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As questions continue to swirl about the end of the “global rules-based order” in the aftermath of America’s raid in Venezuela and the return of an era where “might makes right”, Australia may finally be forced to face its coming-of-age moment.
For virtually the entirety of its existence as a nation, Australia has enjoyed the relative benevolence and protection of a world dominated by our primary security partner of the time.
Whether the British Empire or the United States, this security afforded Australia the luxury, peace, prosperity and relative stability to develop against the headwinds of the 20th century, despite epoch-defining global conflagrations.
This period of strategic benevolence, despite episodic conflicts and buoyed by explosive economic growth and industrialisation in the immediate lead up to and through the course of the Second World War, laid the foundation for the “Lucky Country” to boom throughout the latter half of the 20th century.
However, consciously, both the Australian public and its policymakers never really developed beyond a state of cognitive adolescence, torn between seeking to rebel and assert itself and its independence and seeking safety and security provided by our strategic benefactors.
Ultimately, this attitude would accelerate through the 1980s and into the 1990s as the end of the Cold War and ensuing triumphalism of the “End of History” reinforced the belief that “the good times would never end”, as championed by Australia’s policymakers, really took root in the public zeitgeist.
So, is it any wonder then that the rise of Donald Trump, first in 2016 and then again in 2024, and his less than subtle approach to geopolitics, global power plays and allies came as a rude wake-up call? All despite the rapid deterioration of the status quo on our doorstep.
Now in the aftermath of the successful US raid and arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, coupled with growing American assertions/claims to Greenland, conflict in south-east Asia between Thailand and Cambodia, recent conflict between India and Pakistan, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and rising Chinese antagonism in the Western Pacific, have all served to reinforce an uncomfortable new or old reality: might makes right.
As uncomfortable as our new reality is, it is critical as Australia now faces its own “coming of age” moment and one that will require significant effort, coordination and focus if the nation and its people are going to continue to prosper in the 21st century.
At the core of this national “coming of age” moment are two, distinct choices: the first is to knuckle down and recognise that the world and our region have changed immeasurably and requires a coordinated, holistic, national effort to transform the nation from a declining, lower tier middle power into something more consequential.
The second begins the same, accepting that the world and our region have changed, but with one marked difference, the nation and the Australian public continue on the current trajectory and hope for the best.
Now, slowly but surely, we are starting to see some of the nation’s established public thinkers and commentators recognising that the second option may simply be unacceptable, with David Kilcullen, former Australian Army officer, senior counter-insurgency adviser to General David Petraeus in Iraq from 2007-08 and special adviser for counter-insurgency to former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, outlining this recognition.
Writing in The Weekend Australian, Kilcullen articulated about Trump’s new world order: Venezuela, Greenland and the stark reality for us, with his calls echoed by the Sydney Morning Herald’s David Crowe in his own piece, titled The new world disorder where might is right, in which both men begin to lay the foundation for a more ambitious public conception.
At the core of both men’s analysis is the concept of Australia as a “sub-imperial power” as defined by Clinton Fernandes, professor of international and political studies at the University of NSW, and outlined in his book Sub-imperial power: Australia in the International Arena (a more thorough analysis is forthcoming, I’ve only just started it).
A ’sub-imperial power’ in a post-imperial world
In its most simple description, a “sub-imperial power” is a nation that acts as a “junior partner” or has been frequently linked to Australia, a “loyal deputy” in a larger imperial system, often led by a superpower (like the United States, Soviet Union, British Empire or People’s Republic of China) serving as the centre of imperial power.
The core responsibilities and characteristics of these powers centre around the smaller nation upholding the broader imperial system in its own region or sphere of influence by leveraging its own military and economic power while subordinating some of its own sovereignty (typically in the realm of foreign, defence and economic alignment and policy), bringing it into alignment with the imperial power.
Sounds familiar?
Well it should, Australia, along with other US allies like the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea (although they seem to be splitting a little more openly) and Canada, are all firmly committed to maintaining the “international rules-based order”.
