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With it looking like AUKUS has survived the Trump administration’s review into its viability and impact on the US Navy’s own future submarine capabilities and requirements, what exactly should Australia do to ensure smooth sailing from hereon?
The AUKUS partnership, announced in September 2021, was one of the most consequential strategic decisions Australia has taken since Federation.
Framed as a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, its centrepiece was the commitment to provide Australia with nuclear-powered attack submarines, a capability previously restricted to the five recognised nuclear-weapon states and great powers.
Alongside the submarine program, AUKUS also promised cooperation across a range of advanced defence technologies, including undersea systems, artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum and hypersonics.
In the years since, AUKUS has moved from a headline announcement into the messy, detailed work of implementation.
Australia has signed agreements to allow for the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion information, begun upgrading infrastructure at key naval facilities such as HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, and established domestic partnerships with industry to support the build, sustainment and eventual sovereign operation of nuclear submarines.
Both the United States and the United Kingdom have made clear that AUKUS is not simply about gifting technology to Australia, it is about deepening defence industrial integration and enhancing collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
From the beginning, however, AUKUS has been politically sensitive. Its announcement triggered diplomatic outrage in Paris, after the Morrison government cancelled a long-standing conventional submarine contract with France.
More broadly, several countries in south-east Asia voiced concern about the nuclear implications, even though the submarines would not carry nuclear weapons. Domestically, debates have focused on the eye-watering costs, the potential erosion of sovereignty and whether the program’s timelines are compatible with Australia’s immediate security needs.
It was against this backdrop that President Donald Trump, upon returning to office in early 2025, launched a formal review of AUKUS. The review was couched as a necessary assessment of American industrial capacity, alliance priorities and the security environment.
For Australia, however, the very fact of the review underscored the fragility of relying too heavily on the policy continuity of a superpower whose domestic politics are volatile.
With revelations that the review has now concluded and public signals suggesting broad support for continuation, albeit with renewed scrutiny on costs, delivery timelines and allied burden sharing.
Indeed, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles recently told ABC Melbourne Radio host Justin Smith: “AUKUS is happening – that’s not in question. AUKUS is the subject of a trilateral treaty between Australia, the US and the UK. An incoming government having a review about how AUKUS can be done better is a really natural step for an incoming government to take, it’s a step that we took when we came to government.”
Either way, the completion of the Trump administration’s review presents both an opportunity and a challenge for Canberra.
Challenges and opportunities
On the one hand, Australia retains the partnership and the prospect of fielding a class of nuclear-powered submarines that will radically transform its deterrent posture. On the other, the process has revealed just how vulnerable AUKUS could be to political shifts in Washington and London, industrial bottlenecks across all three partners and scepticism at home and abroad.
The path forward will demand not only perseverance but also agility. If Australia wishes to secure the long-term benefits of AUKUS, it must focus on five interlinked priorities:
- Industrial delivery.
- Nuclear governance.
- Complementary capabilities.
- Regional diplomacy.
- Domestic political consent.
The first and most immediate priority is industrial. The reality is that Australia cannot simply buy its way into the nuclear submarine club. Submarines are not off-the-shelf items and the supply chains that underpin their design, construction and sustainment are already stretched thin in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
The Trump review highlighted that allied shipyards are struggling to meet existing national demands. Unless Australia builds genuine sovereign capability in parallel, its program risks becoming hostage to delays and bottlenecks overseas.
Canberra therefore needs to treat AUKUS less like a procurement project and more like a national mobilisation effort. That means binding agreements with partners on production quotas and timelines, backed by enforceable contracts rather than political promises.
It also requires a domestic industrial plan on a scale comparable to Australia’s post-war shipbuilding efforts, complete with new infrastructure, workforce training pipelines and transparent reporting mechanisms.
If Australia can present AUKUS not only as a strategic insurance policy but as a driver of jobs, skills and industrial innovation, the program will be far more resilient to political headwinds.
Closely tied to industrial capacity is the second priority: nuclear governance. For all the strategic logic of acquiring SSNs, Australia is stepping into unchartered territory as a non-nuclear state seeking to operate nuclear-propelled vessels. Success will hinge on building a regulatory regime that reassures allies, international partners and the Australian public.
Canberra must move quickly to establish an independent nuclear regulator, staffed with the expertise and authority to oversee the program to international best practice standards. Legislation codifying safety, security and non-proliferation obligations will be essential. So too will be clear plans for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, which cannot be left as an afterthought.
