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There is an old saying that the only constant in life is change, and nowhere, it seems, is that truer than in the way the public understands national security and what it truly is today in the era of great power competition.
There’s no avoiding the fact that Australia finds itself at a critical juncture in its geopolitical, economic and strategic history, as the global order shifts from unipolar dominance to a multipolar landscape marked by intensifying competition, growing regional assertiveness and the return of great power rivalry.
The rise of China, the resurgence of India, and the growing strategic influence and ambition of Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam are transforming the Indo-Pacific into a contested and fast-moving geopolitical arena.
These changes are challenging long-held assumptions that have underpinned Australia’s foreign and defence policy and are testing its ability to operate as an effective and influential middle power.
Historically, Australia’s status as a middle power has provided a measure of diplomatic clout and strategic reassurance, supported by alliance networks, chief among them the ANZUS Treaty and a stable, rules-based international order.
But this position is becoming increasingly precarious. While Australia still possesses one of the region’s more advanced economies and defence forces, its relative influence is declining as regional nations modernise their militaries, broaden their diplomatic relationships and expand their economic reach.
Australians – both the public and political leaders – are being confronted with the reality that the Indo-Pacific is no longer a benign strategic environment. It is now defined by grey zone tactics, technological arms races and intricate interdependencies, where Australia can no longer assume it will shape the rules or set the agenda.
This evolving environment calls for a fundamental reassessment of Australia’s strategic posture and national ambition. In a more contested and multipolar region, Australia must look beyond its traditional alliances and reactive policy settings and adopt a more proactive, independent approach to securing its interests.
Each of these factors, both individually and in conjunction with one another, are serving to rewrite the traditional understanding of what constitutes “national security” and how it now encompasses every aspect of Australian life.
Highlighting this growing shift is Justin Bassi and John Coyne of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, in a piece titled National security isn’t what it used to be—and that’s the point, in which the pair argue for a new, more comprehensive “whole-of-nation” understanding of national security and how every aspect of Australian life is now critical to national security.
The pair highlighted this shift, saying, “When people think of national security, it’s about spies, soldiers and submarines. But these days it’s about much more than those things. But how much more? In an era in which global competition, trade policy, technological development and domestic stability are deeply entangled, the challenge is defining what should fall under the national security umbrella.”
Learning from the past to shape the future
Australia’s national security definition has always evolved. In 2008, Kevin Rudd took a bold step by introducing an “all‑hazards” approach in his National Security Statement, embracing terrorism, pandemics, economic stability and natural disasters alike and appointed a national security adviser in PM&C, unfortunately, that role was later dismantled.
Meanwhile, under Anthony Albanese, moves like removing intelligence chiefs from cabinet’s National Security Committee (NSC) and reversing that when the terror threat increased reflected ongoing uncertainty over what national security now entails.
This has seen a broadening of the concept of “national security” to include, as highlighted by both Bassi and Coyne, modern challenges, namely, in the areas of:
- Trade – economic coercion from overseas powers.
- Technology – bans on TikTok, semiconductor export controls.
- Climate – NSC now must consider climate security alongside supply chain risks.
Bassi and Coyne articulated this, saying, “Part of the confusion comes from so many things now intersecting with national security. Trade? Just ask the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials managing the fallout from economic coercion. Technology? The TikTok bans and semiconductor controls speak for themselves. Climate change is now within the purview of the National Security Committee and is increasingly framed through a security lens – necessarily so, given the need for due diligence on global supply chains and technological vulnerabilities.”
This expansive approach has however seen resistance over concerns that making everything a “priority” inevitably means that nothing is a priority and can serve to undermine the efforts of a cohesive, considered national response.
The pair articulated this, saying, “This expansion has led some to cry foul, accusing governments of ‘securitising’ too many policy domains. The critique is intellectually fashionable in some circles, and driving it is often a (repeatedly failed) desire to take advantage of short-term economic opportunities and downplay long-term risks.”
They add, “course, not everything is a national security issue. Social-policy domains such as housing and taxation are vital to the national interest but not matters for the National Security Committee”.
While I don’t necessarily agree with this last point, particularly given the increased levels of dislocation, atomisation and disenfranchisement generations of young Australians feel (thus impacting their willingness to put their lives on the line to defend the nation) or the nation’s atrocious fiscal situation, the point advocated by Bassi and Coyne is a fair one.
Authoritarian competition, grey zone warfare and building public understanding
Importantly, Australia isn’t operating in a vacuum. Countries like China have already integrated economic, technology, military and diplomatic efforts into cohesive national security strategies. That means Australia must support moves like TikTok bans, export controls and tech countermeasures to protect democratic values lest “Beijing and Moscow … sow doubt, division and destruction in our societies”.
Equally, while the bar for threats has shifted, incremental incursions, cyber breaches, foreign investment bids, disinformation campaigns might not seem individually dramatic, but combined – they “represent an incremental erosion of sovereignty or social cohesion”.
That cumulative risk is modern national security.
The pair argued, “That’s why we need a more rigorous and transparent framework, a national security strategy and a national security adviser to ensure Australia recognises the blurred lines between economics, infrastructure, public sentiment and traditional statecraft. This is especially important when some nations, including China, have already fused not just their military and civil sectors but their entire economic, technology, security and diplomatic domains into cohesive national security strategies. When China uses state-owned enterprises and private companies to project influence or when it leverages supply chain dominance to punish dissenting states, it’s redefining what power looks like.”
This brings us to building greater public understanding among every day Australians, something that Bassi and Coyne drew inspiration from The Simpsons of all reference points, quoting Homer Simpson, when he tells Lisa, “Just because I don’t care doesn’t mean I don’t understand.”
Most Australians might not follow every security debate but instinctively react when something’s wrong like foreign companies buying critical infrastructure or cyber attacks. The solution? Raise national security literacy through transparent, public‑facing conversations led by government before a crisis hits because keeping Australians safe is ultimately the government’s responsibility.
Final thoughts
From an economic and industrial standpoint, the post-COVID-19 era has laid bare the fragility of global supply chains and exposed just how limited Australia’s domestic manufacturing capacity really is.
As the economic, political and strategic foundations built after the Second World War continue to fray, Australia’s exposure to external shocks has become all the more obvious, highlighting the urgent need to build genuine national resilience.
Australians must also come to terms with an uncomfortable truth: unlike many other countries, modern Australia has been largely insulated from the hardships of conflict. Entire generations have grown up without experiencing shortages of food, energy or medicine. As a result, there’s little real understanding of the scale of disruption such crises could bring. That sense of complacency now risks undermining our national preparedness.
To secure its future, Australia must become more self-reliant and strategically capable developing the economic, diplomatic and military tools worthy of a middle power with global responsibilities. Doing so would not only help reinforce our sovereignty but also position Australia to play a more assertive and constructive role in shaping a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific.
Letting go of the “too hard basket” mindset is essential. Embracing the scale of this challenge would open up new economic, diplomatic and strategic opportunities. As great power rivalry deepens and China exerts greater influence across the region, Australia faces a critical choice: continue as a dependent secondary player or step up as a more capable and independent contributor to regional stability.
Government policy must focus on expanding opportunities for Australians while strengthening national resilience particularly our economic resilience to reduce our vulnerability to coercion and external shocks that could otherwise erode our sovereignty.
In the end, only a strong, diverse and innovative economy can underwrite a credible national defence posture, one that protects Australian interests and contributes meaningfully to peace and security in an increasingly contested world.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
