iscover
As the United States Navy continues its efforts to reopen and secure the Straits of Hormuz, Australia must learn some critical lessons about the scale and make up of its future naval capabilities.
Following the Battle of Midway the United States emerged as the world's premier naval power, rapidly overtaking the formerly unchallenged British Royal Navy on the back of America's vast industrial base and the demands of a global war.
Even the end of the Second World War didn't slow down the growth of the US Navy, which throughout the Cold War continued to grow, both in size and complexity, translating to the practically unrivalled global dominance of the United States and a central pillar which the modern world was built upon.
While the Soviet Navy, particularly its submarine arm would seek to challenge the global dominance of the US Navy, more recently, the accelerating technological sophistication and scale of the People's Liberation Army-Navy has served as the main "pacing challenge" for the US Navy, however to this day it remains the unrivaled apex predator of the global maritime commons.
That was until recently.
However the challenge to the US Navy hasn't necessarily come from a rival maritime power, so much as an asymmetric threat, combining low-cost, mass-producable munitions and kamikaze-style autonomous vehicles to raise the risk profile, not only to the vast volumes of civilian merchant travel that traverses the Straits of Hormuz, but also the United States Navy.
As the US Navy struggles to secure and open this critical waterway, it becomes clearer by the day that Australia needs to significantly and rapidly reevaluate its priorities and modernisation efforts to deliver a robust, survivable, scaleable and future-proofed national maritime capability that provides us with the capacity to, as outlined in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, "unilaterally deter any adversary."
Because as it stands, things are looking a little lacklustre to say the least.
Reinforcing this uncomfortable reality is retired naval officer, turned strategic analyst, Jennifer Parker, who has repeatedly called for a significant rethink in the way the nation goes about building maritime power that is not only sustainable, but is survivable and scaleable in the context of the mounting political, economic and strategic challenges shaping the Indo-Pacific and globe more broadly.
Parker articulates this in a piece for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, titled 'Crisis in Middle East exposes Australia’s maritime vulnerability' in which she articulates, "We are a trading island nation whose prosperity and security rely on ships arriving safely from distant ports. Fuel, fertiliser, ammunition and other essential supplies move through increasingly contested sea lanes that Australia does not control."
Contested sea lanes and Australian sea control
Australia has long grappled with its relationship with the sea and its importance in the day-to-day life our connectivity with the regional and global maritime commons have, this relationship has only become more complex and inescapable since the end of the Cold War and the rise of hyperglobalisation giving rise to long, vulnerable "just-in-time" supply chains.
This complexity has historically also shaped the way the nation has developed its naval forces, albeit largely through the lens of dependence on a global power for strategic mass and might, first the British Empire and more recently the United States, now however that dependence is being called into question and the plans articulated by the Government's 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 Independent Analysis into Navy's Surface Combatant Fleet and of course the trilateral AUKUS agreement.
Just as a refresher, the 2024 Independent Analysis of the Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet concluded that Australia’s current fleet is the oldest in its history and "not fit for purpose" given the nation’s deteriorating strategic environment, in order to address these vulnerabilities, the review recommended a transition to a larger, more lethal "two-tier" fleet structure.
As a result, the 2024 Independent Analysis of the Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet concluded that Australia’s current fleet is the oldest in its history and "not fit for purpose" given the nation’s deteriorating strategic environment. To address these vulnerabilities, the review recommended a transition to a larger, more lethal "two-tier" fleet structure.
Key findings and recommendations include:
- Fleet Expansion: Increasing the surface combatant fleet from 11 to 26 major warships.
- Tier 1 Capability: Maintaining nine high-end vessels, comprising three upgraded Hobart-class destroyers and six Hunter-class frigates (reduced from the original nine).
- Tier 2 Capability: Acquiring 11 new general-purpose frigates to replace the ageing Anzac class, providing enhanced air defence and strike capabilities.
- Innovation: Introducing six Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSVs) to increase missile "magazine depth".
- Economic Impact: A commitment to continuous naval shipbuilding in South Australia and Western Australia, supported by an additional $11.1 billion in funding over the next decade.
All of this is further enhanced by the nation's future fleet of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines to be delivered under the AUKUS framework and supported by the introduction of a suite of complementary, advanced technologies including uncrewed and autonomous systems to provide Australia with much needed maritime mass.
Yet as Parker articulates, "While crises often prompt a sudden focus on fleet numbers, Australia’s structural challenges in protecting its maritime domain and critical seaborne supply run much deeper. The problem is not only that the surface fleet is at its smallest and oldest in ship numbers since the 1950s, or that mine warfare and hydrographic capabilities have declined sharply. It begins with a system that has not fully grasped the scale of Australia’s maritime dependence or worked through how to reduce the vulnerability that comes with it."
While Parker recognises and articulates that while these challenges aren't purely a matter for Defence, and do require a coordinated whole-of-nation response, when the rubber hits the road, it is Defence that will be required to deliver the maritime security, and sea control necessary for Australia to guarantee its economic and by extension, political stability Australians are used to.
