iscover
Despite what we have been told, America’s power has its limits and Russia’s enduring war effort against Ukraine has served to reinforce this, but it also provides an opportunity to be clear-eyed about the multipolar future.
Full disclosure, I have no doubt that this is going to upset some people; I am not trying to be needlessly provocative, rather I am trying to open up the conversation.
Over the weekend, while watching an interview with an Australian organising a pro-Ukraine march, I was confronted by his narrative that can be best summarised as, “Russia is on the verge of collapse, the Russian people are close to having enough of Putin and throwing him out, their economy is breaking” or perhaps, “We have them on the ropes”, the Ukrainians just require the tools “to finish the job”.
Now yes, this fits with the enduring narrative that has permeated the West’s public consciousness since the failure of Russia’s airborne-led initial invasion in early 2022.
But something didn’t quite “gel” for me.
Following a sip of my coffee and finally relenting to my toddler son’s repeated requests to watch him jump on his new trampoline, it hit me: wasn’t Putin’s Russia also positioning itself to directly assault Europe, crush NATO and conquer the continent in a way that Stalin could only dream of?
How could these two diametrically opposed, seemingly contradictory realities be simultaneously true? Surely this wasn’t a case of Schrodinger’s Russia?
Then the reality really hit me. This wasn’t so much about Russia and whether or not it was on the verge of collapse, or whether the hordes of Russia were going to storm through the Fulda or Suwalki Gap in a daring surprise attack taking the Western allies by force.
This was actually about the very real limitations of the United States and broader Western allies under the auspice of NATO and similar organisations when it came to actually affecting the decision making of a committed, adversary that ranked somewhere above a lower-tier middle power.
Russia isn’t Libya, Serbia or Syria
For much of the post-Second World War era, Australia, like many US allies, has been successfully conditioned into believing that American economic, political and strategic power and resolve is infinite.
This was particularly reinforced during the first Gulf War, when the US, albeit with some support from NATO partners, effectively decimated the fifth largest army in the world in a matter of weeks, all while it was effectively beamed live into people’s living rooms around the world every evening.
This would be repeated in the mid-1990s when the US dragged NATO kicking and screaming into preventing expanding genocide in the Balkans and again in the mid-2010s when the United States led Western allies in strikes against Gaddafi’s Libya and al-Assad’s Syria, effectively opening the way for the overthrowing of both regimes.
Now while there were some examples where the US has had its efforts blunted – from Korea to Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq 2.0 – for the most part, the US has stood pretty much unopposed, at least since the end of the Cold War.
There were some notable exceptions, like Korea and Vietnam, but they almost get a bit of a pass in the public consciousness given they were largely considered proxy conflicts between the US, its partners and the Soviet Union and Communist China.
But here lies the direct thread that pulls through to the current predicament the US and its partners face in Ukraine today and could potentially confront over Taiwan in the not too distant future.
And we have seen this play out before, in Cuba, where the US was effectively cuckolded into accepting the permanent replacement of the Batista regime in favour of the Soviet-aligned Castro regime under threat of direct nuclear conflagration with the Soviet Union.
What we seem to have forgotten (at least to some degree) is that Russia and China, for that matter, aren’t second or third tier powers, they’re “great power” rivals or “pacing threats” and accordingly, the stakes are significantly higher.
This is only more apparent when one considers the combined economic, political and conventional and nuclear heft of these two nations that has only continued to expand in the post-Cold War world through their own parallel organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) organisation.
As a result, we see the rather reasonable posture of the United States and the second Trump administration as it also comes to terms with the very real limits of its power and its ability to influence and shape the decisions and ambitions of great powers is limited.
Why can’t we grasp reality?
This brought me back to the comments I watched on TV over the weekend and more broadly being that the US and the West should continue to arm Ukraine, often to the detriment of America’s own war stocks (of which many strategists and analysts have raised serious concerns about) and Western war stocks more broadly.
Equally, it seems that we have forgotten the reality or realpolitik that is the limits of US power and, by extension, the limits of Western power when engaging with “peer” powers like Russia and China.
Or more simply put, one could argue that we’re robbing Peter to pay Paul at a time where faulty assumptions or misguided expectations could calamitously collide with reality in Europe or for Australia, much closer to home over Taiwan.
Equally, these expectations and faulty assumptions based on history are no guarantee for the future, so we need to rapidly grasp reality.
That uncomfortable reality being that none of us are ready for the ramifications of potential miscalculations between major powers, rather we risk falling into the trap highlighted in the 1962 book The Guns of August by Barbara W Tuchman, which detailed the miscalculation and assumptions that served as the prelude to the First World War.
So let’s get realistic.
P.S. I'm not a Putin apologist.
Final thoughts
This brings me to a blunt truth: Australia must take full responsibility for its own national security, economic prosperity and competitiveness and the resilience of our nation, our people and our interests, and we must do so seriously, and decisively.
Nothing else in public policy even comes close.
If protecting our future means challenging a few political comfort zones, so be it. It’s no longer optional, it’s essential. Australia needs to get serious, and fast, about building the independent muscle to defend ourselves and shape our destiny both on our own and alongside the United States and our regional partners.
That means confronting some hard truths.
First, the Indo-Pacific is now the world’s fiercest strategic battleground. China, India, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam are flexing new power. Japan and South Korea are reasserting theirs.
The competition isn’t two streets over, it’s already on our doorstep, and it’s here to stay. In fact, it is the new normal Australia and many Western nations face.
Second, without real investment, reform and long-term planning, we risk more than just slipping behind. We risk being left in the wake of our neighbours’ rise. Fail to act now and the next generation of Australians could inherit a nation overshadowed by stronger, richer, more assertive powers.
For too long, Canberra has chased easy wins over lasting results. Since Federation, governments of every stripe have favoured short-term politics over long-term strategy. But the ground beneath us is shifting and business as usual won’t cut it.
Without serious investment, reform and planning, Australia risks being left behind as our neighbours surge ahead. The next generation could inherit a nation overshadowed by stronger, wealthier and more assertive powers.
With China’s influence expanding across the region, we face a stark choice: watch from the sidelines or help shape the future of the Indo-Pacific.
The decisions we make today will decide whether Australia thrives in this new era or gets swept aside by it.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
