iscover
With the election behind us, Australia can finally move forward – but as one newly elected independent urged a more autonomous, nuanced strategy for the nation’s future in a competitive Indo‑Pacific, I can’t help but wonder: do people grasp the real cost of such a shift?
In an age of shifting alliances and intensifying competition, the precise articulation of power, from global hegemonies to emerging regional actors, has never been more crucial.
In the wake of the Second World War, the United States rose to unrivalled prominence, inaugurating the era of Pax Americana through institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and through military alliances like NATO. Bolstered by vast economic resources and unparalleled military capability, Washington assumed and, in many ways, was encouraged to pursue the mantle of global policeman, containing communism, ending colonial conflicts and laying the foundations for a predictable and prosperous international order.
Yet, as the 21st century unfolds, that unipolar moment is fraying. Financial strains from maintaining an extensive overseas presence, deepening domestic polarisation and the burgeoning influence of rival states have all chipped away at the United States’ formerly unassailable position.
The economic miracles of China and India, coupled with the steady rise of other great and major powers, including Brazil, Indonesia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Thailand, among them herald a new multipolar world in which power is dispersed across multiple economic, political and strategic centres.
Against this backdrop, the once‑abstract study of “great powers”, “middle powers” and “small powers” has become firmly rooted in real‑world stakes.
Definitions that once seemed the province of arm‑chair strategists now underlie the coercion, cooperation and competition that shape our regional and global environment.
For Australia, long insulated by its role as a loyal deputy to the United States and comfortably cast as a “middle power”, the erosion of Pax Americana represents a rude awakening.
According to Eduard Jordaan of Singapore Management University, a traditional middle power is “wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential”, exhibiting “weak and ambivalent regional orientation” while legitimising the established order through multilateral cooperation.
Thus far, Australia has fitted this mould admirably. But as the post‑war order unravels and our Indo‑Pacific neighbourhood grows more turbulent, Canberra must confront hard questions: How do we recalibrate our alliances when the underpinning power structure itself is in flux? How do we harness our strengths as a stabilising force without relying solely on a declining superpower?
The challenges ahead demand a radical reimagining of our strategic posture, one that embraces a diversified foreign‑policy toolkit, reinforces our regional partnerships, and refines our conception of power itself. Only by redefining our role in a genuinely multipolar era can Australia safeguard its prosperity and security in the years to come.
Oddly enough, it is in the aftermath of the Australian 2025 federal election that the topic of greater Australian “independence” and a more “balanced, nuanced” approach to our national position and role in the Indo-Pacific has come to the fore, being spearheaded by an unlikely source, the returned independent MP for the leafy Sydney electorate of Warringah, Zali Steggall OAM.
While I am generally supportive of such a proposal, once again, I am left wondering if Australians, including and especially our policymakers, are fully prepared for the costs economically, politically, strategically and societally that embracing such a strategy would entail, particularly as the nation faces years of budget deficits, observable managed decline and the rise of other competing powers close to home.
Calls to ‘balance’ economic prosperity and strategic security
While the notion of Australia finding a greater balance between the two “poles” of our economic prosperity, largely driven by our major trading partner, the People’s Republic of China, and our security partner, the United States, is nothing new, the growing levels of instability across the globe are figuring into Australian’s voting intentions and their consciousness, perhaps far more than expected.
This new reality has only been exacerbated in the past six months as a result of US President Donald Trump’s tariff regime and targeted attacks on the “world that America built” and the underlying, foundational multilateral economic, political and strategic organs to devastating impact on economic markets around the world.
Further enflaming a sense of anxiety is the Trump administration’s treatment of allies and partners around the world, particularly following the fiery clash with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office, which has once again prompted Australia’s policymakers and public to revert to our tried and true national psychological position of strategic anxiety.
Enter independent member of Warringah, Zali Steggall OAM, who, during an interview with the SkyNews Australia election panel, articulated the need for Australian policymakers to be more considered and nuanced when seeking to balance the nation’s economic and strategic relationships, highlighting just how formative they have the potential to be in the minds of voters.
Steggall said in response to questions from Kieren Gilbert about the influence of global shifts on Australian voters: “I think that there is a definite concern around the volatility and uncertainty around the world, and people want to see stability, they also want to see Australia being quite independent.”
