iscover
Questions from the US about whether Australia would back a Taiwan conflict with American-supplied nuclear subs have sparked concerns over sovereignty and blind loyalty, but one expert says the fears are overblown.
Australia has long been a steadfast supporter of the US-led world order, even to the point where former prime minister John Howard referred to the nation as America’s “loyal deputy” role in the Indo-Pacific.
From the Korean War to Afghanistan, Canberra has routinely aligned itself with Washington’s strategic interests, seeing the alliance not just as a security guarantee, but as a cornerstone of its international identity.
The intimacy and interconnectivity of this unique and special relationship became more formalised with the Cold War-era ANZUS Treaty, intelligence integration through the Five Eyes network, and regular participation in US-led military operations have all cemented Australia’s place in this Western security architecture.
This close alignment has generally served Australia well, providing access to advanced military technologies, intelligence sharing, and a seat at the table in broader geopolitical affairs.
Yet the Indo-Pacific today is a very different strategic environment than the one Australia stepped into and helped to shape post-Second World War. The unipolar moment has passed, and the rise of China as a peer/near-peer competitor is reshaping regional dynamics in ways that challenge the assumptions underpinning Canberra’s traditional strategic posture.
This has prompted, in large part, the emergence of the AUKUS trilateral partnership between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, exemplifying both the opportunity and the risk of doubling down on the deputy role (at least in the eyes of much of the region) .
The promise of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and access to cutting-edge defence technologies is transformative and serves as one of the key foundational stones of Australia’s strategic policy and posture moving deeper into the 21st century.
However, it also brings significant obligations, including long-term defence integration with the United States, deeper logistical and operational commitments, and the potential to be drawn more directly into future US-China tensions, particularly over Taiwan.
For many analysts and experts, the crux of the challenge is that Australia now faces a more contested region, where great power competition is sharpening and strategic autonomy is harder to preserve.
As Canberra leans further into the alliance, it must grapple with the reality that loyalty to the US does not automatically guarantee national control over how that loyalty is exercised.
The key question going forward is whether Australia can remain a trusted partner in the US-led order without surrendering its ability to chart an independent course, especially as strategic, economic, and military pressures from Beijing continue to grow.
While some experts have raised concerns about the assurance expected by the United States once it has formally handed over the first of Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines, others have been more measured in their analysis of the implications for Australia.
With the former assistant secretary for alliance policy in the Australian Department of Defence and chief executive of research corporation Strategic Forum and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, Ross Babbage, pushing back against the concerns raised by others.
Babbage in his analysis piece for ASPI’s The Strategist, titled “No, the US isn’t asking for the keys to the ADF”, in which he seeks to set the record straight and reassure the Australian public that Australia and indeed the Australian Defence Force will not become mere auxiliaries of the broader US Armed Forces.
Babbage highlights this, saying: “A US request for advice on Australia’s stance in the event of a major crisis over Taiwan is being badly misunderstood. Australia isn’t being asked to hand over command of its armed forces, and it can satisfy the request with just in-principle guidance. That’s all that the US would expect.”
The need to think with clear eyes
At the centre of Babbage’s analysis is the need to view the US requests for information and intent with clear eyes, rather than the creeping hysteria that seems to have dominated the thinking of other experts.
Late last month, Pentagon policy Under Secretary Elbridge Colby asked Canberra for clarity on how Australia would respond if a major crisis erupted over Taiwan, particularly regarding intelligence sharing, access to facilities, logistics, and ADF combat support.
The initial headlines, though, wildly overstated the ask, with as Babbage put it: “Australia isn’t being asked to hand over command of its armed forces,” but rather to provide “some in‑principle guidance”.
Going further, Babbage assessed that critics were quick to decry the move, with DSR co-author Peter Dean grumbling that “Colby needs to get his own house in order before he starts making demands of alliance partners”, while the ABC’s Patricia Karvelas likened it to a marriage contract, one spouse demanding an “ironclad commitment that you will never leave them while they strongly reserve the right to walk out whenever they like”.
The Australian’s Paul Kelly likewise asked if any other US de facto ally had ever faced such a request.
In light of this positioning, it is easy to understand why Australians are becoming confused and concerned about the implications of the trilateral partnership.
Seeking to set the record straight, Babbage shoots down these concerns, pointing out that allied planning routinely involves exactly this type of in‑principle commitment, for example, NATO’s Article 5 obligations, or longstanding defence arrangements on the Korean peninsula.
He describes the request as a standard piece of “combined campaign planning”, not a surrender of sovereignty, saying: “Colby’s request concerning the Australian government’s intentions in the event of a crisis over Taiwan is unexceptional. Indeed, such guidance is needed for effective allied planning.”