Kilcullen highlighted the current predicament Australia finds itself in, saying, “As a ‘sub-imperial power’, Australia cannot be secure in an unstable system. But a major global shift this week – 12 decades after Federation – is our invitation to national adulthood.”
This sentiment is echoed by Crowe, who added, “The security of the old world order is being blasted away with every airstrike to enforce the will of Donald Trump so he can assure his followers he is making America great again ... The Trump vision comes with proof of his willingness to deploy hard power, rather than merely posting ‘truths’ on social media, to get his way.
“It includes bombing Caracas, capturing Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and seizing oil tankers on the high seas. And it shakes old alliances because it comes with a signal that he could use force against others – even NATO members – if they do not submit to his plans.
“It feels like a new world disorder. The sense of balance in world politics is shifting and a new era of great power competition is under way. In this world, might is right. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin believed it already. Trump has signed up as well.”
The central presupposition of both Kilcullen and Crowe is that America’s shift, particularly under Donald Trump post returning to the White House, is, in essence, the end of the old, post-Second World War economic, political and strategic “rules-based order” upon which the preceding imperial system was built and functioned.
Kilcullen detailed this by comparing these actions to the previously agreed upon “norms” championed and enforced by the United States in the late 20th and early 21st century, saying, “Twentieth and 21st-century US justifications for the use of force – regime change, democracy promotion, reshaping rogue states, responsibility to protect, countering terror, safeguarding an international rules-based order or preserving democracies against an emerging alliance of autocracies – as advanced by previous administrations (including, as it happens, the first Trump administration in its 2017 national security strategy) do not really explain what is happening here.”
Rather, Kilcullen argued that these most recent developments herald a shift towards an older, more primal and almost animalistic application of power, dating back to the 19th century and before, saying, “Nineteenth-century notions, on the other hand, make much more sense.”
Kilcullen added, “These include suzerainty, where a powerful state controls the foreign and economic relations of a weaker vassal while allowing it some measure of internal autonomy, and protectorate status, in which smaller states retain formal sovereignty while ceding control over external affairs to empires or hegemonic powers. A related notion is spheres of influence, where great powers acknowledge peer competitors’ right to dominate zones of interest while asserting similar rights in their own regions, or dividing subject territories between them.
“The imposition of protectorates or outright annexation to protect critical infrastructure or safeguard commercial interests via punitive expeditions or limited wars was standard international practice until about 1928, disappearing (in theory if not in reality) only after 1945.”
This sentiment is echoed by Crowe, who, in speaking to Michael Clarke – visiting professor at King’s College London, a former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute and a former defence adviser to British governments – added, “Clarke sees an era of major rivals seeking to impose their will across their spheres of influence. American allies, he says, must adapt because they have no choice but to survive in this new dispensation. He quotes an adage: If you’re not running a sphere of influence, you’re in one.”
There are four major powers in this world view: the United States, China, Russia and India. This seems generous to Putin, given the weakness of the Russian economy, but Russia is a nuclear state that is aggressive in using its military.
It is this combination of factors that now characterises the “post-imperial” world. Australia, as a “sub-imperial power”, now confronts a reality reinforced by White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller during an interview with perplexed CNN commentators, where he said, “We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else. But we live in a world, in the real world, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world.
“The US is using its military to secure our interests unapologetically in our hemisphere. We’re a superpower, and under President Trump, we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower.”
Ultimately, what this shift (and arguably response to foreign actions since at least 2010) in American policy firmly entrenches is the “new world order”, one defined by, as Crowe said, “competing spheres of influence”.
So how does Australia not only survive in this new era, but thrive?
Consequence v obscurity: What way Lucky Country?
Undoubtedly confronting this new reality presents a significant departure from the status quo of public policy making as conducted and experienced in Australia since the end of the Second World War.
In large part, this means a focused, coordinated and decisive shift away from the politics of complacency and dependency at both an individual and national level – ultimately, in a world where the old truths can no longer be taken for granted.
Kilcullen highlighted the realities of this new world, saying, “For Australia, the implications are stark. On the negative side, whether or not one agrees with Fernandes’s formulation of Australia as a ‘sub-imperial power’, that role clearly makes no sense unless we share core values and interests with great-power partners.”
