An outdated insurance policy: Do the NDS and IIP skew towards over-reliance on the US?

This has been driven in large part by the geographic isolation of the nation from our security benefactors, beginning with the British Empire, following the Fall of Singapore in early 1942 before shifting to the United States following the Battle of the Coral Sea and our comparatively small population in a region of potential great powers.

The ebbs and flows of history have only served to exacerbate this oscillation, and much like the “boom and bust” cycle of our great brown land, have seen the nation, its policymakers and people struggle with the realities of a broader world.

At its lowest point, the Battle for Australia and the attacks by Imperial Japan on Australia during the Second World War served to heighten the underlying cultural anxiety, while at its highest point, the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union and the “End of History” served to reassure the nation that the only way was up.

However, today we know that like Mark Twain’s infamous quote, “History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme”, the world is once again the domain of ambitious, competing and assertive great powers, each seeking to shape their own spheres of influence, guarantee their own interests and designs for the broader global environment.

Against this backdrop, it has come to the shock of many in capitals around the world that the United States has, beginning with the first Trump administration (2016–20) and again under the second Trump administration (2024–28), for the first time in living memory – our strategic benefactor, the global hegemon and foundation of the “global rules-based order” – is openly acting like a “traditional” great power.

For Australia in particular, this is quite a rude shock. After all, we expected better from the United States because we had long tied our moral legitimacy and position in the “global rules-based order” to the morality and exceptionalism of the United States as the “leader of the free world”.

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As a result, we shaped our defence and national security policies and capabilities writ large around fitting within the broader plans, strategies and priorities under the umbrella of American strategic might, much as we did with the British Empire before it.

But as the world has become increasingly multipolar, formalised perhaps most dramatically with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and now the ongoing, interconnected economic, political and security crises resulting from the conflict in the Middle East, questions have been asked about Australia’s traditional “insurance policy”.

This has only become increasingly timely in the aftermath of the release of the 2026 National Defence Strategy and supporting Integrated Investment Program and the enduring status quo of Australia’s defence and national security policy, despite efforts to prioritise self-reliance and sovereignty.

Highlighting this is deputy director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Defence Strategy Program, Courtney Stewart, in a piece titled NDS 2026 – How Australia’s defence strategy converges with US’s balance of power, in which she inadvertently poses an important question not only about the forces we are building as outlined in both documents, but the assumptions made about the enduring commitment of the United States to serve as a strategic balancing force in the region and globally.

Three ’interlocking’ drivers

At the core of Stewart’s inadvertent question is three distinct, “interlocking” drivers, as she defines them, that are fundamental to enduring defence and securing of Australia’s national interests in the Indo-Pacific, but within the confines and under the umbrella of the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order, based on American strategic hegemony.

Stewart detailed these three points, saying, “To that end, the strategy [the 2026 National Defence Strategy] elevates three interlocking drivers: the Australia–US alliance, the role and presence of the United States in the region, and Australia’s strategy of denial. These changes signal a shift in how the government defines the role of Defence – not as a supporter of an abstract rules-based order but as an active participant in shaping the balance of power.”

These three drivers do, however, as Stewart identified, raise questions how Australia pursues and indeed balances its relationships in the Indo-Pacific, particularly those between the United States and China, while also raising a significant question about just how committed Australia is (at least in its current iteration) to serving as an “active participant in shaping the balance of power”.

By far and away the major shift for Stewart is the recognition and prioritisation by both Australia and the United States of the “balance of power” and how they can shape what will no doubt be a fragile balance at the best of times under the modern framework.

Stewart unpacked this reality, saying, “The return to a focus on balance of power, first in US strategy and now in Australia’s, does not signal an abandonment of rules and norms. Protecting them remains an ADF task, and institutions and norms still matter.”

She detailed further, saying, “Rather, it’s a recognition that the rules alone cannot shape China’s behaviour as regional power dynamics shift. As the balance tilts, so too does the authority and strength of the rules that once sustained it. In the same regard, future cooperation will shift away from shared values to common interests.”

The singular focus on China, while it is justifiable and understandable, however, there is now more than one great power or emerging great power in the Indo-Pacific, each with their own unique ambitions, designs and desires for the region and their role in it. This reality is one overlooked by both the NDS and IIP and Stewart to our major detriment.