Training pipelines for nuclear engineers and regulators need to expand now, drawing on exchanges with the US and UK to embed expertise early. Without robust governance in place, AUKUS will remain vulnerable to accusations of eroding the non-proliferation regime and could stall on allied concerns about technology transfer.
With governance secured, by contrast, Australia can demonstrate that it is a responsible steward of sensitive technology and a credible partner.
Even if the industrial and governance challenges are met, submarines are a long-term proposition. Australia is unlikely to see its first domestically built AUKUS-class boat enter service until the 2040s.
That brings us to the third priority: diversification and resilience. Australia cannot afford to pin its entire deterrence strategy on submarines that remain decades away.
The Trump review itself noted that great power competition is intensifying now, not in 20 years’ time. Canberra therefore needs to accelerate the acquisition of complementary capabilities that can deliver deterrent effects in the near term.
Long-range precision strike, including land-based anti-ship and cruise missiles, is one area where investment can quickly shift the strategic calculus. Expanding maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, particularly through unmanned systems, is another. Australia must also harden its logistics and supply chains, dispersing basing arrangements and stockpiling munitions to ensure resilience in a crisis.
By developing layered capabilities alongside AUKUS submarines, Australia both reduces strategic risk and sends a message to potential adversaries that its defence posture is broad, flexible and sustainable.
A fourth priority flows not from hardware but from diplomacy. AUKUS has never been purely a military program – it is a political signal of alignment. Yet that alignment has generated unease in south-east Asia and beyond, with concerns ranging from proliferation risks to fears of being drawn into the US–China competition.
The Trump review, by reopening the debate about AUKUS’ future, has likely sharpened those concerns. Canberra must now embark on a sustained diplomatic campaign to explain its intentions and reassure its neighbours. That means being transparent about non-proliferation safeguards and emphasising that AUKUS submarines will not carry nuclear weapons.
It also means demonstrating the broader regional benefits of the partnership, such as enhanced maritime domain awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief cooperation, and joint exercises on search and rescue or emergency nuclear response.
Australia should present AUKUS as one piece of a wider Indo-Pacific stability agenda, not simply an anti-China alliance. By doing so, it can mitigate suspicion and reinforce its reputation as a constructive regional partner.
Finally, the fifth priority is domestic political legitimacy. AUKUS will cost hundreds of billions of dollars over its life cycle, span multiple decades and require public patience through periods when tangible results are limited.
That scale of commitment is unsustainable without bipartisan support and public trust. The Trump review underscored how easily external political shocks can destabilise perceptions of the program; Australia must not allow domestic politics to become an additional point of failure.
The government should therefore commit to maximum transparency: publishing detailed budgets, independent cost–benefit analyses and clear milestones that allow Parliament and the public to track progress.
A parliamentary oversight committee, with access to classified briefings under strict conditions, could provide additional accountability. Communication will be critical, Australians need to understand not just the risks and costs, but also the potential benefits in jobs, industry and security.
Honest acknowledgement of uncertainties will build credibility in a way that glossy slogans cannot. By securing broad domestic consent, the government can ensure AUKUS outlasts electoral cycles and remains a truly national endeavour.
Final thoughts
Taken together, these five priorities form a roadmap for stabilising AUKUS in the aftermath of the Trump administration’s review.
Industrial mobilisation ensures the submarines can actually be built and sustained; nuclear governance underpins the legitimacy of the program; diversification provides resilience in the near term; diplomacy reassures neighbours and preserves regional influence; and domestic transparency secures the political foundation without which the entire project could collapse.
None of these priorities is optional; each addresses a different vulnerability exposed by the review process.
The lesson of the Trump review is stark: AUKUS is not a static commitment but a living project subject to political, industrial and strategic currents across three nations.
For Australia, the challenge now is to act with urgency and foresight. If Canberra can shore up the foundations, AUKUS could become not just a vehicle for acquiring submarines but the cornerstone of a sovereign industrial base, a revitalised alliance structure and a more resilient national defence posture. If it fails, the result could be a capability gap, fiscal drain and strategic dependence at the very moment Australia can least afford it.
In that sense, the review may prove a blessing in disguise. By reminding Australia of the fragility of relying too heavily on any one ally, it has underscored the importance of building national strength and credibility alongside alliance commitments.
The next phase of AUKUS will not be easy, but if approached with clear priorities and sustained political will, it can still deliver the transformational security dividends envisioned in 2021.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
