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Many commentators have long debated Australia's capacity to defend itself independently, with arguments both in the pro and con columns. But for too long, the Australian impulse to retreat into an "echidna strategy" is not how we achieve this, but nor is overdependence on allies and partners.
Since the end of World War II, Australia has been caught in a continuous balancing act between securing its national interests and relying on external powers for defence. This tension between security and dependence – and the pursuit of strategic independence – has been a defining feature in the evolution of Australia’s strategic policy and doctrine.
As the global geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically after 1945, Australia, like many nations, faced the challenge of reconstructing its national security framework amid the uncertainties of a bipolar world order.
The emergence of the Cold War and alignment with Western powers underscored a profound reliance on alliances, particularly the ANZUS Treaty with the United States and New Zealand, which became a cornerstone of Australian defence strategy.
At the same time, Australia was increasingly aware of the need to assert its own interests and strategic agency. Despite the comfort of a security umbrella provided by its alliances, the country’s policymakers consistently grappled with the implications of dependence on external powers whose priorities did not always align with Australia’s own national agenda.
This complex interplay has driven a persistent quest for autonomy within its strategic doctrine, compelling Australia to invest in homegrown defence capabilities and pursue a more nuanced approach to its international relationships.
Moreover, the tension has often been influenced by regional dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, where rising powers and evolving security challenges demanded an agile, responsive policy framework. Australian strategic thinking evolved to accommodate these shifts, progressively incorporating considerations of both traditional alliance commitments and emerging imperatives for independent action.
Over the decades, this dual approach has reflected an enduring belief that national security is best safeguarded not only through collective defence mechanisms but also through the cultivation of self-reliance and strategic foresight.
This introduction sets the stage for an in-depth exploration of Australia’s journey as it navigated between the imperatives of security and the quest for independent policymaking – a struggle that continues to shape its strategic posture in an ever-changing global context.
In recent decades, shifting technologies and evolving regional alliances have intensified these debates, compelling Australia to balance the benefits of its alliances with a resolute commitment to self-reliant defence.
This shift has only accelerated as the reality of Trump 2.0 has set in, both in Canberra and capitals around the well and played firmly into Australia’s long-standing insecurity and fear of abandonment by our “great and powerful friend” of the day, prompting a resurgence in the “echidna” strategy as the basis for Australia’s independent defence and strategic posture.
Leading the charge is Lowy Institute’s Sam Roggeveen in a piece titled Yes, Australia can defend itself independently in which he detailed the form and function of how such a doctrine would be implemented in the Australian context.
Regional dynamics go beyond China and need to be accounted for
First things first, it is important to understand what is meant by the term “Echidna Strategy”, which is based upon the presupposition that Australia will, at some point, be required to defend itself without American support.
This fear of abandonment has echoes of the calamity and blow to the national psyche that took hold in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Singapore in 1942 and the ensuing collapse of British imperial power in the Far East, which prompted the nation to look across the vast expanse of the Pacific to America for its security guarantee.
At its core, the “Echidna Strategy” seeks to make Australia as inoffensive, unprovocative and as small a target as possible, lest we draw the ire, discontent or hostility of other powers, even those who are largely viewed as benign today, but may as their own relative wealth, power, prestige, military capability and ambitions evolve and become more achievable.
Where the “Echidna Strategy” as Roggeveen proposes in this context comes into play is the shift in strategy and doctrine that would see Australia become, as Roggeveen said, “Australia look[s] benign and friendly to nations that mean us no harm, and spiky and indigestible to those that do.”
This means at a capability level, discarding the AUKUS submarine program and some of our other ambitious “longer-range” focused capabilities, shifting towards a capability mix that prioritises continental defence, over a crude, half-assed attempt to deliver “forward defence”, or as the government’s own 2023 Defence Strategic Review and 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program described, a “strategy of denial” that will afford Australia the capability to “unilaterally deter any adversary” without the support of a “great and powerful friend”.
Once again, the nation’s attempt to buy champagne on a beer budget is coming back to bite us.
