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With the government hinting at a major restructuring of the Australian Defence Force, culling senior ranks in favour of boosting combat power, does Singapore’s world’s best practice provide a model worth considering and emulating?
Australia’s long and storied history of geopolitical and strategic insecurity comes largely as a result of our small population, which has only been exacerbated by our proximity to some of the world’s most populated nations buoyed by their own rising economic, strategic and political power and ambitions for the Indo-Pacific.
Equally influential is the shift in Australian domestic politics, which like many Western nations in the aftermath of the Cold War, took advantage of the dual phenomenon known as the “Peace Dividend” and the “End of History” championed by policymakers and academics the world over.
As a result, we bore witness to a seismic shift in the public consciousness and its approach to military force and the use of the Australian Defence Force, marked by a doctrinal, structural and personnel shift away from high-end “warfighting” towards the reshaping of the ADF into a glorified constabulary force for the Pacific, with some high-end warfighting capabilities dispersed around the edges.
Indeed, Australian strategist Paul Dibb, architect of the 1987 Dibb report – Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities – which formalised much of this shift ahead of the end of the Cold War, has recently stated, “I’ve lost count of how often I’ve been with ministers and seen their disbelief when confronted with the reality that the most we could sustain on operations, even for a short time, would be a couple of battalions, two submarines and a continuous combat air patrol, the latter to be maintained for only a few days.”
In place of a “war”-focused military, we saw the Australian Defence Force gradually shift towards a force focused on “low-intensity” regional peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief missions all backed by an inescapably highly bloated and bureaucratic structure, where a great deal of “operational capability” is locked behind in the “tail” of the organisation.
All of this has evolved and metastised as a result of the largely benign security environment experienced since the end of the Cold War and the “over there” nature of our small-scale involvements in central Asia and the Middle East. Today however, we face a far less benign security environment and a region at the epicentre of the emerging multipolar order.
This has, in recent years, prompted a significant backlash by Australian strategic policy experts, policymakers and a growing chorus from the Australian public about the state of the combat capability of the Australian Defence Force amid concerns that when push comes to shove, our military has become a force dominated by “too many chiefs and not enough Indians”.
Arguably, this dialogue began under the previous government, which recognised the growing personnel requirements that the ADF would face in coming decades, announcing in March 2022 an intent to expand the “whole of Defence” workforce to approximately 100,000 personnel, with then Defence minister Peter Dutton stating: “Defence operates with a highly integrated workforce spanning the Australian Defence Force, civilians and industry providers, with each bringing specialised skills and expertise.
“This growth in workforce and expertise will enable us to deliver our nuclear-powered submarines, ships, aircraft and advanced weapons. It will mean we can build warfighting capabilities in the domains of space, and information, and cyber.”
This growth would see the ADF personnel cap increase from the current authorised/budgeted strength of between 57,226–59,373 (with the government recently announcing that the ADF’s strength had reached 61,189), all the while we struggle to scrounge enough personnel to deploy a single surface combatant to support multinational maritime security operations in the Middle East.
More recently, we have seen growing speculation off the back of the 2024 Defence Workforce Plan and ahead of the release of the 2026 National Defence Strategy that the senior leadership from 1-star and above would be in the chopping block by up to 30 per cent amid swirling media speculation.
All of this got me thinking, particularly as the regional geopolitical security environment continues to deteriorate and the Australian Defence Force will be increasingly called upon, how do we maximise the amount of combat power we can generate and deploy sustainably?
Equally, what best practice models can we draw upon and repurpose rather than reinventing the wheel?
Singapore’s ‘lean professional core’
At first glance, it might seem like a strange comparison, Australia and Singapore, however, not when one considers the broad strokes of both nation’s respective military strength, broadly analogous structures and capabilities either currently in service or expected to be fielded in the coming years.
As it stands, the Singaporean Armed Forces have a total full-time strength of approximately 51,000 across the Army, Navy and Air Force, compared to Australia’s aforementioned current authorised/budgeted full-time strength of 61,189 as at 4 August 2025, with common platforms ranging from HIMARS, SPIKE Missile, AH-64 Apache, KC-30, F-35A, C-130 Hercules and CH-47F Chinook helicopters.
But that is where the similarities end, with the Singaporean Armed Forces leveraging a lean force structure, focused on delivering real, quantifiable combat capability, backed by follow-on mass drawn from reserve forces numbering 252,000 through a model combining national service with lean operating margins.