“Absent shared values or commitment to common norms, we become simply a vassal or tributary, suffering what we must at the hands of one stronger state or another,” he added.
This ultimately means that Australia recognises that in an increasingly volatile, competitive and unstable world, Australia as a maritime trading nation, is intrinsically dependent on the benevolence and stability of the international order for its own economic, political and strategic security and stability.
Kilcullen added, “Trump differs from his predecessors primarily in his rhetorical bluntness, saying the quiet part out loud rather than sugarcoating threats and demands. Whoever succeeds him, we need to recognise the reality that a unipolar world order led by a mostly benevolent US is gone and is never coming back.”
For Kilcullen, this isn’t all bad news, however, rather it presents an opportunity for transformation, something he recognises, saying, “This, paradoxically, is the positive side of the situation. We may think of it, more than 12 decades after Federation, as an invitation to national adulthood. Australia is bigger and more consequential, capable, economically and militarily powerful than ever.
“Our ability to convene like-minded middle powers to pursue common interests has been proven again and again. What is sometimes called punching above our weight actually understates the real weight that Australia brings to the international arena.”
However, it is worth saying that his assessment of Australia’s more “consequential, capable and powerful” economy, military and political positions and capabilities is far less a reality than he would have us believe and is at best a serious over-egging of the pudding (at least at this point in time).
In order to deliver this, regardless of how we chose to pursue future international and regional engagement, it will require, as Kilcullen argued, “self-reliance, national resilience, collaborative regional partnerships, selective engagement with great powers on our own terms and in our own interests – across the board on energy, climate, security, commerce, trade, technology and industry” as an inevitability, not a choice.
The Sydney Morning Herald’s David Crowe goes on to expand on this sentiment, again citing Michael Clarke, adding, “Clarke believes the future for nations such as Britain and Australia is to adapt to the changes in America rather than break with a necessary ally. This means, for instance, building up military strength to reduce the risk of relying on an American president...
“The future is an unhappy picture of great power competition and serious risk for Australia ... Australia is on notice, just like the rest of the world. The old era is gone. The new dangers are here.”
Final thoughts
At this point, I well and truly sound like a broken record, but it has to be said.
Only by transforming Australia into an independent power with the economic heft, diplomatic reach and military strength of a major regional player that it is no longer just an aspiration. It is an increasingly necessary expression of national sovereignty.
It speaks to an Australia prepared to take full responsibility for its own security and to play a leading role in shaping a stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific, rather than relying on others to do so on our behalf.
For too long, Australia has been constrained by structural dependence, economically tied to China’s markets while strategically anchored to the United States alliance, leaving us exposed to the dynamics of a contest not of our own making. That need not be our future.
In a world increasingly divided between democratic and authoritarian systems, Australians deserve a frank and open conversation about where we stand, what we value and the direction we intend to take.
That conversation cannot be confined to Canberra. It must involve the Australian people, those who will carry the costs, bear the risks and ultimately defend the decisions taken in their name.
Enduring success will depend on transparency, collaboration and trust between government, industry and the broader community. It requires a renewed sense of national purpose: a shared project focused on strengthening the economy, securing critical industries and building resilience against economic coercion, wherever it may come from.
A strong, diverse and self-reliant economy is the bedrock of national power and the most effective shield against external pressure. Without it, strategic autonomy is an illusion.
At the same time, Australia must be honest about its ambitions. Are we prepared to accept a gradual slide into “middle power” irrelevance, or are we willing to step up as a genuine regional leader, a country that helps shape events rather than merely responding to them?
As historian and author Arthur Herman has observed of the United States, whether we call it industrial policy or something else, a new paradigm is required because advances in technology can rapidly reshape economies of scale and determine the trajectory of future innovation.
The same logic applies to Australia.
Without deliberate, sustained investment in capability, innovation and national self-reliance, we risk stagnation and an acceleration of what has often been described as “managed decline”.
The cost of inaction would be the gradual erosion of our power, prosperity and independence – a price far higher than the effort required to change course now.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