Equally, while Roggeveen’s assessment that Australia will, at some point, be required to defend itself without American support is something that I strongly agree with. His prescription of an “Echidna Strategy” falls dangerously short, particularly as the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly contested and competitive, not just driven by China, but by other regional players.
Finally, another point I will agree with Roggeveen on, is his assessment that when Australia has had to confront “abandonment” by its “great and powerful friend”, we have handled it reasonably well, as he said, “But although Australia fears abandonment, when it actually happens, we cope with it remarkably well because we’re a sober, practical, problem-solving people. So, when I hear that Australia cannot defend itself without America, I detect not an argument about military capability or force structure, but a national timidity that is entirely at odds with what we have achieved as a nation.”
Roggeveen’s assessment, along with that of his champions, including former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, is based on a largely idealistic view of the evolving regional dynamics, devoid of the ethnic, religious and historical competition and enmity that colours all the interactions of non-Western nations across the Indo-Pacific.
This added layer of complexity necessitates that Australia not retreat into pseudo-isolationism under the guise of an “Echidna Strategy” because it is more palatable for erudite, eloquent leaders and academics have never really been in the room when the sausage is made.
Rather, it means we have to be more proactive, more assertive, but this doesn’t mean that we need to, nor should we wield military power like a trust fund brat eager to show off his unearned prowess. We require balance built on our relationships, our deep history and deft diplomatic engagement to reassure our friends and potential adversaries that we do not seek conflict, but we will act in our interests decisively.
We can’t wait for any enemy to come to us
Roggeveen’s central thesis under the “Echidna Strategy” essentially becomes a case of waiting for any adversary to come to us, with an expectation that our regional neighbours will guarantee our economic, political and strategic interests in the region. We simply need to focus on our own moat and be ready with the boiling oil for when the barbarians are at the gates.
As I have previously stated, this is based on an unrealistic and idealistic view of the world and is devoid of reality. Rather, Australia needs to be proactive, we also need to accept that irregardless of whether the United States continues to stay engaged in the Indo-Pacific or even scales back its presence, relative to Beijing’s power and indeed the growing number of great powers in the region, America’s power can only go so far.
What this means is that Australia will need to take greater responsibility for its own security, its own prosperity, its own stability and interests in this region in a way that is a fundamental departure from how we have done things for the entirety of our history – but it needs to be done and done quickly.
This requires Australia as a nation to mature, economically, politically and strategically, which translates to the development and maintenance of a more "balanced force" that allows us the capacity to sustainably assert and defend our interests in a region dominated by great powers, where competitive tension is rapidly becoming the new norm.
That means Australia needs to start looking, feeling and acting like a major player, a "regional great power" if you were, with the whole-of-nation economic, political and strategic capacity to be recognised as such, because if we don't we are doomed to fail.
Final thoughts
Australians must come to terms with a stark reality: as the world shifts towards an increasingly multipolar order, the Indo-Pacific is fast becoming the most fiercely contested region on the planet. This seismic transformation will redefine our nation’s role, influence, and security – making it imperative that we place it at the heart of our strategic focus.
At the core of this upheaval is the rise of new powers. China is flexing its economic and military might, while nations like India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam – alongside the resurging strength of South Korea and Japan – are turning our region into a crucible of competition. This is happening right on our doorstep.
For too long, our diplomatic, strategic, and economic decisions have been reactive, shaped by short-term thinking since Federation. That approach is no longer fit for purpose. We must play the long game, seizing the opportunities that are remaking the Indo-Pacific rather than merely responding to them.
The real question is: when will we see a detailed, forward-thinking strategy – one that not only maps out the challenges and opportunities ahead but also offers a clear, compelling vision for industry, policymakers and the public?
As regional tensions escalate and China’s influence grows, can Australia afford to remain a secondary player? Or must we step up – asserting a more independent and decisive role in an era of intensifying great-power rivalry?
For too long, our leaders have prioritised short-term economic gains over long-term strategic vision. That has to change. The issue isn’t whether we face challenges – the issue is when will Australia respond with clarity and conviction? When will our leaders set out a bold, coherent plan to keep us competitive and resilient?
The choices we make today will decide whether Australia thrives – or is simply swept along by the tide of history.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
