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Former Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer has urged our leaders and the public to take defence and national security more seriously as the election campaign gets underway.
Since the end of World War II, Australia’s security environment has undergone a profound transformation, adapting to a shifting geopolitical landscape that has seen the rise of new global powers and complex regional challenges.
In the post-war era, the nation forged a robust alliance with the US, bolstering its defence through collective security arrangements and a commitment to a rules-based international order. These measures were designed to deter aggression and safeguard national interests during a period marked by the tensions of the Cold War.
Over the decades, Australia’s strategic outlook has evolved significantly. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of economic powerhouses in the Asia-Pacific have reshaped the region’s security dynamics.
Increasing interdependence among nations, combined with rapid technological advancements, has brought both opportunities and new vulnerabilities. This transformation necessitated re-evaluation of national defence strategies, as Australia sought to balance traditional alliances with the need for enhanced regional engagement and multilateral cooperation.
In recent years, Beijing’s growing influence in global affairs has introduced a fresh set of challenges for Australia. The People’s Republic of China has steadily increased its economic and military clout, employing a range of coercive tactics to further its interests. These efforts have included economic leverage, strategic investments, and even political interference aimed at swaying policy decisions.
For Australia, such attempts to coerce and intimidate have not only raised concerns about national sovereignty but have also prompted a broader debate on the balance between economic engagement and security imperatives.
This evolving security environment compels Australia to continuously reassess its strategic partnerships, defence capabilities, and diplomatic strategies. As the country navigates this intricate web of challenges and opportunities, it remains committed to upholding its core values, ensuring a stable and secure future for all Australians.
Now, former Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer has launched an impassioned plea for Australia's leaders and the Australian public to begin taking defence and national security more seriously, in a piece for The Weekend Australian titled 'Windmills and solar panels won’t help defend Australia'.
Time to get real
Downer begins his plea with a particularly timely opening salvo: "Australians should take very seriously our inadequate response to a Chinese naval taskforce and research vessel circumnavigating the Australian coast. China is, of course, making a very strident point. That it has force projection capability into our own neighbourhood, and that is a warning to us. Should we decide to trigger our alliance relationship with the United States in the event of conflict with China watch out!"
This comes on the back of recent and continued Chinese efforts to intimidate, coerce and influence the Australian public and Australia's leadership through recent circumnavigation and live fire exercises off the coast of Australia and the looming spectre of global economic warfare and the potential spectre of kinetic conflict all adding to the further fear, uncertainty and doubt playing out in the subconscious of Australians.
Against this backdrop, we have the ongoing, but still infant, election campaign that does add further fear, uncertainty and doubt building in the public consciousness in light of recent events, coupled with the to date lacklustre approach by both sides to date.
Downer says: "The fact that we have shown hesitancy and technical inadequacy in responding to this challenge should be a dire warning to our candidates in this election campaign. They should be taking seriously their primary responsibility to defend the nation and its interests. It’s too easy for the political class to think that our defence force would never be called on except to assist with natural disasters in the Pacific or Southeast Asia."
Adding to this this confluence of challenges, Downer poses an important question that needs to be considered by both sides of Australian politics as we plow further into the election campaign, particularly given Beijing's growing antagonism toward the island democracy of Taiwan and the truly global impact that could stem as a result of any kinetic conflagration over the nation.
Yet what would Australia do if China imposed a blockade on Taiwan and the US Navy went to the support of Taiwan endeavouring to break the blockade? This, after all, is a real-life scenario: it could happen. It has been assumed by policy planners and commentators that if the United States went to the aid of Taiwan, Japan would automatically support the United States. That is a fair assumption. But in this difficult scenario, what would the Australian parliament and government want to do?"
These questions come at a time when the glaring and mounting capability gaps across the ADF are increasingly evident to even the most disengaged and uninterested Australian, with the spotlight only growing in recent weeks, as both sides of Australia's political ecosystem continue to sling mud over the respective, systematic and long-term failures.
"The trouble with the more moderate and freedom-loving political class in Australia is that it has made a very poor effort at building up our defence force over the last 15 or so years. Back in 2009, the Rudd government produced a defence white paper and committed to buying Tomahawk cruise missiles, investing in ballistic missile defence systems and replacing not just our Anzac-class frigates and the Collins-class submarines but, importantly, our ageing fleet of minesweepers.
