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It is an age-old question: “If we don’t take our own security seriously, then how can we expect anyone else to?” Yet for Australia, it seems to once again be rearing its head, but still with no firm answer. So who is responsible for our defence?
From the earliest days of European settlement, Australia and Australians have both celebrated and maligned the “tyranny of distance”, that being our geographic isolation from our main security benefactor of the day.
This isolation from the epicentre of our primary strategic partner’s power, whether the British Empire, or as it has been since the Battle of the Coral Sea in 1942, the United States, has served to create a pervasive sense of strategic anxiety in both the public and its policymakers, while also raising significant questions about the capacity for the nation to defend itself against much larger powers, closer to home.
Beginning with concerns about French, Dutch and Russian expansionism in the “Far East” as it was then known, eventually gave way to similar concerns about the rise of Imperial Germany’s Pacific holdings prior to the very real economic, political and security challenges posed by the rampaging forces and ambitions of Imperial, Japan which ultimately came to a head during the Second World War.
While the post-Second World War global order and period of peace, prosperity and stability – known colloquially as either the “global rules-based order” or the Pax Americana – have served to transform Australia into a “developed”, globalised economy, it has equally served to effectively shrink the world, giving rise to some of the world’s fastest growing and largest economies, backed by nations with their own unique designs and ambitions for the Indo-Pacific.
In doing so, this has served to fundamentally reshape both the regional and global balance of power, stretching the capacity of the United States to serve as the “global policeman” and for Australia, our primary strategic benefactor, serving as a powerful hedge against the economic, political, strategic and territorial ambitions of rising powers closer to home.
This comes at a time of growing strategic uncertainty, anxiety and competition on the global and regional stages respectively, as the US president, Donald Trump, seeks to rewrite the rules of the road, with an expectation that America’s allies will do far more of the lifting on their own security, both in terms of blood and treasure.
Ultimately, this has given rise to an age-old question about who is “responsible” for defending Australia, and then an equally important question of, “If we don’t take our own security seriously, than how can we expect anyone else to?”
Highlighting this reality is Jennifer Parker, defence and national security expert and senior expert associate at the Australian National University’s National Security College, in a piece for The Sydney Morning Herald over the weekend, titled If there’s a war in the Pacific, who defends Australia?, in which she unpacked the very real questions at the core of these issues.
Parker began her timely analysis in the ongoing fallout following Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles’ “happenstance” meeting/photo opportunity with his US counterparts in Vice President JD Vance and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, saying, “This week we debated whether Marles’ photo with US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth represented a ‘happenstance’ or a ‘meeting’, an issue that represents the chaos in the Pentagon rather than a reflection on the alliance. Yet beneath the headlines lies a more pressing question: in a crisis, how would we fight together in an Indo-Pacific conflict, are our expectations of roles clear and are they truly in Australia’s interest?”
The eternal question – who does what?
One of the long-standing questions that has inevitably shaped Australia’s defence and national security posture, capabilities and policy engagement within the Indo-Pacific dating back to the earliest days of the Commonwealth and its relationship with the British Empire: responsibility for strategic security (particularly Australia’s) in the Indo-Pacific.
As a result of our history, Australia is in many ways conditioned to play the smaller, subservient role in the Indo-Pacific, first to the British Empire and now to the United States, largely as a result of the economic, political, strategic and population constraints of Australia when compared to the powers of the Indo-Pacific, which makes plenty of sense.
However, just as Australia’s relationship with both its security benefactor has evolved, so too has its relationship with the “responsibilities” and delineation of responsibilities which is at the core of this ongoing debate.
Parker highlighted this reality, saying, “Australia should focus on complementing US power while retaining the ability to execute key roles independently, from defending Australia and its maritime trade to supporting partners in the Pacific without relying on Washington. After all, as a sovereign nation, Australia alone is responsible for its defence.”
And herein lies the major conceptual and theoretical challenge for Australia’s policymakers and the Australian public, the lack of clarity presents serious challenges and plenty of fodder for debate and conversation to unpack and discuss in the public domain to help inform the public consciousness, as all parties seek greater clarity over who is responsible for what.
Parker elaborated further, saying, “While suggestions of demands for a formal pre-commitment seem unlikely, especially given Washington’s own policy of strategic ambiguity, it is clear the US wants greater certainty. Australia should want that clarity too.”
Further complicating the conversation is the mismatch of beliefs and reality held by Australia’s strategic policymaking community versus that held by the Australian public and their perceptions over Australia’s military power, the power of the US military and its capacity to defend Australia’s interests in the event of threat to the nation.
Where there is perhaps an unwritten and certainly unsaid belief by the Australian public that the United States will come to our aid regardless, there is almost certainly an expectation held by much of Australia’s strategic policy community and many of our policymakers that the US will jump to our defence because of our more than a century of security relationship dating back to the Battle of Hamel during the First World War.
Parker said, “Australia often underscores its reliability by noting that Australian and American forces have fought side by side in every major conflict since the Battle of Hamel in WWI, from Europe to Iraq and Afghanistan. This history can create the impression that operating together is a well-trodden path. At the tactical level, that’s true. But strategically, the conflicts of the past differ markedly from those we may face in the future.”
