Really? We’re still afraid to have ‘hard conversations’ about our woeful defence capabilities?

As the regional and, indeed, global balance of power has shifted, given the rise of China not only as an economic power but increasingly a modern, expeditionary-minded military power tailoring its capabilities towards displacing an otherwise overstretched, overcommitted and domestically challenged United States in the Indo-Pacific.

This combination of factors has served to only get more complex, more vexing and more consequential as the power dynamics of 21st century have continued to evolve and, in many ways, deteriorate at a rapid pace from the relative stability afforded in large part by the United States over the decades from 1945–2010.

However, Australia has continued in a state of pseudo-arrested development, enjoying the good times provided by the Pax Americana, which in turn served to only further entrench the maligned “Lucky Country” mindset coined by Donald Horne, conveniently forgetting the old saying that: “All good things must come to an end.”

Today we are seeing the reality much of the world was forced to confront at least a decade, if not longer ago. We are living in an increasingly unpredictable, volatile and, if the weekend’s events in the Middle East and seemingly into South Asia are to be believed, combustible-era presenting significant economic, political, demographic and security challenges for nations dependent on the globalised world.

Australia meanwhile continues to fall short, despite repeated warnings to the contrary that the good times have come to an end, presenting significant challenges for the nation’s security, prosperity and stability, with increasing pressure being placed on an Australian Defence Force that requires significant overhaul in order to be “fit for purpose”.

Delivering these capability outcomes will require significant dialogue with the Australian public about what exactly is going to be required at every level of public policy making, but especially in the realm of defence and national security capability.

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Highlighting this is former US assistant secretary of defence for Indo-Pacific Security Affair (2021–25) and principal at The Marathon Initiative, Dr Ely Ratner, writing for The Interpreter, in a piece titled Hard conversations on Australia’s defence, in which he began his analysis saying, “The three uncomfortable truths that Australia needs to confront about the gap between perception and reality.”

Three (inconvenient) truths and one (comforting) lie

First things first, let’s begin with the comforting lie Australia tells itself.

Australia as a nation and Australians as a people seem to have collectively mastered the art of self-delusion, particularly when it comes to the ebbs and flows of history, geopolitical power and continues to tell itself a particularly comforting lie: namely, the good times will never end.

Now yes, many people will say, “Ohh but the rhetoric is changing”, but the “proof is in the pudding” and as is always the case, actions speak louder than words, with Australia’s action across most areas of directly related or indirectly related national security public policy areas increasingly being revealed as significantly lacking.

It is important to recognise and understand that this cultural attitude towards our own national security, resilience and vitality often gets a pass (particularly in recent years) due to the “bull in the china shop” that is American President Donald Trump and his mercurial, transactional and decisively “explosive” approach to the global balance of power.

This “forest for the trees” view is something Dr Ratner sought to rectify upfront, saying, “It’s tempting to assume that Donald Trump is the world’s biggest foreign policy problem. But in Australia’s case, that would be as incomplete as it is dangerous.

“After a week of consultations with government officials, industry leaders, and regional experts in Canberra, Melbourne, and Sydney, I came away with an inescapable sense that the most urgent issues are not the ones screaming across the headlines about Trump’s latest outrage. Rather, they are hard conversations the country needs to have with itself. And leaving them unsaid is no longer viable,” Ratner detailed further.

Bringing me to the first of Ratner’s first “inconvenient truth”, which continues to be a central talking point on all sides of Australia’s strategic policy conversation, namely the material costs that Australia will need to incur in order to, as Ratner articulated, “contend with China’s growing military and unyielding ambitions”.

Highlighting recent examples, Ratner reinforced the rhetoric versus action approach favoured by successive Australian leaders, saying, “Despite stark phrases in recent strategy documents about Australia’s worsening security environment, the China challenge still feels more conceptual than visceral, more intellectual than mobilising.

He added, “Distance and geography are still cited as safeguards, even as China’s missiles can reach an Australian mainland that its navy recently circumnavigated. There have also been few clarion calls from leaders in Canberra about the China threat. The result is a defence budget that appears insufficient for the growing number of tasks ahead at the very moment when the security environment demands more from US allies to help keep the peace in Asia.”

This feeds into the American expectation (a longstanding one, by the way) that Australia, like it’s regional partners including Japan, Singapore, South Korea and New Zealand, will actively play a pivotal and significantly increased role in defending the economic, political and strategic status quo in the Indo-Pacific, with the United States providing the strategic “balancing” heft of a traditional great power.

However, as Ratner articulated, this seems to have fallen in large part on deaf ears among much of Australia’s policymaking elite, saying, “Much of the political class in Canberra seems to believe Prime Minister Anthony Albanese got a free pass on defence spending from Trump during their long-awaited White House meeting last October.

“As a result, the political appetite for significant defence increases appears low. There has been no serious effort to build support among the Australian public, and little consideration of tough fiscal choices needed to make room for more than a modest rise in military budgets.”

Shifting to the second “inconvenient truth” focusing on the growing rotation of American military personnel being based in Australia, largely as a “deterrence” force, designed in large part to complicate an adversary’s decision-making processes and, as a result (hopefully), deter an adversary from taking hostile action.