This model is often described as a “lean professional core” backed by what has been referred to as a “strong reserve tail”, designed to provide sustainable mass for the small island city-state, backed by high-technology, modern combat capabilities across the warfighting domains.
For a more data-driven comparison currently, the Royal Australian Navy, according to its website, consists of “nearly 50 commissioned vessels” but actually operates a fleet of 41 “major warships” against “over 16,000 personnel”, bringing together a fleet of advanced combatants in the Hobart Class air warfare destroyers, the venerable Anzac Class guided missile frigates, the Canberra Class landing helicopter docks, Supply Class auxiliary oilers, and the Collins Class submarines.
In stark contrast, the Republic of Singapore Navy operates a fleet of 38 commissioned vessels against a full-time, active personnel workforce of 4,000, with broadly a diverse fleet structure comparable to Australia’s own fleet, including the six Formidable Class guided missile frigates, the six Victory Class corvettes, the eight Independence Class littoral mission vessels, Endurance Class amphibious warfare ships, and a diverse fleet of submarines, including the Archer and Challenger classes, respectively.
Now yes, many pundits will rightfully say you can’t draw a one-to-one comparison of workforce numbers for different navies, and equally, we have to understand that “more” doesn’t equate to better, rather looking at the broadly comparable units to extrapolate a level of comparison.
Looking at Australia’s major surface combatants, the eight Anzac and three Hobart Class, which have individual crews of 179 and 202, respectively, based on publicly available information, compared provides Australia with a combined 2,038 personnel, assuming a single full-time crew for each vessel, bringing Australia’s major surface combatant complement to 13 per cent of the Royal Australian Navy’s total active personnel.
Taking a closer looking at Singapore’s fleet of six Formidable Class frigates, again broadly comparable to Australia’s Anzac Class frigates and Canada’s Halifax Class (albeit significantly more modern), have an individual crew complement of 90, with a total fleet size of 540 personnel in total, again assuming a single crew for each vessel. For Singapore, this represents approximately 13.5 per cent of the Republic of Singapore Navy’s total full-time uniformed personnel.
Comparing the submarine arms of both nations, Australia’s six Collins Class have an individual crew complement of approximately 58, giving the operational arm of Australia’s long-struggling submarine fleet a total personnel headcount of at least 350 personnel (at a minimum based on one full-time crew per boat). Meanwhile, Singapore’s fleet of two Archer Class submarines have an individual crew of 28 and two Challenger Class submarines with an individual crew of 23, bringing Singapore’s operational submarine workforce to 102 personnel (at a minimum based on one full-time crew per boat).
It is worth noting that the personnel numbers around Singapore’s submarine fleet are expected to grow in coming years as it undergoes an extensive modernisation and expansion, with the introduction of the Invincible Class submarine fleet, with six such vessels fielded phasing out the older Challenger and Archer Class submarines.
On these figures, it is pretty clear that by most metrics, the Republic of Singapore Navy is outperforming the Royal Australian Navy on key metrics, with a quarter of the full-time workforce.
What are the key pillars of this “lean professional core” model and how can Australia leverage these learnings to better tailor the Australian Defence Force to fulfill the government’s proposed strategy of deterrence by denial as outlined in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and supporting 2024 National Defence Strategy?
The core pillars
It is worth noting that Singapore’s approach to military organisation is shaped by necessity: scarce land, a small population and an acute awareness of strategic vulnerability. Out of this reality has emerged a defence model built around a “thin professional core”, maximising readiness, combat power and deterrence through discipline, planning, and innovation.
In doing so, Singapore balances a small standing force with a large, trained reserve and delivers a level of capability per soldier and per dollar that is globally respected.
By contrast Australia, as a larger and more geographically dispersed country, has adopted a fundamentally different approach. Singapore’s approach is nevertheless instructive as to how a comparatively small nation can have a disproportionate combat capability. Accordingly, there are valuable lessons to be drawn if Australia seeks to get more combat power and national resilience out of a finite defence workforce and budget.
Doing so requires strict adherence to the central pillars of the model that have provided Singapore with significant success in this space, namely:
Pillar 1: A small, high-readiness regular force focused on combat – Singapore’s standing army, while small by global standards, is finely honed. The regulars are concentrated in high-readiness roles: front-line combat units, combat support such as signals and engineers and essential enablers like aviation and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Complementing this, staff roles, base operations and much of the logistical backend are significantly streamlined or contracted out to civilian enterprise.
In contrast, Australia maintains a larger proportion of its regular force in rear echelon and administrative functions, partly due to its more expeditionary defence model and broader geographic responsibilities. This often results in fewer full-time personnel being available for rapid deployment or sustained front-line operations.