She articulates, this saying, "Addressing these vulnerabilities is not primarily a Defence task. It begins with understanding which goods are truly critical to keep the economy functioning and sustain a war effort, and what key partners rely on from Australia. Resilience also means reducing what must transit vulnerable sea lanes through industrial policy and stockpiling. Meeting the International Energy Agency requirement to hold 90 days of fuel reserves is only a starting point."
Now while the supply chain and fuel security side of the equation is equally a question for public policymakers, particularly in light of the clear necessity for Australia to seriously consider the development of a cohesive industrial and national security strategies, the rapidly deteriorating regional and global environment is also cause for a major rethink about how and what we require from a naval capability perspective to secure our interests.
But what exactly does that prescription look like?
A bitter pill or necessary medicine?
Parker does have some thoughts about what this prescription may look like, arguing, "A properly structured coastguard should carry this burden so the navy can focus on protecting trade and operating forward. Establishing a coastguard would also allow fragmented maritime responsibilities, including search and rescue now led by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, to be better coordinated."
Going further, Parker proposes that, "Once these basics are addressed, attention turns to the navy. Australia needs more frigates and destroyers, and more capable submarines. The Hunter frigate program, the planned acquisition of Mogami-class frigates and AUKUS all point in the right direction. But they are not moving fast enough. Both surface combatant programs should be accelerated, even if this places strain on workforce and supply chains."
Where Parker falls short in her analysis is clearly calling out the fact that despite the rhetoric and posturing around the 2024 Independent Analysis of the Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet, 2023 Defence Strategic Review, 2024 National Defence Strategy and Integrated Investment Programs respectively, the Australian Defence Force as a whole, and Navy in particular has and will change little in material terms over the next decade.
This is especially true when one compares the proposed force structures in successive white papers, going back as far as the force structure outlined in the 1987 Defence of Australia White Paper which articulated the need for a "two-tier" Navy split between the three Perth class guided missile destroyers, six Adelaide class guided missile frigates and eight Anzac class frigates.
So clearly, while the technology has changed and the overarching geopolitical environment has changed, what is proposed hasn't materially served to shift the dial, beyond the nation's planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, because all else is fiddling around the edges.
Parker also hints at the need for an additional component to our maritime security capabilities, a sovereign merchant fleet supporting critical national needs, saying, "Without access to a strategic fleet of nationally directed shipping, Australia risks having trade routes it cannot use even if sea lanes remain open. A recent taskforce examined the issue, but its recommendations reflected compromise rather than the scale of the strategic problem. Momentum has since faded."
Ironically, this is something that the current Government actively campaigned on during the 2022 election in their call for a "strategic fleet" of tankers, and was then subsequently recommitted to during 2025 with an apparent delivery of an initial three vessels as part of a pilot program, although I am struggling to track down details of this pilot program.
Indeed, Infrastructure Minister, Catherine King said in 2025, "We are not just building a fleet; we are building a career path for the next generation of Australian seafarers. Our Strategic Fleet ensures that when the next global crisis hits, Australia isn't at the back of the queue for fuel or essential goods."
Yet Australia appears to have been caught flat footed and all at sea when it comes to securing our critical maritime supply chains.
Addressing these shortfalls and seemingly entrenched frame of reference and thinking is now of paramount importance for the nation, not solely in the maritime domain, but more broadly across how Australia prepares for the potential of conflict in our region at a whole-of-nation level.
Inevitiably this will require an acceptance that Australia will have either accept a bitter pill at a later date, or take necessary medicine and invest rapidly and expansively in our maritime capabilities in a way that doesn't simply lather, rinse and repeat the same findings of the past, delivering the same shallow, stretched and brittle force.
Final thoughts
It’s time for a proper reality check.
We’ve got to pull our heads in and wake up to the world around us, not just for our own sake, but for the sake of our kids and grandkids.
We need a massive rethink about who we are as a nation and where we actually sit in a region that’s changing faster than we can keep up with. The Indo-Pacific is currently the most contested patch of dirt and sea on the planet.
Between China, India, and Southeast Asian nations throwing their weight around, and Japan and South Korea stepping back up, or the conflict now raging across the Middle East the competition isn't "coming", it’s already parked on our doorstep.
If we don't start putting our money where our mouth is with some serious, long-term investment, we’re not just going to fall behind; we’re going to get left in the dust. If we keep sitting on our hands, the next generation is going to inherit a country that’s been completely overshadowed by more ambitious neighbours.
For too long, we’ve seen Canberra chasing short-term wins and "she’ll be right" band-aid fixes. But the old way of doing things is dead and buried. We can’t afford to be reactive anymore.
The real question is: when is the government going to stop talking in circles and actually deliver a bold, clear-eyed plan that gets the public, defence and industry on the same page?
While the Middle East conflagration has served to ignite the public consciousness, and with China continuing to flex its muscles, we’re at a crossroads. We can either be a passenger in our own backyard or step up and help drive the future of the region. The choices we make today will decide if we thrive in this new era or get swept aside by it.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