To be fair, however, the United States does also overlook this reality, rather, instead all parties seek to frame the evolving multipolar region through the lens of “national interests”, which, as these other nations continue to rise, will only become more diverse and conflicting. Just look at the recent statements from Indonesia regarding the potential taxing of ships traversing the Straits of Malacca.

It is this that Stewart believes will continue to drive a shift away from the nebulous concept of “values” towards “interests” which she articulated, saying, “As the balance tilts, so too does the authority and strength of the rules that once sustained it. In the same regard, future cooperation will shift away from shared values to common interests.”

Yet set against all of these competing factors is a reality that only becomes more puzzling and troubling when one considers that despite the rhetoric and the changes in technology, the Australian Defence Force across the board has changed little in shape and composition since the 1987 Defence of Australia White Paper, a strategy document that formalised a pivot away from the concept of “Forward Defence” towards pseudo-isolationism masked as apologia following Australia’s participation in Vietnam.

So with that in mind, how can Australia expect to meaningfully shape the regional balance of power as an “active participant in shaping the balance of power”?

Resorting to faulty assumptions

Compounding Australia’s position, posture and predicament is the faulty game theory and “golden arches” theory of geopolitical relationships, particularly when it comes to the role of economics in shaping binding “interests” and an assumption that those interests will prevent the outbreak of conflict or intensified competition between the region’s emerging powers.

Stewart hinted at this saying, “This is particularly important in the Indo-Pacific, the epicentre of economic and geopolitical competition and a region accounting for nearly half of global GDP on a purchasing-power parity basis. The stakes are explicitly economic: one-third of global shipping transits the South China Sea, making open sea lines of communication central to US prosperity and, by extension, its security.”

“In this framing, maintaining US economic and technological pre-eminence, alongside a favourable conventional military balance, is the surest way to deter and prevent large-scale conflict,” Stewart added.

However, modern history is littered with the failed examples of this. One simply has to look at the economic relationship between the British and German Empires in the lead-up to the First World War and the “rational” thought basis of said economic argument that should have prevented the outbreak of conflict between the two economically dependent nations.

It didn’t.

Rather, we see more rhetoric and more of the same, something Stewart seemed to recognise and articulate, saying, “As a middle power, Australia is positioning itself within a US-led network of allies and partners to collectively balance China. This approach accepts that Beijing’s power and influence will continue to grow as it competes with Washington and other countries for regional primacy.”

"This is competition – a persistent and long-term struggle between nations pursing incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in conflict. Tilting the balance requires sustained effort to shape where and how that competition plays out, in areas that favour US and allied interests or undermine an adversary’s ability to coerce in pursuit of its own interests,” Stewart added.

So perhaps we should be asking, particularly as the world and America’s role in it has become more confused and shambolic, is the status quo insurance policy the best way forward, or should we seek to take on a far more assertive, independent role within the multipolar region?

Final thoughts

The escalating Middle East conflict in 2026 should be the circuit breaker Australia didn’t know it needed, a blunt reminder that our economic, strategic and political foundations are far more fragile than we’ve been willing to admit.

Fuel shocks driven by disrupted sea lanes, a distracted United States tied down in proxy conflicts, and rising domestic tensions all point to the same conclusion: we’ve been too comfortable for too long, outsourcing risk in a world that no longer carries it for us.

And if this sounds like a broken record, it is because the reality hasn’t changed, Australia needs a wake-up call and we need it now, not later, because the next generation will live with whatever we fail to fix.

The Indo-Pacific is no longer a distant “neighbourhood”; it’s the global engine room and the main arena for strategic competition where emerging and established powers alike are moving faster, thinking harder and acting with intent.

Meanwhile, we’re still operating on outdated assumptions, drifting between election cycles while the world accelerates around us. That drift comes at a cost: without a fundamental reset, Australia risks becoming a wealthy bystander, comfortable, but increasingly irrelevant in shaping its own region.

Reversing that means getting serious about sovereignty as a practical task, not a slogan building real economic and industrial depth beyond a quarry-and-farm model, fielding credible hard power that can deter and influence, and securing the supply chains and technologies that underpin national resilience.

This isn’t about walking away from partners but about having the weight and independence to act in our own interests when it counts. The pressures aren’t theoretical, they’re already here. Incrementalism won’t cut it.

The next decade will decide whether Australia is a player or a prize. It’s time to choose and start building accordingly.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below or get in touch at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

Stephen Kuper

Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.