Going further, Babbage adds: “Few Australian commentators appear to understand the lead-up to the request. Colby, with whom I have had long professional association, has been commissioned not only to review the AUKUS agreement but also to prepare the new US National Defense Strategy. Both documents will be guided in part by how much the US can depend on its close Indo-Pacific allies in future crises.”
With this in mind, it becomes clearer as to the direction of travel and logic guiding the current US requests for clarity and assurance from the Australian government.
Babbage articulates this, saying: “To prepare these reports, Colby needs to know whether the US can rely on uninterrupted Australian intelligence flows in future crises. Can the US plan on unfettered access to Australian bases and facilities? Can it expect strong logistic support from Australia? How much combat support can the US plan on receiving from the Australian Defence Force? And can Washington assume that, if it exerts itself mightily to transfer three, four or five Virginia Class submarines to Australia from 2032 to 2042, those boats will be available for combined operations in a subsequent Indo-Pacific crisis?”
Going further, Babbage adds: “These are perfectly reasonable questions for Colby to want clarified. He needs some in-principle advice before the new US National Defense Strategy and the AUKUS review can be written. A US strategy for future Indo-Pacific crises without in-principle Australian commitment would be markedly different to a US strategy with combined campaign planning in place. And bust-a-gut US efforts to supply the promised submarines to Australia will be much more likely if the Pentagon has a reasonable assurance that they will be available to support US operations in any major Indo-Pacific crisis in the 2030s.”
Australia’s next steps
But what does Australia need to do in order to maintain its own sovereignty and national interests, while serving to reassure the United States that its most trusted ally remains committed to the preservation of the “rules-based order” as it so often espouses?
Babbage outlines four steps that can serve to reassure the United States, without compromising Australia’s sovereignty and national interests, beginning with engaging positively with Pentagon officials, acknowledging that Australia, like the US, can’t make absolute promises without knowing the context. Babbage details this, saying: “Relevant officials should engage Colby in a positive manner. They should emphasise that, just as the US cannot easily make absolute commitments to many future contingencies without knowing the precise circumstances, nor can Australia.”
The next step in the multi-pronged approach is focused on reaffirming the commitment of both nations to the ANZUS Treaty and allied Indo‑Pacific planning and operations.
Babbage adds: “Second, the government should reaffirm its strong commitment to all aspects of the ANZUS Treaty and that Australia will continue to support the planning, operations and other activities of the US and other allied forces in the Indo-Pacific.”
Third, Babbage advocates for Australia offering to participate in combined contingency‑planning efforts, including personnel exchanges to work with US staff and contribute in meaningful ways, in many ways stepping up and enhancing the existing relationships and exchanges that exist between the two nations.
He details the intricacies of this, saying: “Third, so the US and Australia can prepare for a range of possible security crises in the Indo-Pacific, the government should say it will make Australian personnel available to work with US staff to prepare combined contingency plans. Australia will try to make high-value and innovative contributions to this work, it should say.”
Finally, Babbage reinforces the need for Australia to emphasise its sovereignty, reaffirming that any ADF involvement will always be decided by the Australian government at the time and measured against the context of the broader request.
Babbage stresses the importance of the final step, saying: “This type of response would fully protect Australian sovereignty and its decision prerogatives. It would be consistent with Australia’s decision making in similar situations during the past century. Importantly, it would also reaffirm the continuing strength of the alliance between Australia and the US and reinforce its deterrence value.”
Final thoughts
If Australia is to not just survive but genuinely prosper in this shifting era, policymakers and the broader community must acknowledge that the world is growing ever more multipolar, and that the Indo-Pacific is quickly becoming the most fiercely contested region on the planet.
This transformation is driven by the rising economic, political and strategic influence of nations like China, India, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam, alongside the established – and resurging – capabilities of South Korea and Japan. Together, they’re forging a highly competitive arena right on Australia’s doorstep.
Confronting these challenges and opportunities means moving beyond the narrow outlooks that have long underpinned our diplomatic, strategic and economic policies since Federation.
To truly harness the profound shifts taking place in the Indo-Pacific, Australia needs to adopt a long-term perspective. The urgent questions now are: when will we see a comprehensive analysis and response to these developments? When will a clear narrative and strategy emerge that enables both industry and the community to understand not only the risks but the thrilling, untapped opportunities ahead?
As regional dynamics evolve and China continues to extend its sway, Australia must decide whether it can afford to remain a secondary power or whether it needs to embrace a more independent and influential role amid intensifying great-power competition.
Most importantly, our leaders and citizens must avoid short-term distractions and stay true to Australia’s core values and principles.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
