS)-like 360-degree threat tracking and NGAD-derived AI copilot/core processor technologies.
Leveraging these technologies and experiences also serves to further de-risk and accelerate the development cycle of a “Super Raptor” in line with President Trump’s stated ambition about moving forward with such a proposal “pretty quickly”.
Importantly, it also fits with the ambitions outlined by Taiclet who explained that “the knowledge and technology development gained from our investments in the NGAD competition strengthened our conviction to enhance the F-35 to a fifth generation plus capability”.
“We’ve aligned these technology investments with our customer priorities and demonstrating meaningful increases in capabilities at relatively low cost. We’ve already shown the networking and teaming ability of the F-35 and the F-22 to control uncrewed vehicle systems like drone wingmen through onboard deployments of our autonomy solutions on real aircraft,” Taiclet added.
Bringing us to the development and production timelines, costs and opportunities for allies like Australia and Japan to engage with and support the US push, while also benefiting by the fielding of an interoperable and interchangeable air dominance platform with a sizeable mass.
Kick the tyres, light the fires
If we are to take President Trump at his word to move on the development of the “Super Raptor” quickly, just how quickly could a “new” platform be developed?
Given the experience of the Super Hornet, coupled with the use of advanced digital design technologies, the concept refinement and risk reduction phase (including system design, digital twin set-up, industry studies, formal DOD program of record) could begin immediately to be completed next year, to be followed by preliminary design review (locking in requirements, interface standards, airframe upgrade architecture) for late 2026 and the critical design review (to finalise the production drawings, full mission system architecture validated) between 2027 and 2028.
Shifting to the prototyping phase, the construction of 4–6 prototypes to be constructed with flight tests and begin the integration of sensors, engines and stealth materials between 2028 and 2030, this would precede the low rate initial production phase from 2030 to 2032 (which would see the construction of 2–3 squadrons to support training and initial operating capability evaluation).
From 2033, the Super Raptor would then move to the initial operating capability (IOC) phase for the US Air Force from the 2032–33 time frame, leveraging the joint training model established for the rollout of the F-35 Lightning II to ensure the seamless introduction of the “Super Raptor” into Australian and Japanese service.
Finally, full operating capability (FOC) could be delivered for the US Air Force by 2035, with Australian and Japanese IOC to be achieved by 2035 and FOC by the late 2030s, delivering an advanced air combat capability in 8–10 years from start to full-rate production.
Bringing us to the costs associated with the research and development, production uplift, production phase and then acquisition costs for the aircraft. For frame of reference, the US Air Force has an estimated development cost for the NGAD/F-47 program earmarked at approximately US$30 billion (AU$46.5 billion).
Based on original research and development costs for the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II aircraft, we can broadly extrapolate figures for the development of the “Super Raptor” could be broken down to airframe redesign, stealth, structure (US$5 billion), NGAD/F-35 tech integration – EW, AI, cockpit, OMS – (US$3.5 billion), software – sensor fusion, AI combat systems – (US$2.5 billion) and prototypes, test airframes, digital twin (US$2.5 billion) for a total development cost of approximately US$13.5 billion (AU$20.95 billion).
At least on development costs, we’re getting close to hitting that 80 per cent of the capability for 50 per cent of the price targeted by Taiclet.
Now this brings us to the procurement costs. It would be economically, tactically and strategically unsound to repeat the mistake of procuring a small number of airframes simply to replace the existing Raptor fleet and supplement the planned fleet of 104 (at this stage) F-15EX currently being fielded by the US Air Force.
Rather it should be a case of the US Air Force procuring, at a minimum, 250 airframes to replace the existing Raptor fleet, while also providing for requisite redundancy, spares, training and deployable squadrons outside of the Indo-Pacific should they be required.
Here is where Australia and Japan (as the initial export operators) would come into play. Both nations are at a cross-roads requiring a significant uplift in their air combat capabilities in order to keep pace with peer and near-peer rivals in the region (namely the People’s Republic of China) while benefiting from economies of scale.
Accordingly, Japan would be required to procure 150 airframes (100 less than their existing, ageing F-15J fleet) while Australia would be required to procure 100 airframes, which would bring the per airframe cost for all three partners down to approximately US$155 million (AU$240.5 million) in current FY2025–26 dollars.
Thus we have achieved Taiclet’s “80 per cent of sixth-gen capability at 50 per cent of the cost” target, ensuring that Australia, Japan and the United States have an aggregated capability that has the modularity and flexibility to remain current well into the future, while also providing these nations with a critical “interim” airframe and bedrock for building up to the rollout and export of the NGAD/F-47.
Final thoughts
The Super Raptor program represents a transformative evolution of the F-22, blending next-generation technologies from the NGAD and F-35 platforms into a proven airframe.
Designed for rapid development and high-end air dominance, it integrates adaptive engines, advanced sensor fusion, AI-assisted systems, and next-gen electronic warfare in a stealth-optimised package.
For Australia, Japan, and the United States, the Super Raptor offers a quantum leap in range, survivability and lethality essential for operations across the Indo-Pacific’s vast expanse and against peer, or near-peer competitors. Its interoperability with F-35 fleets ensures seamless coalition warfare, while its manned-unmanned teaming capabilities support loyal wingmen and future autonomous systems.
By leveraging existing technology, the Super Raptor significantly reduces risk and cost compared to clean-sheet designs, enabling early fielding before NGAD matures. For future partners, it provides a stepping stone towards sixth-generation integration, ensuring shared development pathways, training standards and logistics.
Ultimately, the Super Raptor strengthens allied airpower, enhances deterrence in a contested region and acts as a vital force multiplier, while de-risking and accelerating the transition to NGAD-era capabilities across trusted partners.
Finally, it is important to understand that all of this remains purely academic and well and truly in the ether, nevertheless, it is fruit for thought.
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Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.