However, as Ratner argued, should deterrence fail, these forces would become direct combat forces responsible for the defence and projection of allied power across the Indo-Pacific, inescapably linking Australia to any conflict in the region, whether we like it or not.

Ratner unpacked this reality, stating, “This connects directly to a second inconvenient truth about the growing presence of the American military in Australia. Those forces are there to deter conflict, but should that fail, they will be given the role of defending Australia and projecting power into contested theatres – the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, or elsewhere. In that sense, Australia would be integral to any conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific.”

This is only further complicated by either real or imagined concerns about US President Trump and his bombastic approach to the international order. Rightly or wrongly, this ultimately comes down to Trump’s method of messaging (on any matter) combined with the active campaigns to undermine his election and agenda in 2016 and again despite the clean sweep in 2024.

Ratner added, “Trump’s America only exacerbates concerns about Australia being involved in a war with China. Yet the reality is that the Australian continent is more secure – and the prospects of conflict are lower – precisely because of Australia’s potential role in supporting the US military, not despite it.

He argued that “Canberra will need to do more to generate public and political support for this reality. Otherwise, defence establishments will lack the mandate to adequately prepare, and the government will struggle to generate the resources required.”

Bringing us to the third and final, inconvenient truth cited by Ratner, most notably Australia’s increasing necessity to establish and leverage collective defence relationships with regional partners, as Ratner reinforced, beginning with and most importantly, Japan.

Ratner added, “Australian officials and experts rightly perceive the United States as a necessary but insufficient ingredient for regional security. Australia’s forthcoming strategy documents will likely emphasise the importance of middle power diplomacy, and Canberra has already demonstrated willingness to advance minilateral efforts in the absence of US leadership. Nevertheless, Australia’s actual commitment to building meaningful deterrence beyond the US bilateral alliance remains an open question.”

Building on this, Ratner sketched out an image of how this reinvigorated Australia–Japan strategic partnership would take shape against the background of mounting regional and global tensions, saying, “The Australia–Japan relationship will be a critical bellwether of how far intra-ally alignment can get, with both sides reporting deepening cooperation across intelligence, policy and strategy.

“At the same time, it is not clear whether this activity will move beyond signalling resolve, or whether support for minilateralism in Canberra will translate into actual resources. Australia and Japan will need to ensure that defence cooperation produces real combat-credible deterrence, including the political authorities and integrated command structures required to fight together if necessary,” Ratner detailed further.

Confronting the reality

First and foremost, the expectation (whether true or not) that government sets for the public service must be demanded of the government.

The Australian public should be demanding frank and fearless conversations with their elected representatives and, critically, transparency not just about the challenges we face from Beijing and its ambitions and designs for the Indo-Pacific, but more broadly, as the world increasingly shifts towards a multipolar world.

A key component of this transparency is also a conversation about the opportunities laid out before Australia, whether they’re economic, political, diplomatic or demographic opportunities that could serve to fundamentally reshape Australia its role and position in the 21st century geopolitical environment.

Critically, having these conversations doesn’t need to be particularly scary or confronting, but it does need to be open, honest and constructive. In order to deliver on this, we need to craft a compelling, engaging narrative that has real, tangible outcomes at the macro and micro levels that bring the Australian public along.

If we fail to get that core thing wrong, we will undoubtedly end up being swept along with the tides of history.

Final thoughts

By now, I well and truly feel like a broken record, but I will say it again: Australia needs a wake-up call, and quickly. We owe that much to the generations that will inherit this country, generations like my son and daughter and niece and nephew.

The strategic environment around us is changing faster than our national thinking and certainly faster than our national conversation. Australia must fundamentally reassess how we see ourselves as a nation: our economy, our security, our demographics and the role we intend to play in an increasingly contested region.

The Indo-Pacific is now the world’s primary arena for strategic competition, whether between great powers or between smaller, but nonetheless equally consequential nations.

While major powers including China, India and Pakistan are expanding their influence and while middle powers such as Thailand and Vietnam are also growing more assertive and ambitious.

At the same time, long-established industrial powers like Japan and South Korea are re-emerging as more active strategic players – this is not a future trend, it is the reality we are already living in.

Australia’s national stratagems have not kept pace.

Without sustained investment, long-term planning and a willingness to think at scale, Australia risks being overtaken by the accelerating economic, technological and military momentum of our neighbours.

If we drift, the next generation could inherit a country that is wealthier (at least superficially as we’re now finding out) than it once was, but far less influential in shaping its own region.

For decades, governments in Canberra have prioritised short-term political cycles over long-term national strategy. Incremental adjustments and reactive policy are no longer sufficient. The strategic environment is shifting too quickly.

What Australia needs now is foresight: the discipline to identify emerging opportunities, the resolve to prepare for strategic shocks, and the ambition to shape events rather than simply respond to them.

The pressures facing Australia are not hypothetical. They are already unfolding around us. The real question is whether Canberra is prepared to articulate a clear national plan, one capable of mobilising industry, government and the public behind a coherent long-term vision.

As China continues to expand its economic and strategic reach, Australia faces a simple choice: remain a bystander in the defining contest of our region or step forward as a country determined to shape the future of the Indo-Pacific.

The decisions made and actions taken in the next decade will determine which path we take.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..