iscover
With the United States once again distracted in the Middle East and chewing through critical munitions at a rate of knots, it may have unwittingly emboldened Beijing to take direct action and achieve its goals in Taiwan.
Well it happened again, like the town drunk that wakes up and promises themselves "no more benders", America has launched itself headfirst into a psuedo-regime change conflict in the Middle East.
This time however, the geopolitical hangover that stems from this ongoing and still largely contained regional conflict will have long-lasting ramifications for the economic, political, demographic and strategic security order in the Middle East, and undoubtedly the wider global environment.
As the United States, Israel and Iran slug it out, trading blows with an increasingly dazzling display of military power and stamina (at least from the Iranian perspective, much to everyone's surprise) many of the world's wealthiest and most "consequential" petrol-states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are caught in the cross fire.
All the while, bewildered Europeans watch on in a state of utter confusion over their lack of importance and influence, while Russia and China are undoubtedly experiencing a mixed bag of emotions, watching in shock as American and Israeli aircraft seem to operate with impunity over Iran supposedly defended by some of their best air defence technology.
On the otherhand, the rate at which America is expending munitions, particularly critical air-defence weapons systems like the SM-3, SM-6 and PAC-3MSE systems, but equally critically strike weapons including the latest block variant of the Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, and guided bombs will no doubt be leaving Russian and Chinese leadership with a grin that would give the Cheshire Cat a run for its money.
Reinforcing this is Secretary of State, Marco Rubio during a doorstop in the US Capitol Building, where he told reporters, "They [Iran] are producing by some estimates, over 100 of these missiles a month. Compare that to the six or seven interceptors that can be built [in the United States] a month. They [Iran] can build a hundred of these a month, not to mention the thousands of one-way attack drones that they also have."
But why exactly?
Well the Russian case is fairly straight forward, the consumption of American munitions will undoubtedly draw critical supplies away from the Ukrainian conflict, opening up an opportunity for them to regain some of their lost momentum in their ongoing "special military operation" against their former Soviet holding.
This only becomes more of a reality as we approach European spring and summer which will undoubtedly see a massive upswing in the scale and scope of the conflict that has been running, rather disastrously for the Russians since early-2022. Unfortunately for Ukraine their pleas will fall on deaf ears as the United States continues to prioritise their operations in the Middle East and its efforts to protect international shipping through that critical region.
Now, looking closer to home, Taiwan, the small island democracy just under 200 kilometres from mainland China and long regarded as one of the modern world's greatest potential geopolitical catalysts for broader regional, or global conflagration.
But such a move isn't without its challenges.
Beware the ides of April?
While the planning, logistics and support infrastructure required to conduct such an ambitious amphibious-led operation (of which it would undoubtedly be significantly larger than the Operation Overlord landings of D-Day in 1944) is an immense challenge in and of itself, Beijing has a significant advantage over the US and UK forces of 1944: proximity.
The proximity of mainland China (approximately 190 kilometres) to Taiwan presents Beijing with significant tactical and strategic advantages over Taiwan and its allies, including Australia who, unlike the case in Ukraine will have to traverse many thousands of kilometres of open ocean, congested archipelagic, littoral waters as opposed to the easily navigable, secure and established land-based transport infrastructure corridors of continental Europe.
As a result of these long, exposed and vulnerable supply chains, Taiwan and allies will be at a sizeable disadvantage when it comes to supporting high-intensity combat operations with a peer-competitor. However, it is also worth noting that the proximity of Beijing's industrial and population centres, critical military infrastructure and supporting maritime along their east coast is a bit of a double edged sword.
However, by far and away the most influential determining factors are the weather across the Taiwan Strait and America's capacity, and willingness to intervene in defending Taiwan from a peer-competitor (despite the rather patchy degrees of success of their tech on display in Venezuela and now Iran).
Beginning with the willingness and capacity of America to intervene in defence of Taiwan, we get a startling look at what the American public really feel when it comes to foreign adventurism.
With revelations that only 25 per cent of the American public support the US operation and involvement against Iran, while 59 per cent of Americans disapprove of the strikes against Iran, with most thinking that a long-term conflict in the Middle East is once again likely according to CNN polling conducted by SSRS, it seems that the American public are increasingly war weary.
This polling is reflected by similar polling conducted by Reuters and IPSOS, which revealed that 27 per cent of respondents approving of the strikes, while 43 per cent disapproved, far from overwhelming support for US participation in what could devolve into yet another multi-decade quagmire costing hundreds of billions (if not trillions) and thousands of dead Americans, with tens of thousands wounded.
Bringing us to America's capacity to actively intervene in Taiwan's defence.
As previously mentioned and so elloquently framed by US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, America's physical capacity to defend Taiwan from a Chinese hostility is yet another key determing factor that will undoubtedly shape the planning, decision making and execution of any potential Chinese invasion operation.
