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With regional power struggles and conflict setting the scene for intensified geopolitical and strategic competition in 2026, nuclear proliferation may once again be a major concern, with a south-east Asian political candidate hinting at a new member of the nuclear club.
The architecture that has governed nuclear restraint for more than half a century, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), safeguards and export controls, was designed in a bipolar world to prevent a cascade of new weapons states while managing the arsenals of the original nuclear five.
Since 2010, the picture has changed radically, with the Indo-Pacific witnessing renewed great-power rivalry, rapid modernisation of strategic forces (notably in the People’s Republic of China) and persistent nuclearisation in the Korean Peninsula.
Those trends, combined with erosion of confidence in extended deterrence and technological diffusion, are increasing the risk of nuclear reversal or horizontal proliferation among middle and emerging powers across the region, dramatically upending the eight-decade long balance of power and stability.
The latest such nation beginning to float an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons is Thailand, a rising regional power embroiled in an ongoing territorial dispute with its neighbour Cambodia among other longstanding historic disputes, with one of the nation’s emerging political leaders proposing a nuclear arsenal.
Speaking to media, Mongkolkitt Suksintharanon – leader of the New Alternative Party – effectively shattered the longstanding norm that only great powers, select small powers and rogue nations developed and fielded nuclear weapons, bringing them into the realm of middle and emerging powers.
This builds upon two longstanding structural problems within the existing Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, namely, the NPT is asymmetric: it legitimises five nuclear-weapon states and discourages everyone else, breeding resentment among technologically advanced, insecure middle powers.
Second, technological diffusion via civil nuclear programs, coupled with the democratisation of missile technology, enrichment and reprocessing know-how, made the latent capacity to build weapons accessible to many states. These latent capabilities have political value even absent overt weaponisation: a credible hedging posture can reshape regional calculations.
This new reality directly contradicts the “rule of road”, which in over several decades saw the importance of détente, US alliances and the high political cost of breaking the NPT, keeping most states inside the non-nuclear fold.
But those incentives weaken when the great-power status quo looks brittle and middle and emerging powers become increasingly anxious about their own economic, political and strategic interests, position and ambitions in a rapidly deteriorating global security environment.
Shifting dynamics, a fraying nuclear order
The Indo-Pacific’s strategic landscape has shifted decisively. Beijing’s rise, its military modernisation and a more transactional US grand strategy have sharpened threat perceptions across the region.
The People’s Republic of China has embarked on a rapid nuclear modernisation and force expansion, accelerating the production of warheads and delivery systems and diversifying basing and operational concepts, seeking to close the gap between itself and the United States
Independent assessments by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicate a marked increase in China’s stockpile and delivery capacity in the 2020s, with estimates of its operational warheads rising into the high hundreds and continuing growth projected.
That build-up reduces the regional asymmetry between Beijing and its neighbours and complicates extended-deterrence calculations for US allies.
Meanwhile, parallel developments compound the problem.
North Korea has not only operationalised nuclear weapons but advanced long-range delivery systems and hypersonic capabilities. Pyongyang’s tests through 2022–24 and repeated threats to South Korea, Japan and the broader region underscore a qualitative and quantitative improvement that renders the peninsula a live proliferation flashpoint.
These dynamics erode the binary logic of “nuclear club” and “non-nuclear club” that underpinned the Cold War order, and they increase the perceived utility of independent deterrents among states that sit in uncomfortable security neighbourhoods.
To this end, Mongkolkitt has proposed Thailand acquire a modest nuclear arsenal, of “at least” 10 nuclear weapons at a cost of approximately 6.4 billion baht (AU$304.5 million), citing the relatively modest cost when compared to other military acquisition costs.
At the core of his proposal, Mongkolkitt argued that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would herald a shift in the nation, highlighting that Thailand’s acquisition of these weapons would serve to enhance the position, status and “bargaining power” of the emerging south-east Asian powerhouse in future economic, political, diplomatic and strategic terms.
However, Mongkolkitt also recognised the need for Thailand to emphasise economic growth, prosperity and stability, arguing that traditionally, nuclear powers (in this case, referencing the Permanent Five) have required robust economies as a foundational pillar for Thailand’s strategy moving forward.
But why does this matter for the proliferation regime? Well, three mechanisms are at work:
- First, security competition: when a rival’s strategic capabilities grow and alliance guarantees look less certain, hedging and weaponisation preferences harden.
- Second, demonstration effects: visible tests or opaque but credible programs (e.g. North Korea, Israel) lower the political and technical barriers for others to contemplate weapons.
- Third, technological diffusion: missile and nuclear know-how increasingly travel via legal and illicit networks, civilian projects and dual-use industries.
Opening Pandora’s box
This new reality presents an uncomfortable future, opening the door for a host of other regional and global powers to consider the development and fielding of a nuclear arsenal, weighing up the costs of breaking with the established, post-Second World War and Cold War-era norms to carve out a new path.
In particular, alliance-dependent advanced democracies that face, existential threats like Japan and South Korea epitomise a difficult calculus. Both possess sophisticated civilian nuclear industries, advanced missile and delivery-system capabilities, and strong industrial bases, i.e. the means.
Public and elite conversations about nuclear options have periodic recurrences when threats intensify or when faith in US extended deterrence weakens. Japanese Stimson Center analyst Akiyama Nobumasa argues that Japan faces a “nuclear dilemma”: deep normative constraints and domestic resistance versus stark strategic pressure.
Meanwhile, South Korea’s debates mirror Japan’s, although domestic politics and US alliance dynamics differ. Policymakers in both capitals face a choice between intensified alliance diplomacy (nuclear sharing, deeper missile cooperation) and autonomous, sovereign strategic hedging.
