iscover
Amid recognition that Australia no longer meets the definition of a “serious” middle power, is it time for some national introspection to ask ourselves what exactly makes a “serious” middle power and, more critically, how do we get there?
While a relatively new concept within the confines of historic international relations, “middle powers”, like Australia, have rapidly established themselves as an indispensable and consequential pillar of the contemporary international “rules-based” order.
When compared to their “great” or “major” power counterparts, middle powers wield comparatively modest levels of economic, political and strategic heft, but when leveraged in combination with similarly sized nations, this allow them to effectively wield disproportionate power within the global order.
However, as the international balance of power has increasingly shifted and evolved, particularly following the end of the Cold War and as the brief, unipolar moment dominated by the United States has come to an end, the traditional definition and characteristics of power have equally evolved.
Driven in large part by the emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a viable economic, political and increasingly, strategic counterbalance to the otherwise unassailable United States, the world has stumbled into an era of renewed nation-state driven competition.
During this period of global immense realignment, China wasn’t the only emerging power to further accelerate the devolution of the world’s balance of power to a more “primitive” time, with other nations of equal potential, including India, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan and of course, a resurgent Russia all upending the established norms.
For middle powers like Australia, the continued emergence of this constellation of competing powers is serving to fundamentally and irreversibly alter not only our understanding of power in this “new world”, but most importantly, our role and our position within it.
Bringing us to the growing recognition among Australia’s policymaking community and even segments of the public that the nation, in the face of an increasingly contested region and world, is no longer a “serious” middle power by any meaningful metric.
This recognition heralds a major rethink about the role and position of the nation within the “new world” order and poses a significant, two-part question worth further deliberation and conversation: What makes a “serious” middle power in the face of this new world, and what does Australia have to do in order to reclaim its status as a “serious” middle power?
What makes a ’serious’ middle power?
As part of this discussion and period of introspection, we need to begin by identifying the key mechanisms of power that are fundamentally relevant in the “new world” order, that being what is traditionally defined as “hard” power, or more simply, economic and military means – from each of these we are able to further break down additional elements that contribute to a nation’s capabilities.
Or as the eminent American geostrategic analyst Joseph Nye articulated, “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will”, in which case the proverbial carrots represent the reduction of trade barriers, alliance and diplomatic offers.
While the stick is represented by coercive diplomatic, economic sanctions or direct kinetic, military action to influence, or direct the decision-making process of a foreign leader in accordance with one’s national interest, ambitions and objectives.
This is not to say that “soft” power or social, cultural and diplomatic power isn’t important and won’t play a role in solving this national challenge, rather that the immediate priority should be the most tangible aspects of national power, especially given Australia’s “soft” power is relatively well established.
Increasingly, both economic and military power require significant and considered investment at both the “theoretical”, in this case, policy level, and “practical” or fiscal level in order to adequately meet the real-world requirements as a result of the world and Indo-Pacific’s rapidly deteriorating balance of power and shifting dynamics.
With these points in mind, how exactly does Australia reclaim it’s mantle as a middle power, and a “serious” one at that?
Getting the economic basics right
First and foremost, Australia has to accept that the old conceptualisations, measurements and indeed understanding of what constitutes a “middle” power is now defunct, and as a result, Australia (along with a host of other nations, including Canada, New Zealand and even the United Kingdom to a degree) fall dramatically short on this new emerging scale.
Fundamental to adapting and responding to this new world of intensified geopolitical competition is a resilient, diverse and competitive economy, built upon a robust, competitive and future-proofed industrial base, shifting from our national overdependence on a banana republic-esque “holes and houses” economy.
Simply put, this requires a “no dickheads” (rather crude I know) approach to various aspects of public policy, in particular, this “revolutionary” new approach should emphasise the delivery of a robust, resilient, reliable and cheap national energy ecosystem, supported by a proactive, adaptable planning, regulatory and industrial relations system.
Establishing this as a foundation serves to provide businesses with confidence to invest, employers with a skilled workforce and employees with critical job security, longevity and opportunity, well before any money is invested, workforce is trained or ground is broken on new energy or industrial infrastructure, thus establishing a dramatically different tone almost overnight.
However it is worth stating that this combination of priorities requires not only significant public and private buy-in, but perhaps, most importantly, a rebuilding of trust between the three major parties following nearly three decades of shattered trust, real or imagined betrayals.
We will also need to break dramatically with the dogmatic half-commitment to neoliberal crony capitalism that has dominated our efforts to “liberalise” the national economy since the 1980s, but not in the way many might expect. Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and other nations didn’t have a “natural comparative advantage” in any of the areas they now dominate globally; their respective governments identified focus areas and nurtured the creation and growth of these industries.
This means we will need to identify and prioritise both the “basics” of an industrial economy and the areas of future and sustained long-term growth while critically avoiding the recreation re-engineering or over-engineering the wheel, working with established global entities with access to established customer bases to establish in-country industrial hubs designed to build at scale.
Importantly, this avoids falling for the typical reductive narrative we constantly face when the concept of “reshoring” or reindustrialisation; in the Australian case, that being that any reindustrialisation will require us to compete with China, India and other “low-cost” manufacturing nations (usually as is argued in the low-cost consumer goods) in already hotly contested markets.
Ironic since Apple CEO Tim Cook has repeatedly emphasised (including last year) that China in particular’s advantage comes from skill, saying, “China put an enormous focus on manufacturing, in what you and I would call vocational kind of skills.”