Indeed, only four days into the conflict, it is being revealed that the United States is looking to redeploy air defence systems from South Korea, particularly the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems (THAAD) systems currently deployed to the north Asian nation to protect it, and deployed American forces from missile attack from North Korea to the Middle East.
This fails to take into account the consumption rate of THAAD missiles during the '12 Day War' during 2025, which is reported to have consumed up to 150 of such interceptors, or, put another way, approximately 25 per cent of the total global stockpile according to reporting by the South Korean-based Chosun Daily.
Just how many such missiles would be consumed during a conflict, of which America expects their combat operations to last 4-5 weeks according to President Trump in an interview with The New York Times during which he insisted, it "won’t be difficult" for the US and Israel to maintain the intensity of their combat operations.
Well if footage of the past few days have been anything to go by, the intelligence being passed on regarding Iranian munitions stockpiles may need to be double and tripple checked, especially if this conflict is expected to go on for at least 4-5 weeks, or more critical infrastructure, military bases, personnel and civilians will come under fire.
Giving further insight into the consumption rates of US and Israeli munitions, is analysis conducted by US Air Force Officer, Jahara Matisek (Phd) which reveals just how much has been consumed in the first 36 hours of the war, with 120 Block IV/V Tomahawks, 70 AGM-158 JASSM/JASSM-ER, 210 GBU-31/32/38 JDAMsand 50 AGM-154 JSOW in the offensive weapons category being used.
In the defensive category, the numbers are far more starling, particularly when you add in the allied Gulf nations defensive weapons consumption (largely because they use the US supply chain and missiles as well) with the US using 180 SM-2, SM-3, SM-6 across the deployed US Navy Aegis-equipped vessels in the region.
The US and Gulf partners have expended a total of 340 Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 missiles, and a combined total of 70 THAAD missiles over the past 36 hours, which places increasing pressure on broader American security commitments and its capacity to actively and decisively intervene in the defence of allies aorund the world.
Finally, bringing me to the environmental constraints which make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan tactically, strategically and logistically impossible, with Typhoon Season (July–September) and the Winter Monsoon seasons (November–March) giving way to strong currents, widely varying tides, headwinds, storms that all dramatically impact the viability and chances of success for Beijing.
However, annually there are two, critical breaks in the environmental factors that significantly enhance the possibility of success for an amphibious-led invasion of Taiwan, and one is rapidly approaching. Conveniently enough for us (sarcasm), April and October have long been identified as the optimal time periods for an amphibious operation against Taiwan.
Maybe we're now facing a perfect storm of events that may just tip President Xi's hand and present him with an opportunity that is simply too good to pass up.
So beware the ides of April, I guess.
Final thoughts
Australia and Australians need a wake-up call, and we owe that honesty to our children and grandchildren. Hopefully, the ongoing events in the Middle East
The nation faces a moment that demands a fundamental rethink of how we see ourselves: as a country, as a people, and as an economy. Most importantly, we must reconsider how Australia fits into an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific, where economic strength, industrial capability and technological leadership are inseparable from national security.
The Indo-Pacific is now the most strategically contested region in the world. Major and emerging powers alike are expanding their economic, technological and military influence. This is not a future challenge it is the strategic reality we already face, and it requires a fundamental reset in Australia’s national strategy.
At the centre of that reset must be industrial sovereignty. A nation that cannot design, build and sustain the critical technologies and systems it depends on cannot be truly secure. For too long, Australia has allowed key parts of its industrial base to decline, increasing reliance on fragile global supply chains and the capabilities of others.
That approach is no longer sustainable.
In an era of strategic competition, industrial competitiveness is national power. Nations that dominate advanced manufacturing, energy systems, critical minerals processing and defence production will shape the regional order.
Without sustained investment in sovereign industry, advanced manufacturing and strategic infrastructure, Australia will not simply fall behind we will be overtaken by neighbours whose economic momentum and industrial capacity are rapidly expanding.
If we fail to act, the next generation will inherit a nation with diminished influence, constrained prosperity and fewer strategic choices.
For too long, governments have prioritised short-term gains over long-term national capability. But the strategic environment is shifting too quickly for incremental policy and reactive fixes. Business as usual is no longer an option.
Australia needs a national project of renewal, rebuilding industrial strength, technological capability and economic resilience. Defence, industry, energy, education and infrastructure policy must be aligned around a single objective: ensuring Australia remains prosperous, competitive and secure in a far more demanding world.
The challenge is not whether these pressures will emerge they already have. The real question is whether Canberra will put forward a bold national plan capable of mobilising industry and the public around a clear strategic vision.
Australia now faces a defining choice: drift into declining industrial capability and strategic influence, or invest in the sovereign strength needed to shape our own future.
The decisions and actions made in this decade will determine which path we take. Or, in the words of The Gipper, we find ourselves in "A Time for Choosing".
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