"Plenty more was promised in that white paper, some of which has materialised and much of which has not. We are nowhere near replacing our Collins-class submarines, the Anzac-class frigate replacement program is delayed, we still haven’t purchased the Tomahawk missiles, we have no ballistic missile defence system, and we only have two elderly minesweepers left, which are about to be decommissioned," Downer says.
Getting “match fit”
Yet for whatever reason (although I suspect it has more to do the indirect impact of defence and national security in daily Australian life than anything else) both sides of Australian politics continue to sweep the nation's ailing defence capability and broader national security under the rug in the hopes that the average Australian will not spiral into a collection of hyperventilating hysteria when they truly realise the costs associated with making Australia "match fit".
The urgency around accelerating and expanding the nation's defence spending only becomes more important as the potential for conflagration in key regional flashpoints, like Taiwan, the South China Sea or in the economic exclusion zone of the Philippines, significantly increases and the US continues to be riven by domestic and international challenges and distractions.
These issues only become more pressing when one considers the clear vulnerability of the nation's own immediate maritime and air approaches and the glaring lack of "parity" in terms of capability that can be put to sea to intercept another Chinese naval task group of similar size, or, as will become increasingly likely as Beijing's reach continues to grow, a naval task group incorporating an aircraft carrier.
Downer highlights these vulnerabilities, stating, "So back to the dangerous risk of a war over Taiwan. If we joined with our friends and allies – the Americans and the Japanese – to help defend Taiwan, what would China do about us? Well, the naval task force that recently circumnavigated Australia should give us a hint. It was meant to. Included in that taskforce was China’s most modern guided missile cruiser, which is armed with strike weapons known as Long Sword.
"In the event of war, China could send aggressive task forces down to Australia and strike domestic targets with ship-borne missiles. The targets could include defence establishments, power stations and data centres. China could use its enhanced taskforces to blockade our ports and possibly even mine the access to those ports," he says.
And this is where Dower's tone takes a significantly darker turn: "What would we do about it?"
There in lies the question that needs to be front and centre for both sides of Australian politics as this election campaign continues to unfold, despite the best efforts to keep the focus of the election campaign firmly focused on arguably less important issues, like the continuing expansion of the NDIS and Medicare, dabbling around the edges of immigration (while making no real impact on the demand it drives in other areas of the economy) and work from home privileges for bureaucrats.
Downer paints a particularly concerning picture of what this looks like, should circumstances go sideways: "We might be able to put two or even three Collins-class submarines to sea to try to attack the Chinese taskforces. We could fire missiles at their ships, although they may be able to shoot those missiles down. But the truth is, we would be really struggling to destroy the taskforces. We wouldn’t be able to de-mine our harbours because we don’t have minesweepers, and we wouldn’t be able to defend sensitive targets with anti-ballistic missile defence systems because we don’t have them.
"Then there is our essential trade. If the Chinese navy were able to blockade or even partially blockade our ports, how would we import everything from oil to essential medicines? We don’t even have a merchant shipping fleet any more. In times past, the government could requisition merchant ships for essential trade, but that’s not an option anymore," he says.
With all of this in mind, it becomes clear that we either get serious or we surrender, there is no in between.
Final thoughts
For Australia to survive and prosper in this shifting era, both policymakers and the public need to recognise that while the world is becoming increasingly multipolar, the Indo-Pacific is swiftly emerging as the most fiercely contested region on the globe.
This change is fuelled by the rising economic, political, and strategic sway of nations such as China, India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam, alongside the well-established and resurgent strengths of South Korea and Japan. Together, these dynamics are forging a highly competitive environment right on Australia’s doorstep.
In the face of these challenges and opportunities, Australia must break free from the narrow perspectives that have long underpinned its diplomatic, strategic, and economic policies since Federation.
To truly capitalise on the transformations occurring in the Indo-Pacific, Australia must adopt a long-term, forward-thinking approach. The key question now is: when will we see a comprehensive analysis and a robust response to these challenges? When will a clear narrative and strategy be developed to help both industry and the public grasp not only the risks but also the exciting, untapped opportunities on the horizon?
As regional developments continue to evolve and China asserts its influence, Australia must decide whether it can afford to remain a secondary power or if it needs to assume a more independent and influential role in an era of intensifying great power competition.
Above all, Australia’s leaders and citizens must steer clear of short-term distractions and stay committed to the nation’s core values and principles.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