Expanding on this, Steggall added: “We need to make sure that we have a strong relationship, a strong but respectful relationship with our trading partner, our biggest trading partner, China. And with our defence partner of the US, again, we need to have a strong but respectful relationship but not one that is completely over-dependent either, so I did get a lot of feedback from the community about wanting a strong, independent Australia that can navigate those two relationships carefully.”
And here is my main question: do these people advocating for an “independent” Australia truly understand the costs? Because it would seem, they don’t.
Echoes of previous data
Importantly, such a proposal isn’t exactly new in Australia’s economic, political and strategic discourse, I am reminded of polling conducted by The Guardian Australia in mid-2024, which revealed some surprising results, mainly that when asked what Australia’s role in global affairs should be, 38 per cent of the 1,126 respondents believed Australia should be “an independent middle power with influence in the Asia-Pacific region”.
Other major responses included just 20 per cent of those polled believing “Australia should be primarily an ally of the US”, while a quarter of those polled believing “Australia should do its best not to engage in world affairs”.
But the most surprising response is the belief of 38 per cent of Australians that we should become an “independent middle power in the Asia-Pacific region”, but that doesn’t account for what is truly required.
Yet, as pencilled into the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and supporting 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Program, Australia simply doesn’t have the mass, the platforms (nuclear‑powered submarines aside) or the doctrine to defend our interests as an “independent middle power” in the Asia‑Pacific region.
Sure, some point to Sweden’s military build-up, with its 2040 force, will rival ours on paper, but Sweden’s smaller population, gentler geography (even sharing a border with Russia) and robust industrial base make it a poor template.
A far more telling benchmark is the United Kingdom’s conventional force: lean, modular and battle‑tested, with elements of strategic capability (mainly the UK’s nuclear platforms and modest arsenal), matching that requires far more than 2 per cent of GDP; it demands a serious uplift in personnel, assets and funding.
Importantly, achieving this level of “independence” requires greater economic capacity and diversity, simply moving beyond our relatively under-developed, economy defined by an over-dependence on “holes and homes” and relatively nondescript “services”.
Australia’s economic outlook is a minefield. Our economic complexity is dwindling, competitiveness is slipping, and public and private debt is mounting – while political, regulatory and legislative handbrakes choke growth. Dimitri Burshtein of Eminence Advisory warns we’re on a “long, slow road to economic ruin” unless Canberra unleashes a wave of fierce reform.
This isn’t new. Successive governments have piled on taxes, spending and regulation like bricks in a wall, slowly steering us from prosperity towards penury. “Like boiling a frog,” Burshtein says, “the cumulative sting of ever-increasing taxes, government spending and regulations leads to economic atrophy”.
Dr Kevin You of the Institute of Public Affairs adds fuel to the fire. Once a global powerhouse with some of the cheapest electricity on earth, Australia now ranks 52nd in power prices thanks to a botched net zero transition. We sit at 56th and 57th in corporate and personal tax out of 64 countries, and our bureaucratic burden has surged 14 places since 2004 – smothering investment and job creation under red tape.
So, if we aim to stand tall as an independent middle power in the Asia‑Pacific region, we must break free from three decades of policymaking by default. The cure isn’t rocket science – it’s the very recipe that powered our past success: competitive tax rates, light regulation and restrained government spending.
“Modern economic history shows that low taxes, minimal red tape and fiscal discipline are the bedrock of prosperity,” Burshtein insists. Yet governments keep throwing sand into Australia’s engine – and then toss in even more when it sputters. It’s time to clear the sand and turbocharge our economy.
Final thoughts
If Australians are serious about wanting to genuinely embrace an “independent” capacity in the Indo-Pacific and, more broadly, in an increasingly competitive and disrupted global order, then we need to start thinking far more seriously as a nation.
Defence alone won’t cut it. Our economic muscle, resilience, capacity, and competitiveness must be enhanced to ensure Australia’s “independence” in tomorrow’s contested power landscape. The government’s mission should be crystal‑clear: turbocharge our economy, unlock new opportunities for Australians and build a rock‑solid shield against economic coercion. A strong economy is the greatest deterrent.
Getting there means radical transparency, a culture of innovation and genuine collaboration between policymakers, elected leaders and the public. Australians must be invited back in – given a stake in the future and a voice in the national strategy.
It’s also time for an identity check. Are we content to be a regional “middle power”, or will we fight for a seat at the top table and secure the best deals for this generation and the next?
In an age of great‑power rivalry, short‑term fixes won’t cut it. We need a long‑term vision: a bold, sustained plan that cements Australia as a prosperous, secure and free nation for decades to come.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
