Strategic policy expert calls on Australia to ‘be very realistic’ in confronting regional, global challenges

The rise of China, the resurgence of India, and the increasing strategic agency and ambitions of south-east Asian nations such as Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam are reshaping the Indo-Pacific into a contested and dynamic geopolitical theatre.

These developments are challenging longstanding assumptions underpinning Australia’s foreign and defence policy and testing its capacity to act as an effective and influential “middle power”.

Traditionally, Australia’s middle power status has afforded it a degree of diplomatic leverage and security comfort, underpinned by alliance networks, most notably the ANZUS Treaty and a robust, rules-based international order.

However, this status is becoming increasingly tenuous, while Australia’s economy and military remain among the region’s most “developed”, its relative weight is diminishing as regional powers modernise their armed forces, diversify their diplomatic partnerships, and expand their own economic heft.

Both the Australian public and its political leaders are being forced to accept that the Indo-Pacific is no longer a benign strategic environment; it is now characterised by grey zone competition, technological arms races, and complex interdependencies, in which Australia is no longer a guaranteed rule-setter or agenda-shaper.

This shifting context demands a fundamental reappraisal of Australia’s strategic posture and national ambition. A more contested and multipolar region requires Australia to think beyond its traditional alignment frameworks and reactive policy settings.

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Accordingly, Canberra must consider how to assert strategic autonomy while deepening key partnerships, diversify its economic and security relationships, and invest in capabilities that provide real deterrent value. Furthermore, Australia must reframe its identity not just as a middle power but also as a consequential Indo-Pacific power with unique responsibilities and opportunities.

In this light, the rise of multipolarity should not only be viewed as a challenge to Australia’s established position but also as a catalyst for renewal. By embracing a more agile, independent, and proactive strategic approach, Australia can reassert its influence and relevance in an increasingly fragmented and competitive region.

This rethinking is not optional; it is imperative for ensuring the nation’s sovereignty, security, and prosperity in the decades ahead, highlighting this call for a major rethink in Australia’s sometimes celebrated, sometimes maligned Professor Hugh White in an interview with The Sydney Morning Herald with Greg Callaghan in which he urges both the nation’s public and its policymakers to “be very realistic” about the world we now face.

Shrink into ourselves

It will come as a surprise to no one that I sit very firmly in the camp that vehemently disagrees with the positions, thesis and proposals put forward and advocated for by Professor White; however, in this instance, while I don’t necessarily disagree with the prescription, I disagree with how he got there.

Or simply put, yes, Australia and Australians need to be “very realistic”, as Professor White promotes; however, it doesn’t mean we need to retreat into embracing a “small target strategy”, seeking to limit our relationship with the United States, while leveraging an over-emphasis on diplomatic efforts to offset and mitigate a largely continental defence based strategy.

If it sounds familiar, it is in many ways the basis of the Lowy Institute’s Sam Roggeveen’s Echidna Strategy, which emphasises, much like its namesake, the Echidna that Australia embrace a solitary, non-aggressive strategic posture that emphasises self-reliance and deterrence over offensive capabilities.

Roggeveen critiques initiatives like AUKUS, suggesting that such alliances may entangle Australia in conflicts that do not serve its national interests. He posits that Australia’s geographic isolation provides a natural advantage, making it inherently difficult to invade. By focusing on strengthening maritime and air capabilities, Australia can enhance its defensive posture without escalating regional tensions.

Furthermore, Roggeveen emphasises the importance of regional diplomacy. He advocates for deeper engagement with neighbouring countries, particularly Indonesia, and a more active role in Pacific affairs. By fostering strong regional relationships, Australia can contribute to a stable and cooperative Indo-Pacific environment.

But what does this have to do with Professor White’s interview? Well, when asked about the central pillar of Australia’s security policy, the US alliance, he tells Callaghan: “We have been able to rely on America for so long because it has been by far the strongest country in the world, and stronger by a huge margin than any country in Asia.

“But that is not true any more. We live in a multipolar world where several countries have great power – China, of course, but also India and, before long, Indonesia, too. America no longer has the overwhelming power to keep our region stable and Australia safe ... We still think America can protect us from China today, just as it did when its ­economy was 20 times the size of China’s. In fact, we’re now depending on America more and more to keep China in check as it becomes less and less able to do so.”

