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As the global geopolitical and strategic environment continues to devolve, becoming increasingly unpredictable and dangerous, maybe it is time to thoroughly compare where we are coming from, and where we are going.
In the span of nearly four decades, Australia’s strategic environment, defence priorities and military posture have undergone a profound transformation.
The 1987 Defence white paper and the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, supported by the 2024 National Defence Strategy, stand as key reference points for understanding this evolution in Australia’s approach to national defence.
While both documents respond to perceived external threats and define the structure of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), they reflect fundamentally different world-views, strategic settings and force design principles.
The 1987 Defence white paper emerged from a post-Vietnam War and Cold War context, deeply shaped by the “Defence of Australia” doctrine. It focused on self-reliance within the air-sea gap to Australia’s north, emphasising territorial defence and low-level regional contingencies.
The force structure was centred on a “balanced force in being,” designed for gradual expansion and long-term warning times. At its core, the 1987 ADF was modest in scale but strategically focused, with three regular Army brigades, a smaller and largely coastal Navy and an Air Force built around F/A-18 Hornets and P-3C Orions for maritime patrol and air defence.
In contrast, the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy acknowledge a region marked by accelerating strategic competition, technological disruption and shrinking warning times. The focus has shifted (arguably) to forward defence, impactful projection and deterrence by denial in a dramatic departure from the introspective defence posture of the late 20th century.
The government’s ambition is for the ADF be reshaped to operate across the full spectrum of conflict, from grey zone operations to high-intensity peer conflict, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
The force structure reflects this with investments in long-range strike (including High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and missiles such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range), advanced surface combatants and nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS, and greater integration with the US and regional allies. Meanwhile, Army is restructured into littoral manoeuvre and combined arms brigades, while the RAAF is acquiring advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, and fifth-generation air combat capabilities.
In sum, while both force structures aim to secure Australia’s national interests, the 1987 model prioritised geographic defence and long mobilisation timelines, whereas the 2023–24 strategy embraces agility, reach and a proactive regional posture.
The ADF has evolved from a force designed to defend the continent to one capable of shaping, deterring and responding across a much broader arc of strategic challenge.
But despite the rhetoric, how much is really changing despite what has been promised and what isn’t really materially changing?
Compare the pair
In 1987, Australia’s defence posture was shaped by a sense of relative peace and geographic insulation. The Cold War was drawing to a close, regional tensions were subdued and policymakers judged that Australia would have at least 10 years of warning before any major threat could materialise.
Against this backdrop, the 1987 Defence white paper reaffirmed a doctrine known as the Defence of Australia. This doctrine centred on defending the continent through a layered denial strategy: using surveillance, patrol and interdiction across the air-sea gap to Australia’s north to detect, delay and defeat any potential adversary before they reached Australian shores.
This force was modest in scale. The Australian Army, with around 25,000 full-time personnel, was built around three brigades: the 1st Brigade in Darwin, the 3rd Brigade in Townsville, and the 7th Brigade based largely on reserves. These were predominantly light infantry formations, lightly armoured and geared towards regional peacekeeping or territorial defence.
Their mobility came from M113 armoured personnel carriers, many of which dated to the Vietnam War era, and their firepower was limited to mortars and short-range direct fire weapons. The Army operated fewer than 100 Leopard 1 tanks and had no long-range artillery, rocket forces or integrated ISR.
The Royal Australian Navy was similarly oriented towards constabulary duties and regional surveillance. It operated a surface fleet of six Adelaide Class (FFG-7) guided missile frigates, a handful of ageing Perth Class destroyers and six Oberon Class diesel-electric submarines, with plans just beginning for their replacement under the Collins Class program.
Amphibious capabilities were minimal, represented primarily by HMAS Tobruk, a single landing ship. The Navy had no cruise missile capability, no integrated air defence system and a fleet air arm focused on anti-submarine helicopters rather than power projection.
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) was transitioning at the time from Mirage III fighters to the new F/A-18A Hornet, with 75 aircraft ultimately entering service.
These provided credible tactical air combat capability, but no long-range strike capacity. The RAAF’s surveillance and lift capabilities were modest: P-3C Orions handled maritime patrol, C-130 Hercules formed the backbone of strategic airlift and the force lacked dedicated airborne early warning, tanker or electronic warfare platforms.
The entire ADF was based on a southern-centric posture, with major facilities clustered around Melbourne, Perth and Adelaide, rather than in the north. Crucially, the 1987 force was designed (at least in theory) to operate alone.
While the ANZUS alliance was acknowledged, the doctrine prioritised Australian self-reliance, with a limited role for US forces or overseas deployments, the focus was on defending the continent, not projecting force or shaping the strategic environment.
Fast forward to 2023–24, and Australia’s defence policy has undergone a dramatic transformation. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy were released in response to the rise of great power competition, the expansion of Chinese military reach, the erosion of strategic warning time and the emergence of grey zone operations, cyber warfare and long-range missile threats.
These developments shattered the assumptions of the 1987 world. For the first time in decades, Australia’s strategic planners now judged that conflict in the Indo-Pacific was credible, dangerous and could occur without warning.