“The US over time began to stop having as many vocational kind of skills. I mean you could take every tool and die maker in the United States and probably put them in the room that we’re currently sitting in. In China you would have to have multiple football fields,” he said in 2015.
The final pillar of this national paradigm shift is a significant investment in the national skills base, and significantly protecting our domestic labour market as a means for further establishing and entrenching trust between the employers and employees, while serving to build the world-leading human capital Australia was once famous the world over for.
Rather it means a targeting of our efforts and limited labour force while complementing and enhancing the human workforce (albeit scaled back) with a suite of new technologies across automation, artificial intelligence and additive manufacturing to rapidly move up the value add scale, while diversifying the national economic and industrial base within existing supply chains.
As the Second World War established and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has reinforced, industrial power, capacity and resilience undergirds national power and the capacity of a nation to maintain both a civilian and wartime economy against a nation-state competitor and as a result, is at the core of a nation’s military power.
But that doesn’t mean we don’t require tangible, military power significantly exceeding the mediocre levels of capability we currently field, but what does that look like?
Getting lean, mean and building muscle – hitting the gym
While Australia’s economic muscles are getting a significant workout (and with a helping hand from some creatine, protein and maybe even a little TRT), the nation’s military capabilities require a significant regimen in order to rebuild the nation’s standing as a “serious” middle power, especially in the face of the wave of military expansion and modernisation transforming the Indo-Pacific.
This requires, at a minimum, an expansion of the “standing” Australian Defence Force to at least 100,000 full-time, active personnel, combined with an expansion of the Reserve forces to be half of that at 50,000 and most critically, a significant culling of the “top heavy” force structure that has resulted in “too many chiefs and not enough indians”.
Equally, this requires a significant investment in the platforms and capabilities that enable the Australian warfighter to conduct their missions, including an expansion of the surface fleet, acceleration of AUKUS and the fielding of autonomous underwater systems at pace and scale, an expansion of the Air Force fleet writ large with specific emphasis on expanded air combat capabilities, long-range strike and interconnecting enablers.
However, merely throwing more money at the forces isn’t the answer, rather it needs to be guided by a strategy, and while the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy, respectively, sought to establish a strategy of “deterrence by denial” as the basis of the nation’s shift towards an “integrated, focused force”, the reality is we require some just a tad different.
At the core of this shift is a need to accept a reality where we can no longer simply expect to depend on the immediate strategic weight of a “great power” partner and we may need to be required to “go it alone” as it were, at least for a protracted period of time, something we were forced to accept in the immediate aftermath following the Fall of Singapore in 1942.
Accordingly, our strategy of “deterrence by denial” needs to shift to a hybrid strategy of true deterrence and flexible containment in order to secure our national interests throughout the Indo-Pacific, with a specific focus on the geographic area from the east coast of Africa and Strait of Hormuz through to American Samoa, and finally from Antarctica through to Taiwan.
Quite a sizeable area of responsibility, but one that is inescapably and undeniably critical to our national security; now the minimum of 100,000 full time personnel makes sense, right?
Delivering on this will also require a break with traditional Australian doctrine and military platform development and acquisition, away from the tried-and-true method of only providing niche, boutique capabilities into a large coalition force towards a force designed to emulate the strengths of the United States Armed Forces while mitigating weaknesses that have been identified and are clearly (and publicly) being countered by the People’s Liberation Army.
Becoming a “serious” middle power won’t be easy, won’t be fast and above all, it won’t be achievable with “silver bullet” solutions. Like a solid commitment to our New Year’s resolutions to get fit and healthy, it’s going to need real hard work, consistency, patience and discipline.
It’s grind it out time.
Final thoughts
At this point, I well and truly sound like a broken record, but it has to be said.
Only by transforming Australia into an independent power with the economic heft, diplomatic reach and military strength of a major regional player that it is no longer just an aspiration – it is an increasingly necessary expression of national sovereignty.
It speaks to an Australia prepared to take full responsibility for its own security and to play a leading role in shaping a stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific, rather than relying on others to do so on our behalf.
For too long, Australia has been constrained by structural dependence, economically tied to China’s markets while strategically anchored to the United States alliance, leaving us exposed to the dynamics of a contest not of our own making. That need not be our future.
In a world increasingly divided between democratic and authoritarian systems, Australians deserve a frank and open conversation about where we stand, what we value and the direction we intend to take.
That conversation cannot be confined to Canberra. It must involve the Australian people, those who will carry the costs, bear the risks and ultimately defend the decisions taken in their name.
Enduring success will depend on transparency, collaboration and trust between government, industry and the broader community. It requires a renewed sense of national purpose: a shared project focused on strengthening the economy, securing critical industries and building resilience against economic coercion, wherever it may come from.
A strong, diverse and self-reliant economy is the bedrock of national power and the most effective shield against external pressure. Without it, strategic autonomy is an illusion.
At the same time, Australia must be honest about its ambitions. Are we prepared to accept a gradual slide into “middle power” irrelevance or are we willing to step up as a genuine regional leader, a country that helps shape events rather than merely responding to them?
As historian and author Arthur Herman has observed of the United States, whether we call it industrial policy or something else, a new paradigm is required because advances in technology can rapidly reshape economies of scale and determine the trajectory of future innovation.
The same logic applies to Australia.
Without deliberate, sustained investment in capability, innovation and national self-reliance, we risk stagnation and an acceleration of what has often been described as “managed decline”.
The cost of inaction would be the gradual erosion of our power, prosperity and independence – a price far higher than the effort required to change course now.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
