iscover
As limited conflict rages in Southeast Asia, Australia has largely ignored the implications of and underlying motivations behind Thailand and Cambodia’s enmity at our own peril, with this conflict undoubtedly a sign of things to come.
For centuries, the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia has been shaped not only by wars and shifting borders, but also by deeper ethnic, cultural and religious currents that predate European colonisation.
These two kingdoms, heirs to the legacies of the Angkor and Sukhothai civilisations, have long competed for influence in mainland Southeast Asia, with overlapping claims to territory, heritage and regional primacy.
Beneath their formal diplomatic ties lay a current of historical mistrust, shaped by centuries of Khmer–Thai rivalry, religious divergence between Theravāda Buddhist traditions and contestation over symbols of national identity such as the Preah Vihear Temple.
These tensions have flared into armed clashes even in the 21st century, demonstrating the enduring power of pre-modern rivalries in modern geopolitics, a fact often overlooked by Western academics and policymakers, especially in Australia as we grapple with the fraying of the US-led world order.
Crucially, the antagonisms between Thailand and Cambodia are not simply a product of colonial borders or Cold War politics.
Rather, they reflect a deeper and older regional pattern, one in which identity, language and belief systems play as much a role in conflict as material power.
Ethnolinguistic divisions, overlapping or hostile religious beliefs and interpretations, and historic tributary systems have long influenced the way Asian states understand sovereignty, legitimacy and neighbourly relations.
In many parts of Asia, including mainland Southeast Asia, pre-colonial hierarchies and rivalries remain embedded in national narratives, influencing everything from education to foreign policy, serving to fundamentally dismantle the narrative that is the “global rules-based order”.
Critical to Australia’s own security, prosperity and stability, it is urgent that we understand and acknowledge that these dynamics are emblematic of broader and entrenched patterns across the Indo-Pacific.
In south Asia, east Asia, and Southeast Asia alike, identity-based tensions whether between Han Chinese and Tibetans, Burmese and Rohingya or Sinhalese and Tamils, frequently complicate otherwise pragmatic diplomacy.
Future Australian foreign and security policy urgently needs to move beyond the binary of great power competition and engage with the region with a firm understanding of its own historical and cultural terms. Critically, understanding the roots of local conflict from ancient civilisational rivalry to religious and ethnic difference will be vital in crafting enduring partnerships and supporting regional stability.
Importantly, Australian policymakers urgently need to accept that this “new” reality is set to rapidly become our “new normal” as the US-led, post-Second World War global “rules-based” order is no longer relevant or applicable to the Indo-Pacific and the competition rapidly emerging at the periphery of great power competition.
The ’new normal’ of regional competition
For much of Australia’s recent history, we, like most nations across the Indo-Pacific, lived under the economic, political and broader security umbrella provided by the United States, assuming the role of the once mighty European imperial powers.
This umbrella threw off the shackles of the colonial world that had dominated much of the globe in large parts up until the end of the Second World, with successive independence movements across the Indo-Pacific, central and southern America and Africa all providing the perfect playgrounds for proxy and “grey zone” conflict between the US and Soviet Union.
However, in many ways, these proxy conflicts served to gloss over the simmering ethno-religious, political and strategic tensions and hostilities, but equally served to place these movements under increasing pressure as both the US and Soviet Union propped up various regimes across the globe.
In spite of this, these animosities didn’t simply fade away into memory, nor did the Indo-Pacific follow the European example post-World War Two and embrace a model dominated by a “union of states”, rather, in many ways, the Cold War years served to only kick the can down the road, placing these tensions and enmities under a pressure cooker, exacerbated by proxy and grey zone operations.
Today, the chickens have come home to roost, as the once developing nations across the Indo-Pacific, in particular, are rapidly developing, becoming immense economic, political and strategic centres of mass in a world that is accelerating towards a “new normal” of multipolar competition.
Yet for whatever reason, Australia, like many Western nations seeking to expand their influence in the Indo-Pacific, remains woefully unprepared to confront the reality of our own multipolar region.
Much of the national capacity in regard to economic, political and strategic thinking has, for the better part of the last four decades, been focused on the elephant in the room, that being the People’s Republic of China and its immense economic, industrial, political and strategic potential both in our region and more broadly on the global stage.
As a result, we have seen Australia continue to “hitch it’s wagon” to Beijing’s economic house of cards, while continuing to entrench itself in the US strategic alliance network and while navigating this dichotomy.
While on the global stage, this dichotomy makes a great deal of rational sense when looking at the more micro level within the confines of the Indo-Pacific – it becomes clear that there has to be greater nuance and indeed understanding and acceptance of the predominately ethno-nationalist, political, religious and historical drivers behind the rise of multipolar competition in our region.
With this in mind, what are some of the other potential flashpoints we face?
Canary in the coal mine – the true ’multipolar’ order is FAR closer to home
The conflict brewing between Thailand and Cambodia is just the tip of the iceberg of the shifting regional dynamics Australia now faces, with the true global trend shift towards “multipolarity” happening far closer to home and at an increasingly accelerating pace.
