Intelligence integration as deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

Real-time awareness across all domains (space, cyber, sea, land and air) is now crucial for gathering intelligence … anticipating the future and maintaining decision advantage.

In this context, Japan and Taiwan play indispensable roles in the forward edge of deterrence. Japan has explicitly shifted from passive defence to a proactive defence posture. Its 2022 National Defense Strategy commits to deter threats “before they arise”, including acquiring long-range strike options.

In July 2025, Tokyo unveiled its first Space Defense Guidelines, including plans for a satellite constellation to detect moving targets in real time and next-generation communications satellites to ensure resilient, allied-interoperable links. This strategic direction will continue, and most likely accelerate, under the new Takaichi administration.

Taiwan continues to build asymmetric, multi-layered defences. Its 2025 defence report emphasised resolute defence and multi-layered deterrence through agility, asymmetric warfare and decentralised operations. In practice, this means stockpiling precision-guided missiles, dispersing mobile batteries, hardening command networks and investing in ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) systems to watch the strait.

Taiwan is also deepening security cooperation with the US and other partners to improve its resilience. Together, US forces and these allies form a networked defensive architecture that depends not only on weapons but on integrated intelligence and decision superiority.

The grey zone and intelligence transformation

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Conflict over Taiwan is not inevitable, but Beijing is already waging a persistent grey zone campaign designed to engineer a fait accompli. This includes air defence identification zone incursions by People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) aircraft and naval vessels, cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns and economic coercion aimed at isolating Taipei.

China’s long-term strategy is to erode Taiwan’s will to resist and deter allied intervention without triggering open war. Today’s PRC approach “has more to do with cyber power than firepower”.

Countering such grey zone coercion requires shifting from reactive intelligence collection to anticipatory, all-domain awareness. US doctrine now emphasises new concepts like the Joint Warfighting Concept and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

Their aim is to link “any sensor to any shooter” across all services and allies, creating an integrated “kill web” that accelerates decision making.

In a Taiwan crisis, JADC2 must mesh US satellites and cyber sensors with Japan’s extensive maritime surveillance and Taiwan’s coastal radar networks. This would include a mix of sensor-to-shooter connectivity, greater allied ISR sharing, real-time data fusion and decision superiority.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces operate with US-supplied platforms and data links and Japan fields Aegis destroyers and E-2D Hawkeye aircraft that share fire control data via Cooperative Engagement Capability – essentially a functional JADC2 data link that achieved the goals of JADC2 even before the term existed.

Similarly, Taiwan has been training to integrate US Tomahawk missiles and exploit satellite imagery. These trends are forging interoperability that could render allied intelligence webs seamless.

Any conflict with China is likely to be far faster and more dangerous than past wars. New technologies will compress the decision cycle.

Swarms of drones, AI-driven targeting, hypersonic missiles and autonomous munitions could strike with little warning, forcing commanders to react in minutes, not hours. Space and Cyber domains will be fiercely contested, and Beijing is expected to use deception to achieve surprise. Taiwan’s proximity means very little reaction time and makes for a uniquely challenging intelligence problem.

The US Intelligence Community and regional partners must rethink every assumption. The goal is not just more collection, but faster fusion and dissemination. Advanced algorithms, machine learning and cloud architectures will be essential to auto-correlate data from SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, and open sources.

This is where partnerships are critical. For example, Japanese satellites and maritime sensors can cue US space assets while Taiwan’s human intelligence and surveillance add local depth.

A major challenge is the traditional compartmentalisation of US intelligence. The IC comprises 18 agencies, each with its own networks, classification rules and collection priorities. This fragmentation limits collaboration and integration, risking confusion in a crisis.

Therefore, the next frontier of deterrence is not a new platform but integration. The US Defense Intelligence Agency is now championing a continuous, shared operational picture. But to work in the Indo-Pacific it needs political backing, funding and allied participation. A truly integrated intelligence architecture would fuse US, Japanese, Taiwanese (and Australian) sensor networks into one collaborative system.

In practical terms, Japan’s advanced over-the-horizon radars, coastal sensors and burgeoning space constellation would anchor the network. Taiwanese patrol ships, UAVs and radar screens would supply local tracking. US satellites, underwater sonar arrays and cyber attack indicators would fill in broader coverage. Australian P-8 Poseidon aircraft and long-range radars could further extend reach.

By aligning intelligence architectures, modernising command networks and committing to shared situational awareness, the US and its allies can preserve peace, strengthen deterrence and ensure that a free and open Indo-Pacific endures.

Bernice Kissinger is a Senior Fellow at ASPI and dual-use technology expert.