Pillar 2: National service and a large, integrated reserve force – At the heart of Singapore’s defence model is compulsory National Service. Every able-bodied male citizen undertakes two years of full-time service, followed by years of regular reservist training. This creates a trained mobilisation base of more than 250,000, giving Singapore the ability to surge from peacetime to full wartime strength in a matter of days.
Australia, by contrast, relies on an all-volunteer force. Its reserves, while professional and increasingly integrated, are smaller and less central to overall force structure and planning. Australia lacks a mechanism for large-scale national mobilisation, meaning the regular force must carry more of the national defence burden at all times.
Pillar 3: Technological force multiplication and indigenous defence industry – Singapore invests heavily in networked systems, unmanned platforms and automation to offset its manpower limitations. It has developed indigenous capabilities through ST Engineering and DSO National Laboratories, allowing it to tailor platforms to local conditions and integrate them seamlessly across services.
Robotic maintenance, AI-enabled logistics and battlefield drones are increasingly commonplace throughout the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).
Australia, with a more diverse and dispersed industrial base, has tended to purchase platforms off the shelf and modify them, sometimes at great expense and delay. Although there is now a strong push for sovereign capability, particularly in guided weapons and drones, Singapore’s coherence of military-industrial integration remains a step ahead in terms of speed and efficiency.
Pillar 4: Integrated, joint training and simulation – Due to limited training space, Singapore has pioneered the use of advanced simulation, instrumented urban combat zones and overseas training partnerships. The SAF’s SAFTI City, a multi-level smart urban warfare facility, exemplifies this approach. Moreover, exercises are joint by default, with land, air, and sea units operating together from training to execution.
Australia enjoys expansive training areas and live-fire opportunities, but historically, its services have trained more independently. Although jointness is improving especially with HQJOC and amphibious task groups, it still lacks Singapore’s level of doctrinal unity and day-to-day inter-service integration.
Pillar 5: Total defence and whole-of-nation alignment – Perhaps Singapore’s greatest strategic advantage is its total defence framework, a cultural and political consensus that national survival demands every citizen plays a role. Military, civil, economic, digital, social and psychological resilience are all integrated into the national security narrative.
Critically, defence is not just the domain of uniformed personnel, it is seen as a civic responsibility.
In Australia, defence is often viewed as a niche government function, disconnected from broader society. National mobilisation planning has been and continues to be minimal, and defence capability is rarely linked to economic or civil resilience in a coherent framework.
This is a critical difference in mindset, one that affects recruitment, national will and the ability to respond to major crises.
Final thoughts
While Australia and Singapore face different strategic circumstances, Singapore’s lean professional core offers clear advantages in efficiency, readiness and scalability. For Australia to adopt a similar model, it would need to restructure its regular force, expand and train a modern reserve or national guard, civilianise and automate non-combat functions and embed jointness into every layer of doctrine and command.
Equally, it would require a cultural shift, one that redefines national defence as a whole-of-society effort, not just the job of a uniformed few. In doing so, Australia could build a force that is smaller in standing size but larger in strategic weight, responsiveness and deterrent power.
Australia is facing a rapidly deteriorating geopolitical environment that’s reshaping the regional and global security landscape. This demands clear-eyed, realistic thinking from our policymakers, not wishful optimism or half-measures. Yes, getting 50 per cent of something is better than 100 per cent of nothing – but cutting corners on defence capability today only guarantees higher costs tomorrow, when we’re forced to rush-build a high-end warfighting force in a crisis.
The truth is unavoidable: Australia must dramatically increase long-term investment in national defence. Short-term sugar hits or accounting tricks that push funding into the forward estimates won’t cut it. Real growth, not inflation-adjusted illusions, is needed to build and sustain credible military power.
No one said defending the nation in an era of great power rivalry would be cheap or easy. It won’t be. But it’s a responsibility we can’t afford to dodge.
Australia’s standing in the Indo-Pacific will depend on our ability to sustain ourselves economically, strategically and politically. Despite our vast natural resources, industrial capacity and agricultural strength, we still lack a coherent national security strategy that ties together defence, diplomacy, industry and economic resilience.
To change that, we need real transparency and genuine collaboration between our strategic leaders, elected officials and the Australian people. We need to rebuild public trust in the idea that national defence isn’t a niche portfolio – it’s a shared national project.
And most of all, we need the courage to act before the choice is no longer ours.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
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