While some are held in uneasy stasis, others flare periodically into violence or diplomatic crisis. These fault lines are often obscured by narratives of economic growth or pan-regional cooperation; however they remain potent flashpoints and reminders that history, identity and memory are as strategically important as geography or military hardware.
This flies in direct contrast with the pluralistic and multicultural societies of nations like Australia, America or contemporary Europe, creating a significant disconnect between how we view the world and the reality of the contemporary geopolitical environment. But what are some of the other areas that present significant flashpoints that have the potential to impact Australia’s economic, political and strategic security and stability in the region?
Nowhere is the Indo-Pacific’s historical burden more pronounced than the Korean Peninsula. The division of Korea in the aftermath of the Second World War fractured a people with shared language, culture and history.
The North’s dynastic, militarised regime contrasts starkly with the South’s democratic modernity, yet both claim legitimacy as the sole Korean nation. The armistice that ended open conflict in 1953 has never been replaced by a peace treaty, and the border remains one of the most heavily militarised in the world.
Any miscalculation, regime collapse or outside interference risks igniting not only regional conflict but also great power confrontation.
Moving to Southeast Asia, Myanmar is home to over 130 officially recognised ethnic groups, many with their own languages, religions and armed movements. The Bamar-dominated military junta has long struggled to suppress calls for autonomy or independence from the Shan, Kachin, Karen and others.
Most acutely, the violent persecution of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority in a predominantly Buddhist country, has drawn international condemnation and triggered mass displacement. Myanmar’s internal conflicts risk spilling across borders into Bangladesh, Thailand, India and China, with direct implications for regional stability.
This gives way to the unresolved status of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-majority region claimed by both India and Pakistan, which remains a flashpoint in south Asia. Born from the trauma of partition in 1947 when British India was carved along religious lines, Kashmir has seen repeated wars, a militant insurgency and a heavy military presence.
With both countries nuclear armed and prone to nationalistic posturing, even minor incidents risk escalation. Religious identity, colonial legacies and territorial sovereignty are tightly interwoven in this volatile dispute.
Closer to home, we see in Indonesia’s easternmost provinces of Papua and West Papua, a decades-long independence movement simmers beneath Jakarta’s efforts to integrate the region. Indigenous Papuans, ethnically and culturally distinct from the Javanese-dominated centre, have long resisted what many view as colonial-style occupation.
Accusations of human rights abuses, demographic engineering through transmigration, and religious and cultural suppression have fuelled separatist sentiment. The conflict has regional implications, particularly for Melanesian solidarity, Australian diplomacy and broader debates over self-determination in the Indo-Pacific.
Finally, we can’t neglect the South China Sea dispute, which is often framed in terms of maritime law or resource competition, but its roots go deeper. China’s expansive claims, including the so-called “nine-dash line”, draw upon narratives of historical entitlement and civilisational continuity. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and others reject these claims, citing both international law and their own histories of maritime independence.
Each of these flashpoints combine the high stakes of national identity, historical grievance and competing strategic interests converging here in some of the world’s most militarised and legally ambiguous zones.
Final thoughts
Together, these flashpoints serve as a stark reminder that modern borders often mask far older contests of faith, identity, memory and power, factors far removed from contemporary understanding in Western countries like Australia.
For Australia, engaging effectively in the Indo-Pacific will require more than economic integration or defence posturing. It demands a deep, historically literate understanding of the cultural and political undercurrents that shape regional security and a readiness to navigate a terrain where history remains an active and unpredictable force.
As the post–Second World War order unravels, Australia’s vulnerability to external shocks is becoming impossible to ignore. The need to build real national resilience is no longer a long-term ambition, it’s an urgent priority.
Australians must also confront an uncomfortable truth: unlike many nations, modern Australia has been largely sheltered from the harsh realities of conflict and crisis. For generations, we’ve lived without food, energy or medicine shortages.
That comfort has bred complacency, and it’s now putting the future of our nation at risk.
To secure its future, Australia must become more self-reliant and strategically capable, developing the economic, diplomatic and military tools expected of a confident middle power. This isn’t just about defending sovereignty, it’s about stepping up to shape a stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific alongside like-minded partners.
We can no longer afford the luxury of throwing hard problems in the “too hard basket”. Embracing the scale of the challenge opens the door to new strategic, economic and diplomatic opportunities.
As great power rivalry intensifies and China’s regional influence expands, Australia faces a defining choice: remain a dependent junior player or rise as a more capable and independent contributor to regional security.
This means smart, forward-looking government policy that strengthens national resilience, particularly economic resilience to reduce our exposure to coercion, disruption and shocks that could undermine our sovereignty.
Ultimately, only a strong, diverse and innovative economy can sustain a credible national defence posture. One that protects our interests, enhances regional stability and gives Australia a meaningful voice in a world where security is no longer guaranteed and power is increasingly contested.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
