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For some, rumours of the demise of the post-Second World War global “rules-based” order have been overstated. For others, it is continuing at pace. For author and geopolitical expert Peter Zeihan, the old world order has collapsed, with serious ramifications.
The century that followed the Second World War was organised around a set of institutions, alliances and economic habits that collectively stabilised a largely bipolar and, later, a unipolar world.
That order, born of the US-led reconstruction of Europe and a rules-based trading architecture, rested on predictable alliances, nuclear deterrence and expanding global markets. Its apparent solidity began to unravel after 1989–91, when the Soviet Union’s collapse removed the binary fault line of the Cold War and set in train a dramatic reordering of power and purpose across the globe.
The 1990s looked, at first, like an accelerant for global integration. Market liberalisation, the spread of trade rules and the opening of formerly closed economies, not least in Eastern Europe and Asia, pushed deep economic interdependence, lifting growth and reshaping supply chains.
Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank helped mediate the transition from state-managed systems to market-based ones, reinforcing a belief that economic convergence would produce political convergence.
Yet this era also incubated new contradictions.
The promise of a single, liberal economic order collided with the realities of uneven development, financial crises and the domestic political backlashes they produced.
The 21st century brought three tectonic shifts that have defined the emerging multipolarity.
First, the meteoric rise of China as an economic engine and global trader altered the distribution of material power and challenged existing norms of governance and influence. China’s scale and outward investment reshaped regional balances and created alternative networks of trade and finance.
Second, the perceived retreat or recalibration of Western dominance – driven by overreach in distant conflicts, the global financial crisis, and rising domestic populisms – weakened the automaticity of Western leadership and opened space for regional actors to assert themselves.
Third, the resurgence of an assertive Russia and its willingness to contest spheres of influence underscored that state revisionism had not been consigned to history; great-power competition had merely changed form.
The contemporary order is therefore not a return to 19th century anarchy but a more complex, layered system: transnational institutions and global markets coexist with regional blocs, bilateral power plays and asymmetric tools of influence, cyber operations, economic coercion, and information campaigns.
For established powers, the implications are profound. They can no longer assume primacy on every front; they must compete across economies, technologies and narratives while sustaining alliances and domestic legitimacy.
For rising states, the challenge is balancing national ambition with the responsibilities and frictions of greater influence. For middle powers and smaller states, manoeuvring room expands even as strategic uncertainty grows.
Critically, for nations like Australia, the post-Cold War settlement has matured into a punctuated, multipolar order shaped by economic interdependence, technological disruption and renewed geopolitical contest, a world in which power is dispersed, strategies are hybrid, and the old certainties have been replaced by continual adjustment.
Highlighting this is author of The end of the world is just the beginning: Mapping the collapse of globalization and geopolitical strategic analyst Peter Zeihan in a podcast interview with Chris Williamson of Modern Wisdom, in which he unpacked why in his words, “The New World Order is here.”
The evolution of the post-Cold War world
Put simply, the “post–Cold War dream” of a stable global order led by a single superpower (or coherent alliance of powers) is ending. Instead, what’s replacing it is a patchwork of regional blocs, shifting alliances and divergent national interests, a world in which strategic geography, resource distribution and demographic changes matter more than lofty ideals about global governance or liberal order.
Looking back at the broad sweep from the aftermath of WWII to the early 1990s, the global order gradually shifted from bipolar confrontation (US versus Soviet Union) to a unipolar moment after the Soviet collapse. That order was underpinned by:
- A rules-based trading and economic architecture so that global markets expanded, states liberalised and economies became interdependent.
- Institutional and alliance structures (NATO and other alliances, multilateral institutions) that underwrote security and economic cooperation.
- A fairly stable strategic balance: nuclear deterrence, containment and a broadly shared Western-led worldview.
As noted earlier in your narrative, the dissolution of the Soviet Union shook the foundations of bipolarity and gave rise to optimism about convergence, economically, politically, even culturally. But over time, that optimism met hard constraints: uneven development, financial crises, internal politics, domestic backlash and rising inequality.
Into that context steps Zeihan’s argument: the structures that once promised stability are now unravelling because the underlying assumptions cheap energy, growing populations, rising productivity, faith in liberal global norms are no longer reliable.
So the “new world order” Zeihan described is not a deliberate plan or group consensus, but an emergent outcome of deeper structural shifts.
Key structural trends
Zeihan highlighted several trends that he sees as reordering geopolitics. Viewed through the lens of the post-Cold War and post-WWII order, they are transformative.
He argued that population growth has peaked in many of the old powers; birth rates are falling; societies are ageing. Meanwhile, regions with favourable demographics and strategic geography access to arable land, proximity to sea lanes, resource endowments will become more important. In other words: map and demography now weigh more than ideology or economic dogma.