The frequently cited flash point is undoubtedly the Taiwan situation, with the potential for either a direct military loss or draw for the United States, irrevocably shattering the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order, particularly for Australia, leaving the nation torn between two armed camps left undoubtedly licking their wounds.

Nevertheless, this outcome would see the Western Pacific and the Indo-Pacific balance of power completely upended, with Beijing the weakened, albeit dominant power of the region, something many nations throughout the region are fearful of, particularly given the precedent established by China’s ambitions in the South China Sea, Tibet, Mongolia, and other areas.

Professor White, however, has a different view, saying: “Many people fear that if America steps back from leadership in Asia, the whole region would be oppressed by an all-powerful China. But that will not happen. In today’s multipolar world, China will face other strong powers to balance and limit its power, including Indonesia, Japan and Russia.”

In some ways, he is correct that the aggregated power of those other nations will play an important role, as will even a limited, continuing American presence in the region; however, for White, “Australia will sit on the boundary between Chinese and Indian spheres of influence, and if we are smart, we will keep a balance between them so that ­neither becomes too dominant.”

However, further into his interview with Callaghan, White, in some ways, bells the cat, saying: “Like all great powers, China will throw its weight around. We must learn to manage that as best we can, as middle-size powers have ­always had to do. Working with neighbouring countries will be key to that. And, as the last resort, we will need to be able to resist military pressure independently.

“That is a big challenge, but not impossible. And anyway, we have no choice because those big tides of ­history mean there is no way we can keep sheltering behind US power.”

So, if we are to take Professor White at his word that we may, in fact, be required to “resist military pressure independently” and can’t continue to “shelter behind US power”, how exactly does he suggest we do that in the face of the relative rise of our region, while our own comparative power continues to stagnate and decline?

New power metrics mean we are no longer a ‘middle power’

I think it is safe to say that Australia, as it stands, is very far from the “middle power” it was at the beginning of the 21st century, particularly as the aggregated economic, political and strategic weight of the new, multipolar world and region continue to grow and evolve.

Rather, Australia, like a number of its “like-minded” nations, has embraced a policy of steady, managed decline across every major metric, seduced by the “End of History” narrative and the “Golden Arches” theory of economic interdependency, putting an end to the potential of nation-state conflict and great power competition.

Events across the globe now reveal those theories to be little more than comforting fairy tales, requiring a major rethink of the way in which Australia not only views itself in the multipolar world but also the way it conducts itself in this new, competitive and fluid global paradigm.

Doing so requires an acceptance that Australia is no longer a “middle power”, and we have, in fact, put ourselves in this position; therefore, we can get ourselves out of it, and the work begins at home, not abroad, contrary to popular belief and advocacy.

Despite the lofty speeches, many Australians see through the cracks. The nation may be rich in resources and strategically positioned, but it’s failing to live up to its potential. Economic stagnation, rising geopolitical risks, and a growing sense of political disillusionment have left Australians feeling increasingly vulnerable.

For decades, Australia has enjoyed a fortunate position – shielded from major conflicts, rationing, and scarcity. But as global disorder deepens, hard truths are closing in. The illusion of security is fading fast.

Former DFAT deputy secretary Richard Maude captures the urgency in The Australian Financial Review: Australia must rethink its foreign and defence policy and make bold, long-term investments in national resilience.

Australia doesn’t have to choose between subservience and isolation. It can and must forge a new path: one of sovereign capability, strategic foresight, and regional leadership. That means building the economic, diplomatic, and military strength to act independently, not as a junior partner, but as a credible Indo-Pacific power.

The Indo-Pacific is the epicentre of global competition. Powers like China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Japan are all rewriting the rules. If Australia doesn’t lift its game, it risks being left behind, economically marginalised and strategically dependent.

Short-termism has dominated Canberra for too long. As I have long advocated and will continue to, the nation needs its “Rocky montage” moment, a conscious, collective effort to reform, invest, and prepare for the trials ahead. National resilience and economic sovereignty aren’t just buzzwords; they’re survival strategies in a world that’s moving fast and breaking old assumptions.

Maude’s call for a clearer strategy in the face of rising economic nationalism and fractured global trade should be the baseline, not the endpoint. It’s time for Australian leaders to stop waiting for permission and start shaping the nation’s future. The stakes are high, and the window is closing. Whether Australia becomes a true Indo-Pacific leader or fades into irrelevance will be decided by what it does next.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Stephen Kuper

Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.