iscover
The prime minister has returned from the region empty-handed and empty-pocketed, meaning only one thing: Australia is in danger of losing the “Great Game” playing out on our doorstep – a serious problem when our own house isn’t in order.
In its truest sense, the idea of the “Great Game” dates back to the period of intense geopolitical competition between the British and Russian empires over control of central Asia during the 19th century.
However, history is characterised by a number of “great games” albeit using different monikers throughout the history, most notably with the scramble for the Americas and Africa and now Beijing’s efforts to coerce, control and manipulate nations across the Indo-Pacific.
From the east coast of Africa through south Asia and Sri Lanka, across to small Pacific Island nations, Beijing has sought to capitalise on the distracted Western nations, Australia and the United States in particular, in order to build robust, if somewhat questionable economic, political and quasi-security relationships, often resulting in major concerns in capitals across the region.
For the Indo-Pacific nations, the rise of debt trap diplomacy and infrastructure deals – often alienating local communities who were pushed out of job opportunities – have served to create a powder keg of domestic and international issues that has placed the region, particularly Australia’s “backyard” in the Pacific, in the crosshairs for many powers seeking to push back against Beijing’s rising influence.
Highlighting this reality, in the aftermath of the Prime Minister’s recent whirlwind diplomatic tour of the Pacific, is The Australian’s Cameron Stewart following an interview with former US deputy secretary of state Dr Kurt Campbell in a piece titled, China playing the ‘the great game’ against Australia in the Pacific, Kurt Campbell says, in which he warned, “The politics of the Pacific are increasingly contested, and the great game is afoot.”
Australia is dropping the ball
Kurt Campbell, the former US deputy secretary of state and one of the architects of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, has delivered a blunt warning in Canberra: China is playing “the great game” against Australia in the Pacific, and will use every available lever to frustrate and undermine Canberra’s initiatives.
Speaking at the National Press Club, Campbell – a central figure in Joe Biden’s administration and widely regarded as the intellectual force behind the US “pivot to Asia” – cautioned that the Pacific Islands have become a new front line in strategic competition. He argued that Beijing is waging an unrelenting campaign to displace Western influence and reshape the balance of power across the Indo-Pacific.
“The politics of the Pacific are increasingly contested, and the great game is afoot,” Campbell said. “I will say I’ve been very impressed at how Australia has stepped into the gap (because) you’ve seen some countries, including the United States, fall back with respect to our aid and our assistance programs.”
Campbell’s remarks reflect growing unease in Washington and Canberra about Beijing’s expanding reach in the Pacific Islands. Since 2019, China has pursued a series of high-profile moves: a secretive security pact with the Solomon Islands; efforts to court Kiribati after it switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan; proposals for region-wide policing and data-sharing agreements; and heavy investment in infrastructure projects, loans and elite influence operations.
These initiatives are not simply economic or diplomatic – they are viewed in Canberra as steps towards establishing a long-term Chinese security presence in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood.
Against this backdrop, Campbell suggested that Australia’s long-delayed security agreement with Papua New Guinea and the shelved discussions with Vanuatu should be understood as contested terrain. Asked about the hold-up in Port Moresby, he pointed directly to possible Chinese interference.
“I think it suggests that this is a region at strategic play, and that China is relentless, and they use all venues of engagement to try to block and block initiatives like the ones that Australia has initiated,” he said. “What Australia has done in a comprehensive fashion in PNG, beginning with sport, looking at training, and then also focusing on security, I think is ingenious and important.”
For Campbell, the slow progress is hardly surprising. Beijing has honed its tactics in the Pacific: offering infrastructure finance, exploiting divisions among local elites, cultivating ties with security services, and positioning itself as an alternative to Australia’s historically dominant role. Each time Canberra or Wellington seeks to deepen ties with a Pacific government, China counters with offers of funding, high-level visits, or inducements that make agreements politically or economically harder to conclude.
“I do not believe that China’s pattern of engagement or practices among the Pacific Islands, in any way will halt or diminish,” Campbell said. “These are deals that are contested behind the scenes.”
The stakes, he argued, go well beyond defence cooperation. Beijing is positioning itself as a partner on issues that resonate deeply with Pacific societies, particularly climate change and economic development. Unless Australia, New Zealand and the United States can meet those expectations, China’s influence will only grow.
“We (must) address the central issues that basically define life in the Pacific: dealing with climate change, resilience, societal resilience, illegal fishing, jobs, opportunities, communications with undersea cables,” Campbell said.
His message was clear: strategic competition in the Pacific is not only about submarines and bases but about who can win trust and deliver tangible benefits. China, he suggested, has recognised this and is acting accordingly.
Campbell’s intervention also touched on broader Indo-Pacific dynamics. He voiced confidence in the AUKUS nuclear submarine pact, noting that while it may not dominate headlines in Washington, “the pact was on track” and retained “solid support from the Trump administration”. At the same time, he joined a chorus of defence analysts urging Australia to increase its military spending.
“I’ve made very clear to Australian colleagues that I do believe more defence spending is relevant and timely and frankly, important, but ultimately, these are decisions for the Australian people,” Campbell said. “This is not something that we can wait on. The urgencies are clear. (But) the key here is that Australia is a sovereign, democratic nation, and it must make these decisions on its own. It’s not appropriate for another country to come in and dictate terms.”
Campbell also highlighted the fragility of the Quad – the strategic grouping of the US, India, Japan and Australia designed to counterbalance China’s rise. Tensions between Washington and New Delhi over trade and India’s ongoing imports of Russian oil have cast doubt on upcoming Quad meetings. Here again, Campbell argued, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese could play a pivotal role.