This undermines the old assumption that global trade and liberal capitalism would inexorably bind nations together – instead, self-interest, resource security and regional coherence become more salient.
Post-WWII and post–Cold War growth relied on cheap energy (fossil fuels) and expanding, integrated global supply chains. Zeihan suggested those engines are winding down. Scarcity, climate pressures, energy transition, disrupted supply chains, these factors will drive states to prioritise energy and resource security over global cooperation.
Consequently, nations may turn inward or regional, build “resilience zones” and reduce reliance on sprawling global networks. That would shrink the influence of global institutions and weaken the logic of a unified global economic order.
The result, according to Zeihan, is a more fragmented world: regional alignments, shifting strategic partnerships and competition rather than cooperation. The dominance of global frameworks will give way to “blocs” shaped more by geography, resources and security interests than by shared economic ideology or international law.
This aligns with what we’ve observed since the 2000s: a reassertion of regional powers, resurgence of nationalism and declining moral authority (or cohesion) of older global hegemonies.
Major implications
If Zeihan is right, the implications are wide-ranging and they map closely onto the challenges and opportunities identified in our previous narrative about the evolving multipolar order.
It is becoming clear for the world’s established powers (like the US, Europe, Australia, Canada and others) that they can no longer rely on primacy rooted in global institutions, market reach and liberal norms.
Their advantage – militarily, economically, technologically – will be challenged by geography, demography and resilience of rising powers. They must adapt: shifting from global dominance to maintaining influence through selective partnerships, regional presence, energy resilience and strategic alliances tailored to regional dynamics rather than universal ideals.
Meanwhile, in the case of the world’s rising powers, Zeihan argued that nations with favourable demographic trends, geographic advantages or resource endowments may find themselves in stronger positions than purely economic might would suggest. This might give them leverage not just regionally but globally, particularly if established powers are distracted or overstretched.
But rising powers will also face the burden of responsibility: establishing regional stability, securing supply lines and managing internal development as the veneer of global fairness and rule-based trade recedes.
Finally, for the world’s middle and smaller powers, in a fragmented order, smaller states can exercise more agency.
If large powers are less dominant globally, smaller states may have more freedom to pivot, choose alignments and negotiate regional or bilateral deals that suit their interests.
But that freedom comes with uncertainty: volatility, shifting alliances and resource competition may make the environment unpredictable.
In some cases, smaller states may benefit as “wildcards” or as strategic pivots but only if they manage to preserve flexibility, invest in resilience and avoid being drawn into zero-sum rivalry among larger powers.
The Australian context
We live at a time when old assumptions about peace, progress and globalisation increasingly feel brittle. Economic shocks, supply chain breakdowns, resource competition, demographic decline, climate change, and renewed great-power rivalry all point in directions consistent with Zeihan’s thesis.
For Australia and other nations on the periphery of major power blocs, this might mean recalibrating alliances, investing in regional resilience, diversifying partnerships beyond traditional Western powers and being alert to shifting strategic dynamics in Asia, the Pacific, and beyond.
Ultimately, the video’s central thesis serves as a timely reminder: global order is not eternal. It is contingent fragile in the face of structural change and must be actively managed if states are to protect their interests in a changing world.
Final thoughts
For far too long Australia has depended on “she’ll be right”. Well, in the face of the range of risks and challenges facing the nation, “she won’t be right”, and we need to accept that.
Building Australia’s weight as an independent power, with the economic heft, diplomatic clout and military capability of a great power isn’t just a lofty aim. It’s fast becoming a necessary expression of our sovereignty.
It’s a statement that Australia is prepared to take full responsibility for its own security and to play a leading role in shaping a stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific.
For too long we’ve been boxed in: dependent on China’s markets, tied to the American alliance and caught between larger players in a contest we don’t control. It doesn’t have to stay that way. As the world hardens into competing blocs of authoritarian and democratic systems, Australians deserve an honest, clear conversation about who we are and where we’re headed.
That conversation must include the Australian people, the ones who’ll carry the cost, bear the responsibility and ultimately defend the decisions taken in their name.
Real progress relies on transparency, collaboration and trust between government, industry and the public. It means rebuilding confidence in a shared national mission, one that strengthens our economy, secures critical industries and hardens the nation against economic coercion.
A strong, diverse and self-reliant economy is the bedrock of national power. It’s also our most reliable defence against external pressure, no matter where it comes from.
At the same time, we need a clear-eyed understanding of our ambitions. Are we satisfied being a shrinking “middle power” or are we ready to step up as a genuine regional leader, a nation that shapes events rather than simply responds to them?
Because without decisive investment in capability, innovation and self-reliance, we risk sliding into stagnation. We risk accelerating a kind of “managed decline” and with it the slow erosion of our strength, prosperity and independence.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