While this relationship has, as Parker stated, “allowed a nation of 27 million to wield disproportionate influence in an era of great-power competition”, the reality is somewhat different to what both the Australian public and our policymaking elite seem to believe.
Parker does hint at this reality, posing the following, “Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy notes that ‘Australia’s alliance with the US is fundamental to our national security and the ADF’s capacity to generate, sustain and project credible military capability’. While true, it prompts a critical question: in a crisis or conflict in the Indo-Pacific, would that power be projected as part of a US-led force, with Australian units integrated into American command, or in a complementary role with clearly defined missions, responsibilities and geographic areas? Who is responsible for defending Australia?”
So we need to fundamentally restructure the way we think about our national security and, accordingly, the way we plan, fund and shape Australia’s defence and natural security response to the new regional and global power paradigm.
Why should anyone else defend us, if we won’t do the heavy lifting ourselves?
This brings me to an inescapable central point: Australia and its policymakers MUST take the responsibility to defend the nation and its interests seriously, more than any other public policy initiative, not repaying 20 per cent of HECS debt, not our commitment to punitive, self-defeating climate and environmental protection policies, not the sacred altars of Medicare and the NDIS.
Sorry if that slays a few sacred cows, but it is necessary.
No, Australia needs to urgently get serious about securing our own independent capability to defend our security and national interests and how we operate both independently and in partnership with the United States and our other regional partners.
Parker detailed this, saying, “This is more than semantics; it goes to the heart of who controls the employment of Australian ships, aircraft and other capabilities, and how we design and operate the ADF.”
Going further, Parker added, “The question of integration of forces versus delineation of forces becomes even more pressing given that, in any Indo-Pacific conflict, Australia would be fighting from its own territory for the first time since WWII ... Australia built its force contributions to fight and, when required, to sacrifice on distant shores, where the defence of the continent was never in question and Australian civilians were never directly at risk.”
This reality presents a significant challenge for both the Australian public and the policymakers to grapple with, the fundamental truth that we’re no longer likely to send our soldiers, sailors and aviators to fight and potentially die on some foreign shore on the other side of the world, rather, for the first time since the Second World War, our region is front and centre for the global great power competition.
“The only time Australia fought alongside the US with its own defence and civilian population at risk was during the Pacific campaign of WWII. After the fall of Singapore, a vulnerable Australia turned to Washington for protection, placing its forces under US General Douglas MacArthur’s command,” Parker said.
This is further complicated by a number of realities, including the cultural, demographic and societal makeup of contemporary Australia that has significant implications for the “subordination” of Australian military forces under the command of a US commander, as occurred during the Second World War and finally, the way in which we have funded (or perhaps, haven’t funded) and shaped the Australian Defence Force arguably as far back as the 1980s.
Parker hinted as these points, saying, “Australia today is a different nation. It has long since shed the constraints of empire, formalised by the 1986 Australia Act, and now boasts a far more diverse population, with 31.5 per cent of Australians born overseas. Australia in 2025 is far less willing to hand control of its naval, air and land forces and its defence to a US commander, and rightly so. But does Washington see it that way?
Going further, Parker articulated, “The harder truth, however, is that Australia has neither funded nor designed its ADF to independently defend the continent or execute key missions without US support. From a lack of sovereign space capability to limited missile defence and a stretched navy, the gaps are stark ... real sovereignty requires more, a clear strategy and a force design built around Australia’s own defence and regional roles. It should be designed to be supported by the US in our defence, not in support of the US defending us.”
This approach would serve as the foundation of Australia developing true autonomy and strategic capacity, in many ways it would serve as a “coming of age” moment for Australia which has long lingered in a state of arrested development, forcing the nation to take many other critical policy areas seriously, but it requires a major cultural and political rethink.
Final thoughts
Both government and everyday Australians are going to face some hard and truly uncomfortable truths if we’re serious about securing our future.
First, the Indo-Pacific is fast becoming the world’s most hotly contested region. China, India, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam are flexing new economic, political and military muscle, while Japan and South Korea are reasserting themselves. Competition is no longer looming on our doorstep – it’s already here, and it’s here to stay. Our “whole-of-nation” strategy must be reset to meet this new reality.
As Parker stated, “To preserve its autonomy, Australia must articulate and fund a strategy that clearly delineates responsibilities, rather than continuing to field a force built to be employed under US command, as it has in past conflicts.”
Second, without a sustained surge in investment, reform and long-range planning, we risk more than simply falling behind, we risk being left in the wake of our neighbours’ momentum. If we don’t act now, the next generation of Australians could find themselves living in a nation overshadowed by richer, stronger, more influential powers.
For too long we’ve settled for quick wins and reactive policies. Since Federation, governments have chased the short-term pay-off instead of the long-term prize. But the Indo-Pacific is shifting beneath our feet and business as usual won’t cut it. We need to think ahead, seize opportunities and blunt the threats before they overtake us.
The real question isn’t whether these challenges are coming, they’re already here. The question is when will Canberra finally roll out a bold, detailed plan that rallies industry and the public behind a clear national vision. When will we see a strategy that keeps Australia resilient in the face of sharpening great power rivalry?
With China pressing its influence in the spotlight, Australia has a stark choice: sit back as a bystander or step up as a shaper of the Indo-Pacific’s future. The decisions we make today will decide whether we thrive in this new era or get swept aside by it.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
