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Celebrated Australian strategist, Paul Dibb, has called for greater discernment in the national security policy debate, arguing that both the Australia–US alliance and greater self-reliance are critical to having a well-rounded defence posture.
In a world of shifting alliances and rising great power rivalry, understanding how power is wielded from global heavyweights to fast-emerging regional players has never been more critical to Australia’s long-term security, stability and prosperity.
After the Second World War, the United States stepped into the vacuum left by shattered empires, establishing itself as the dominant global power. Through institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and alliances such as NATO, Washington ushered in the era of Pax Americana, a rules-based order underwritten by American power.
Armed with overwhelming economic clout and unmatched military reach, the US took on the role of global sheriff, often at the urging of others. It pushed back against communism, helped manage the end of colonialism, and kept the peace in a world craving stability.
For nations devastated by war, America became the security cornerstone. Australia, though largely spared from the worst of the conflict, was no exception. In the early 1950s, the ANZUS alliance marked a formal pivot away from the British Empire – a farewell to the “old world” and a firm handshake with the “new”.
But the world is changing fast.
America’s Cold War-era dominance, supercharged in the unipolar years after the fall of the Soviet Union, is losing steam. Endless military engagements, growing political dysfunction at home and the rise of peer competitors have chipped away at US primacy.
China and India are surging. So too are countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam and Thailand. The international order is tilting towards multipolarity – a far messier, more complex landscape where power is diffused across several centres.
For Australia, long sheltered by the US alliance and comfortable in its “middle power” identity, the fraying of Pax Americana should be a loud wake-up call. But if it is, our leaders aren’t acting like it.
Despite the tectonic shifts unfolding around us, especially in our own backyard, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese insists Australia must chart a more “independent” path on defence. He’s flagged a potential loosening of our strategic ties with the United States at a time when the alliance arguably matters more than ever.
This bold repositioning comes just as Washington is pressing allies to lift defence spending to at least 3.5 per cent of gross domestic product, a move that would bring Australia into line with the demands of a tougher, more contested world. At the same time, the Albanese government is grappling with ballooning costs tied to the AUKUS program and rising budget pressures at home.
The stakes are rising. The old order is fading. And Australia now faces a choice: drift with the tide or navigate the storm with clear-eyed purpose. In response to these tectonic shifts, we have seen growing questions mounting about the longevity and validity of the nation’s close alliance with the United States amid calls for the nation to embrace and build greater self-reliance to strengthen national security.
Highlighting the short-sightedness of this approach is Paul Dibb, the celebrated Australian strategist and author of the 1986 Dibb report which laid the foundation for the nation’s defence posture and resourcing well into the 21st century in a piece for the ASPI Strategist, titled Our US alliance is essential – yet we must also be more self-reliant, in which he advocates for a far more nuanced approach.
Strong alliance important, but not unconditionally
Dibb is quick to reinforce the reality that Australia’s alliance with the United States has been a cornerstone of national security since the 1950s and will continue to be foundational well into the 21st century.
However, Dibb argued that Australia must develop the ability to lead and defend itself regionally, especially in situations where US engagement isn’t guaranteed or may be delayed.
He said, “So, how might Australia turn towards a more self-reliant defence posture while still maintaining an alliance with the US? My central policy guideline is to demonstrate to Washington that, short of a large attack on Australia by a major power, we would be able to defend ourselves.”
Dibb cited the 1999 East Timor intervention, where then President Bill Clinton backed Australia but made clear that Canberra had to take the lead. The lesson? We must be able to act decisively on our own when the moment demands it.
He articulated this new reality, saying, “The days are gone when we can immediately turn to the US if we are threatened by military challenges in our own region of primary strategic concern. That was made clear to us in 1999 when then Prime Minister John Howard asked for US military protection as we undertook the multination leadership role for the United Nations in what became an independent East Timor.
“President Bill Clinton made it very clear that this was a role for Australia’s own military to lead. More than a quarter of a century later we should not still be waiting for Washington to hold our hand when it comes to military contingencies in our own region of primary strategic concern.”
America, like every nation, acts in its own interests
Perhaps still somewhat shocking for many Australian policymakers is the recognition that America will act in its own national interests as its first port of call, something Australian policymakers seem unwilling to accept, let alone approach and embrace domestically.
This approach has only been dialled up to 11 under the increasingly transactional Trump administration, where while the US remains Australia’s most important ally, its global commitments and internal divisions mean its support may not always align with our needs.
