iscover
Opinion: The 12-day war weakened Iran but strengthened China, deepening Beijing’s influence and exposing US limits – reshaping Indo-Pacific security dynamics for Australia and regional powers, explains international security expert Shay Gal.
The 12-day war between Israel and Iran shattered Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, dramatically weakening its geopolitical standing. Yet beneath this upheaval lies a strategic shift benefiting China in the Indo-Pacific. For Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan, Tehran’s crisis could redefine security, diplomacy and economic alliances in new ways.
The war erupted after diplomatic efforts collapsed, driven by Iran’s rapid nuclear advancements and intensifying proxy conflicts across the region. The swift Israeli strikes, openly supported by unprecedented US military coordination, stunned Tehran and reshaped strategic calculations globally.
Publicly, Beijing has fiercely condemned the attacks on Iran, denouncing them as “reckless Western aggression”. Privately, Chinese strategists view Tehran’s humiliation pragmatically. A weakened Iran serves Beijing’s interests. No longer defiant or independent, Iran now urgently needs economic rescue, and China stands as the natural benefactor.
Tehran’s reduced leverage allows China unprecedented access to Iranian resources and strategic infrastructure, deepening Iran’s dependence on Beijing. What appears at first glance to be a strategic loss for China may ultimately represent a considerable gain.
Notably, Tehran avoided closing the Strait of Hormuz due to confidential diplomatic pressure from Beijing. According to diplomatic sources, China signalled to Tehran that significant economic support, including emergency financial aid, depended on keeping the strategic strait open.
Tehran’s restraint stabilised energy markets, allowing China to intensify diplomatic outreach to Tehran while diversifying energy imports from Russia and central Asia.
Indeed, a fragile and isolated Iran provides a perfect client state for Beijing’s Belt and Road ambitions. Extensive Chinese investments in Iranian ports, railways and energy infrastructure can transform Iran into an indispensable hub of Beijing’s transcontinental economic network without the competition or interference of the US and its allies.
Beijing thus quietly achieves a strategic paradox: leveraging US-led military actions to expand Chinese economic influence into a previously contested region.
With US attention diverted to the Gulf, Beijing increases provocative naval patrols in the South China Sea, challenging Philippine and Vietnamese claims. This tests the credibility and capacity of US security commitments, potentially weakening Southeast Asian confidence in Washington.
Beijing’s moves test America’s doctrine of simultaneous deterrence, betting that the US now lacks the capacity to manage multiple crises.
ASEAN states question US reliability: the Philippines and Vietnam fear abandonment, while Indonesia and Malaysia lean towards Beijing’s anti-intervention stance, risking ASEAN unity.
China skillfully exploits this uncertainty, positioning itself not just as an alternative partner but as a guardian of sovereignty, a narrative tailored perfectly to ASEAN’s historical sensitivities.
These uncertainties extend beyond ASEAN, reshaping relationships among Indo-Pacific actors.
Australia’s deepening ties with Washington complicate relations with Beijing, while rising energy prices heighten tensions. Japan, driven by energy security concerns, cautiously supports the US, unsettling China.
India, alienated by China’s pro-Iran stance, moves closer to Washington, further complicating Beijing’s ambitions. These evolving alignments, rather than creating clear-cut blocs, instead risk a fragmented and volatile regional order, precisely the ambiguity Beijing seeks to exploit.
Iran’s crisis deepens Sino-Russian alignment. Both condemn Western intervention, strengthen energy cooperation and intensify diplomatic coordination.
This tactical partnership aims at countering US-led hegemony yet carefully avoids direct confrontation. Iran, however, privately expresses deep disappointment over Russia’s cautious neutrality, which some in Tehran perceive as outright pro-Israel bias. This bitterness intensified after Russia redirected advanced Sukhoi fighter jets – originally intended for Egypt, which cancelled its order amid efforts to appease the US and EU over Ukraine – to Algeria instead of selling them to Iran.
Yet, beneath the visible solidarity lies an unspoken Russian unease: Moscow quietly fears becoming junior partner in a partnership increasingly dominated by Beijing’s global ambitions.
With Russian supplies stalled, Tehran turned to Beijing, purchasing Chinese J-10C fighters, aircraft notably based on Israel’s cancelled Lavi jet developed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in the 1980s.
Ironically, Tehran is now paying billions for fighter jets built on Israeli technology, underscoring both Iran’s deepening reliance on China and Moscow’s declining influence.
America’s pre-emptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities alarms Chinese strategists regarding Taiwan and may encourage Beijing to test US resolve amid distraction. Privately, senior US officials express concern over strategic overstretch, recognising that a prolonged focus on the Gulf risks eroding Washington’s deterrent posture against China’s increasingly assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific.
Trump’s preoccupation with pursuing a Nobel Peace Prize and Middle East peace initiatives has diverted US strategic attention from the Indo-Pacific, ironically encouraging Beijing to consider swift and decisive action on Taiwan.
Iran’s defeat reconfigures strategic equations far beyond the Gulf. China, walking a tightrope between exploiting vulnerabilities and avoiding escalation, emerges paradoxically strengthened, its diplomatic clout and economic leverage subtly yet decisively enhanced. Indo-Pacific nations now navigate an era defined by fluid alliances, latent rivalries and unprecedented strategic ambiguity, conditions ripe for miscalculations, but equally fertile ground for China’s patient, calculated ambitions.
Shay Gal is a strategic analyst and adviser specialising in international security, diplomatic strategy and geopolitical crisis management. He advises senior government and defence leaders on complex strategic challenges.