In response, Australia’s new strategy is defined by a concept called National Defence. This moves beyond the passive defence of the homeland and embraces a forward posture that projects power into the northern approaches and Southeast Asia. It emphasises deterrence through denial – but not just at the shoreline.
Now, deterrence is built on long-range strike, integrated surveillance, cyber resilience and the ability to work seamlessly with the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, India and regional partners. Australia is no longer simply defending itself, it is seeking to shape its strategic environment.
To deliver on this vision, the ADF is being fundamentally restructured. The Australian Army is transitioning from a light infantry force into a combination of littoral strike and mechanised manoeuvre units. The future structure centres around three major combat formations:
- Two littoral manoeuvre brigades (based on the current 1st and 3rd brigades) optimised for amphibious operations, regional intervention and grey zone warfare.
- One mechanised combined arms brigade (likely formed from the 7th Brigade) structured for conventional combat with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) artillery and integrated support.
The Army is acquiring 129 Redback IFVs, 211 Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles and 75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, replacing legacy fleets. In a first for the ADF, the Army is acquiring long-range strike systems, including HIMARS rocket artillery, with a future capability to deploy land-based missiles reaching hundreds of kilometres.
For aviation, the Army is receiving 29 AH-64E Apaches and 40 UH-60M Black Hawks, along with the existing fleet of Chinooks, with additional investment in ISR drones, cyber-electronic warfare, and rotary-wing collaborative combat aircraft.
The Royal Australian Navy is being transformed from a regional patrol force into a blue-water navy capable of sea control, strike and integrated operations. Key future capabilities include:
- 6 Hunter Class anti-submarine frigates.
- 7–11 future general-purpose frigates.
- 3 Hobart Class guided missile destroyers to be replaced at a future date.
- 8–9 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) – initially Virginia Class, then SSN-AUKUS – with long-range strike, ISR, and ASW roles.
- A mix of 9 large, unmanned surface vessels for missile and sensor operations.
- The continued use of 2 Canberra Class amphibious assault ships.
- A rationalised replenishment and logistics fleet to support operations at distance.
This modern fleet is being complemented by investment in undersea surveillance, unmanned systems and maritime strike from both ship- and land-launched missiles.
The RAAF, meanwhile, is being transformed into a multi-domain strike and ISR force, focused on stealth, survivability and networked lethality. It continues to operate 72 F-35A Lightning II aircraft, while extending the lives of the Super Hornet and Growler fleet, which will be supported by:
- 6 E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft.
- 6 MQ-4C Triton high-altitude ISR drones.
- 14 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.
- Strategic strike capabilities, including JASSM-ER, ARGM and the potential fielding of hypersonic missiles.
- A modern air mobility fleet of C-17A Globemaster III, 20 C-130J-30 and the world-leading KC-30A tanker fleet.
Air Force strategy now emphasises distributed basing, runway dispersal and the ability to operate in denied environments, coordinated with allied airpower in joint missions.
Beyond the traditional domains, the ADF is also expanding into space and cyber warfare. Where the 1987 force had no such capability, today’s ADF has established both a Defence Space Command and a Cyber Command, backed by investments in space-based ISR, satellite resilience, offensive cyber capabilities and information warfare.
Meanwhile, at the fiscal level, the 2024 Integrated Investment Program earmarked AU$330 billion over the next decade, including a $5.7 billion uplift in the first four years, funded by reprioritising AU$22.5 billion worth of existing projects. Defence spending is expected to reach around 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product early next decade, with over 900 new public service roles generated for the AUKUS renascence.
Final thoughts
Long-time readers of Defence Connect will know my consistent call for a coherent, forward-looking strategy to transform Australia from a middling “Middle Power” into a truly consequential regional actor – one capable of confidently and, when necessary, assertively pursuing its national interests.
The time for complacency is over. The old “she’ll be right, mate” mindset is dangerously out of step with a world and region growing more competitive, volatile and openly hostile.
While this may jar with the instincts of many Australians, recent conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and South Asia reveal a hard truth: we are once again in an era where might makes right and not just military might, but whole-of-nation power.
Australia, like many Western nations, is dangerously underprepared for the cascading effects of modern conflict, economic, societal and strategic. Our long-standing insulation from war, rationing and social upheaval has bred comfort and with it, complacency.
To secure our future, Australia must grow up fast. That means building the economic, diplomatic and military strength expected of a serious power. This is not just about defence; it’s about safeguarding our sovereignty, prosperity and ability to shape our region – not simply endure it.
Real change is hard, but not changing is now the greater risk. A more ambitious Australia can unlock immense economic and strategic potential, positioning itself not as a follower, but a regional leader.
With tensions escalating and China asserting its power, Australia faces a stark choice: remain small and exposed, or step up to an independent, resilient and influential role in the Indo-Pacific. That means diversifying our economy, accelerating innovation and preparing for coercion – so our national security can’t be held hostage by foreign leverage.
Only a strong, forward-leaning economy can provide the strategic weight to deter threats and lead with confidence. And only then can we build a defence force that is not just reactive, but ready, capable and credible in an age where security must be earned, not assumed.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