“We have some challenges now (with the Quad),” he said. “I believe what is going to be necessary is someone to help bridge and bring together two powerful, wilful, important leaders in the forms of Prime Minister Modi and President Trump. I think this is something that would be right up the alley of Prime Minister Albanese (and) it is my fervent hope that Australia will play a role in trying to bring back together what I think is one of the most important institutions in the Indo-Pacific.”
For Campbell, the contest in the Pacific and the Indo-Pacific more broadly cannot be separated from the state of US engagement. He was candid in acknowledging that Washington’s influence had eroded during Donald Trump’s first term, particularly in aid, diplomacy and climate policy. Campbell urged Albanese to press for renewed American commitment.
“I fully believe that Prime Minister Albanese will make the appeal to President Trump to re-engage, to continue the strong partnership with Australia in the Pacific,” he said.
Campbell’s comments echo long-standing concerns in Canberra. For years, Australian policymakers have worried that American inconsistency – from the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership to wavering attention spans in Washington – creates openings for China. The Pacific Islands, long neglected by major powers, have emerged as a testing ground for this competition. Beijing’s willingness to invest political capital and resources has already shifted dynamics in places like Honiara and Tarawa.
Canberra has responded with stepped-up aid, labour mobility schemes, expanded diplomatic representation and security partnerships. But as Campbell made plain, each initiative faces headwinds. Beijing’s strategy is not episodic but systemic: to entrench Chinese influence in a region historically aligned with Australia, complicating Canberra’s strategic depth and providing Beijing with potential leverage over maritime approaches to Australia’s east coast.
That contest, Campbell suggested, is only intensifying. “The politics of the Pacific are increasingly contested,” he repeated. “The great game is afoot.”
In many ways, Campbell’s remarks were both a warning and a rallying cry. They underscored how the Pacific Islands – often framed in Australian politics through the lens of aid or migration – have now become a fulcrum of great power rivalry. For Australia, the implication is stark: the era of uncontested regional leadership is over.
Beijing’s “relentless” engagement, Campbell argued, will not abate. Instead, it will seek to frustrate Australian initiatives, woo local leaders, and present China as the indispensable partner for development and security. For Canberra, that means the task ahead is not only to negotiate defence agreements but to demonstrate that Australia, alongside allies, can deliver lasting solutions to the challenges Pacific peoples themselves prioritise.
As Campbell put it, the “urgencies are clear”. The question now is whether Australia – with its allies distracted, its defence budget stretched and its diplomacy tested – can rise to the moment.
Final thoughts
The Indo-Pacific is no longer a distant theatre of competition – it is the world’s most contested region and the struggle for influence is unfolding on our doorstep. China is driving relentlessly to reshape the balance of power, India and Pakistan are asserting their weight, Southeast Asian nations like Thailand and Vietnam are flexing new economic and military muscle, and Japan and South Korea are re-emerging as decisive players.
The “Great Game” is not just about strategy in Beijing or Washington – it’s about who sets the rules, who builds the partnerships and who commands the future in our own neighbourhood.
Australia can’t afford to view this as background noise. The politics, economics and security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific are being rewritten in real time, and unless we adapt, we risk being reduced to a spectator.
As Kurt Campbell warned recently in Canberra, “the great game is afoot” – and China is “relentless” in using every tool available to frustrate and block Australian initiatives in the Pacific.
That brings us to the second hard truth: without a sustained surge in investment, reform and long-range planning, we won’t just fall behind – we risk being overshadowed by neighbours who are moving faster and thinking bigger. If we don’t act decisively, the next generation of Australians could inherit a nation eclipsed by richer, stronger and more influential powers.
For too long, Canberra has settled for the quick win and the reactive fix. Since Federation, governments of all colours have too often chased the short-term political dividend rather than the long-term national prize. That luxury has expired. The ground is shifting beneath us, and the “business as usual” mindset simply won’t cut it.
The “Great Game” in the Pacific is not abstract. China’s deepening ties in Solomon Islands, Kiribati and elsewhere, its attempts to sign security agreements across Melanesia and Polynesia, and its investments in undersea cables, ports and infrastructure are all part of a coherent strategy. Every delay in finalising Australia’s agreements with Papua New Guinea or Vanuatu is not just a bureaucratic hiccup – it is contested space, where Beijing is working the angles to block or slow our progress.
The real question, then, isn’t whether these challenges are coming. They’re already here, shaping the region and narrowing our room to manoeuvre. The question is when will Canberra finally deliver a bold, detailed plan that rallies both industry and the public behind a clear national vision? When will we see a whole-of-nation strategy that sets out how Australia will compete, deter and thrive in the midst of sharpening great power rivalry?
Because make no mistake: this is not just a game of governments. Everyday Australians have skin in the fight. Our jobs, our standard of living, our ability to make independent choices all hinge on whether we can navigate the “Great Game” with foresight and resilience.
The contest is about who controls the trade rules, who builds the digital infrastructure, who sets the security arrangements, and ultimately, who commands the trust of our Pacific neighbours.
With China pressing its advantage and the United States distracted, Australia faces a stark choice. We can sit back as a bystander, hoping others will secure the neighbourhood for us.
Or we can step up as a shaper of the Indo-Pacific’s future – investing in our defence, our diplomacy, our economy, and our partnerships with Pacific nations on the issues that matter most to them: climate resilience, jobs and security.
The “Great Game” will not wait for us. The decisions we make now will determine whether Australia thrives as an active, respected player in this new era – or whether we are swept aside by the relentless momentum of others.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