Another angle, adding further legitimisation to the proposed ambitions of Mongkolkitt, is regional dynamics between historic enemies and rivals, particularly between nuclear-armed powers like India and Pakistan, which have demonstrated how bilateral threat perception combined with domestic politics can rapidly overwhelm non-proliferation norms.
Critically, it is important to establish a firm understanding as to how local rivalries, particularly longstanding ethno-religious ones can override global non-proliferation logic and rationality if existential fear becomes dominant.
Finally, two structural enablers make proliferation easier today than in 1968: civilian nuclear technology is more widespread and missile technology (including cruise missiles and road-mobile ICBMs) is comparatively easier to acquire and indigenise, something Thailand has demonstrated great proficiency in through collaborative development programs across a number of defence programs.
Even without full weaponisation, a credible “hedge” posture, technically reversible steps towards a bomb can be strategically potent.
Wide reaching consequences
By breaking the established norm, Thailand would essentially let the “genie out of the bottle”, paving the way for other regional nations to pursue their own nuclear ambitions, with profound consequences for the regional economic, political and strategic order and the balance of power.
In particular, we can undoubtedly expect that regional security dynamics would become more entangled and markedly less predictable. The advent of multiple nuclear-armed dyads increase the probability of miscalculation, particularly in crises where command and control, early warning and crisis-communication systems are immature.
Nuclear doctrine diversity (from assured retaliation to hair-trigger postures) would only serve to magnify this risk.
Equally, it would open up the possibility of arms races expanding beyond warheads, with nuclearisation prompting investments in delivery systems, missile defences, counterforce capabilities and non-nuclear precision strike. The result is not simply more warheads but a more complex and expensive security competition that strains budgets and political capital.
Meanwhile, a wave of defections or de-facto nuclearisation undercuts the credibility of export controls, the IAEA verification regime and multilateral instruments, that erosion reduces diplomatic leverage to constrain clandestine programs elsewhere.
Finally, and importantly for Australia, the US alliance network might adapt via nuclear sharing, tailored extended-deterrence guarantees or explicit forward deployments.
Alternatively, if allies doubt US resolve, they may move towards autonomy, creating a more fragmented strategic architecture.
Against this backdrop, the most stabilising path for Australia lies firmly in reinforcing non-nuclear deterrence rather than pursuing any form of independent nuclear capability.
Robust conventional deterrence, particularly achieved via long-range strike, maritime denial, undersea warfare and integrated air and missile defence, allows Australia to contribute meaningfully to regional balance without undermining non-proliferation norms.
Deeper alliance integration, including more explicit and flexible forms of extended deterrence, intelligence sharing and operational planning, is equally critical. Australia’s growing role in initiatives such as AUKUS reflects this logic: enhancing credible deterrence while remaining within the non-nuclear fold.
At the same time, Australia has a strong interest in non-nuclear countermeasures that improve resilience rather than escalation dominance. Missile defence, civil defence preparedness, space and cyber resilience, and continuity of government planning all reduce the coercive value of nuclear threats without lowering the threshold for nuclear use.
These investments also signal to regional partners that security does not require nuclear weaponisation to be credible.
However, Australia cannot insulate itself from proliferation pressures through defence policy alone. Diplomatically, Canberra faces a delicate balancing act.
It must continue to press for strengthened verification, transparency and export controls, while also recognising that the normative power of the non-proliferation regime is fragile. If regional states come to believe that the regime primarily locks in the advantages of existing nuclear powers, particularly as those powers expand or modernise their arsenals the political logic of proliferation will grow stronger.
Australia therefore has an interest in advocating not just restraint by smaller states but visible restraint and dialogue among nuclear-armed great powers themselves.
Final thoughts
For Australia, the accelerating nuclear dynamics of the Indo-Pacific are not an abstract arms-control problem but a direct challenge to national security, alliance strategy and regional statecraft.
The familiar governance toolkit for managing nuclear risk, verification, export controls, alliance deterrence and arms control remains necessary, but it is no longer sufficient on its own.
What has changed is the strategic context in which these tools must operate. Great-power competition, technological diffusion and rising doubts about extended deterrence are altering the incentives of regional states in ways that directly affect Australia’s security environment.
At a structural level, Australia remains deeply invested in the non-proliferation regime. The NPT, the IAEA safeguards system and multilateral export controls have long served Canberra’s interests by limiting the number of nuclear-armed actors in its near region and reinforcing norms of restraint.
Australia’s diplomatic identity as a credible middle power (but one of declining influence and capacity), exporter of uranium, and advocate of rules-based order is closely tied to the health of these institutions. Any erosion of the regime weakens not only global stability but also Australia’s ability to shape outcomes through law, norms and coalition diplomacy rather than raw power.
Yet the Indo-Pacific’s strategic realities are placing unprecedented strain on this framework. China’s rapid nuclear force modernisation and diversification, combined with North Korea’s increasingly sophisticated nuclear and missile capabilities, are reshaping deterrence calculations across north-east Asia and beyond.
For Australia, this creates a more crowded, opaque and potentially volatile strategic environment in which escalation risks are higher and crisis stability weaker. It also amplifies anxieties among key regional partners, most notably Japan and South Korea, about the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence, anxieties that Canberra cannot afford to ignore.
Ultimately, non-proliferation in the Indo-Pacific has become less about treaty compliance and more about strategic reassurance. For Australia, the central challenge is to help shape a regional order in which states feel secure enough not to seek nuclear weapons of their own.
That requires credible alliances, strong conventional forces, resilient societies and sustained diplomatic engagement, not just with like-minded partners but with the great powers whose choices will determine whether competition constrains or accelerates the diffusion of the world’s most dangerous capabilities.
In that sense, Australia’s future security will be defined not only by how well it prepares for a more dangerous region but by how effectively it works to prevent that region from becoming nuclearised in the first place.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
