Deterrence and the 2024 National Defence Strategy – what else is missing?

At its core is a commitment to deterrence by denial – a strategy designed to prevent conflict by convincing potential adversaries that coercive military action would be unsuccessful or too costly.

As discussed in my earlier paper, the NDS24 acknowledges the roles of collective deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence to achieve the required deterrence outcomes.

However, the NDS24 does not explicitly recognise the need for integrated deterrence – that is, the coordinated use of all elements of national power to achieve deterrence outcomes. Further, the NDS24 does not fully engage with the broader typology of deterrence theory, particularly the concepts of basic, general and immediate deterrence.

Understanding these concepts is important, so let’s begin with definitions:

• Basic deterrence – applies where there is no specific threat or adversary. Aims to prevent adversaries from even contemplating military action. Force design is shaped by long-term geostrategic considerations. Maintains credible military capability to generate warning time and reduce likelihood of conflict.
• General deterrence – Applies when a specific adversary exists but is not planning immediate action. Seeks to deter planning or preparation through posturing, presence, alliances and signalling. Most effective before crisis emerges.
• Immediate deterrence – Applies when an adversary is actively considering aggression. Relies on clear counter-threats, mobilisation and forward deployment. Risk of failure is higher due to adversary’s potential commitment to conflict.

For many years, Australian defence planning followed a capability-based model. This approach, well-suited to a period of relative strategic calm, was underpinned by the assumption of a 10-year warning time before conflict.

Force design in this context was not based on specific threats or adversaries but on maintaining a broadly capable force to respond to a range of contingencies. Within this framework, basic deterrence – the idea that credible military capability could dissuade any potential adversary from contemplating aggression – served as the strategic foundation.

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As the strategic environment has evolved, so too has the basis for defence planning. The NDS24 reflects this shift. With the erosion of strategic warning time and the emergence of assertive state actors, particularly China, Australia is now adopting a threat-informed approach. This represents an appropriate and necessary evolution.

It also underscores the need to move beyond basic deterrence alone.

The concept of general deterrence is now particularly pertinent. General deterrence refers to discouraging specific adversaries from preparing or planning hostile actions, even in the absence of an immediate threat.

The NDS24’s emphasis on enhancing force posture in the northern approaches, strengthening regional partnerships and acquiring capabilities such as long-range strike and persistent surveillance aligns with this approach. These initiatives signal Australia’s willingness and capacity to impose costs on potential aggressors, thereby shaping adversarial planning well before a crisis emerges.

In this context, the NDS24 implicitly advances the concept of general deterrence – even if the term is not used. There is value in making these distinctions explicit in future strategic documents.

Doing so would help align Australia’s defence investments, preparedness and diplomatic efforts with clearly defined deterrent objectives.

The concept of immediate deterrence – dissuading a known adversary from taking imminent hostile action – is also relevant. While the NDS24 highlights readiness, rapid response and integrated operations, it does not frame these elements within the context of immediate deterrence.

Future strategies could benefit from doing so, as this would help focus attention on the need for crisis response, escalation management and the credible communication of consequences.

Each form of deterrence – basic, general and immediate – places distinct demands on force design, policy settings, and inter-agency coordination. Basic deterrence supports long-term capability development; general deterrence requires persistent presence, joint exercises, and strategic signalling; immediate deterrence demands speed, flexibility, and clarity in thresholds.

Recognising these distinctions would strengthen strategic clarity and improve the alignment of defence planning with national objectives.

Looking ahead to the 2026 update of the National Defence Strategy, there is an opportunity to build on the strong foundation established by the NDS24. A more refined taxonomy of deterrence could assist Defence and its partners in developing policies and capabilities that respond proportionately to emerging threats. This would also support the development of a broader, whole-of-government approach to integrated deterrence.

In summary, the NDS24 sets a solid direction for Australia’s evolving defence strategy. By explicitly distinguishing between basic, general and immediate deterrence, future strategic guidance could further sharpen Australia’s deterrence posture and enhance its ability to prevent conflict in an increasingly contested region.

John Harvey is a retired Air Marshal in the Royal Australian Air Force. His ADF career spanned more than 30 years, with early emphasis on employment as a navigator and weapons officer in Canberra and on F-111 aircraft and later in more diverse roles such as technical intelligence, military strategy, visiting fellow Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, program manager for the Joint Strike Fighter Project for Australia and Chief of Capability Development Group.

He also served as NSW defence advocate from June 2016 to September 2021.