Dibb stressed that the US will intervene only when it serves its national interest and those interests may not always line up with ours. As China’s power grows and strategic flashpoints multiply, the US will increasingly prioritise its own contests, especially in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, rather than Australian contingencies like the Solomon Islands or Papua New Guinea.
He articulated this reality, saying, “The second policy point is not to assume the isolationist tendencies of President Donald Trump will endure after him as a new normal in our bilateral relationship.”
Dibb added, “As the former secretary of foreign affairs Peter Varghese wisely counsels, the US, like all countries, will only ever act according to its own interests and that does not include guaranteeing the security of an ally in all foreseeable circumstances. Contrary to some views in Canberra, Varghese believes that for the next several decades, the world will remain largely bipolar, dominated by the US and China. This will continue to increasingly demand the attention of Washington, which will continue to have its hands full.”
This conveniently leads us to Dibb’s next key point, that being that defence “self-reliance” doesn’t mean going it alone.
We’re not going it alone, but we need to make critical strategic investments
Self-reliance, as Dibb proposed, isn’t code for isolation or neutrality, rather it means having the sovereign ability to detect threats, deter aggression and defend Australian interests across our area of primary interest, which he argued “includes Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and the northeast Indian Ocean” with credible and sustainable force. Doing so includes long-range strike capabilities, robust air and missile defences, hardened infrastructure and sovereign munitions production.
Going beyond that, and something overlooked by Dibb, is the need for a fundamental restructuring of the Australian economy, to simply move beyond the “holes and houses”-dominated economy, with a shift towards complex, competitive advanced manufacturing, economic and industrial diversity.
Dibb added, “However, it needs to be plainly understood in Canberra that all this will require significant and sustained increases in our defence spending. As China’s power grows, we need a defence force capable of helping to constrain it in our region of primary strategic concern.”
These capabilities should be developed in close collaboration with allies, particularly through AUKUS and deeper integration with Japan, India and ASEAN partners, but they must be usable independently if required.
Dibb goes further, adding, “Moreover, it is imperative that we quite quickly acquire long-range anti-ship strike missiles with ranges of more than 2,000 kilometers as well as a much-needed integrated air defence system. And, instead of yet more expensive major platforms – ships, aircraft, big ground vehicles – we need to urgently focus on drones and unmanned combat aircraft and submarines. We should be consulting our quasi-ally Japan about closer cooperation in this urgent new endeavour.”
Finally, Dibb argued that one of the most important structural reforms outlined in the recent Defence Strategic Review is the adoption of a regular, classified net assessment process, to be used in such a way as to systematically weigh Australia’s capabilities against known and emerging threats.
Dibb argued that this will help avoid strategic drift and provide a framework for timely course corrections. This is a move towards more strategic discipline, ensuring that Australia’s defence investments actually match the evolving nature of the threat landscape.
Final thoughts
Australia stands at a cross-roads. Its long-standing security alliance with the US remains indispensable, but the era of automatic reliance is over. Instead, Australia must build real capacity: submarines, missiles, hardened infrastructure and smarter coordination.
The objective isn’t going it alone, it’s showing Washington we can carry our weight and enhance regional stability. That’s the meaning of true sovereignty and soft power in today’s world.
A disciplined defence posture, backed by rising domestic capability and sustained partnerships is the vision. If Australia succeeds, the US–Australia alliance becomes stronger not just in name, but in substance.
Like many Western nations, Australia is nowhere near prepared for the ripple effects of modern conflict.
Australians have enjoyed extraordinary security and comfort for generations: no rationing, no real shocks to our system, no prolonged chaos. But that comfort has bred dangerous complacency. To protect our future, Australia must build the diplomatic, economic and military strength expected of a serious power.
This isn’t just about defence, it’s about safeguarding our way of life and earning the ability to help shape, not just survive, the future of the Indo-Pacific. We urgently need to drop the mindset that bold reform is “too hard”. With the right leadership, we can unlock enormous strategic and economic opportunity and become not just a fast follower, but a true strategic leader.
With China growing more assertive and tensions rising across the region, Australia faces a clear choice: stay small and exposed or rise to meet the moment.
That means building real national resilience diversifying our economy, investing in innovation and preparing for economic coercion so that our sovereignty isn’t vulnerable to global shocks. Only a strong, agile economy can provide the leverage to deter threats, grow prosperity and lead with confidence.
And only then can our defence force move from being reactive to being truly ready, capable of defending our interests in a world where power is shifting fast and security can no longer be assumed.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
