iscover
The increasing unpredictability of the United States as the nation’s primary security benefactor has reignited calls from an expert for Australia to have a little more self-respect when it comes to the alliance and invest in itself without being too keen.
By now virtually everyone is familiar with Australia’s long, storied and often strangely co-dependent relationship with its “great and powerful friend” of the day, whether that is the British Empire or the United States.
While it was historically understandable, particularly in the decades immediately following Federation and when considering the nation’s small population, geographic isolation and the disparity between our much larger regional neighbours as the global rules-based order emerged, that level of co-dependency seemed obsolete.
However, Australia embraced the security of the post-Second World War economic, political and strategic order as a toddler embraced its favourite blanket, enjoying the perceived security it provides when struggling to sleep at night.
The nation, however, was not a benign actor in the post-World War II world, at least initially, with the era of “Forward Defence” launched under the Menzies government and encapsulated in Australia’s central role in the Indonesian Konfrontasi, the major role in the Korean War and eventually its contentious participation in the Vietnam conflict.
That participation would ultimately result in the end of Australia’s formal “Forward Defence” policy, giving way to the rise of the “Defence of Australia” doctrine which prioritised continental defence and the “sea-air gap” in a form of pseudo-isolationism, withdrawing from directly shaping the security environment of the Indo-Pacific.
While successive governments have sort of pivoted away from the trap of the “Defence of Australia” era, to this day, our strategic and tactical posture, force design and capability acquisition and development have been shaped by this late-Cold War policy designed for a far more benign regional and global environment.
Now if you took all of the rhetoric in successive Defence white papers, Defence strategic updates and reviews and National Defence strategies, the catchphrase of “shape, deter, respond” has come to represent just how disconnected Australia’s posture is from reality, while serving to reinforce Australia’s dependence on the United States for its security.
It is important to acknowledge that Australia will always require a degree of “top cover” to be provided by a “great and powerful friend”, however, if the increased unpredictability and transactional nature of the Trump administration continues to be the status quo post the Trump-era, Australia will require a clear-eyed and realistic pivot.
Highlighting this is the longtime proponent of a more neutral and sovereign Australian strategic posture, the Lowy Institute’s Sam Roggeveen in a piece for The Interpreter, titled Canberra can’t want the alliance more than Washington does, in which he unpacked the growing necessity for Australia to begin taking its own security far more seriously.
Roggeveen began his analysis stressing: “Both major parties treat US support as a given, but an ambitious Australia can plan for its own defence”, something that seems to be somewhat controversial for both Australia’s policymakers and public for that matter to truly take seriously.
No indication of movement
As I have previously alluded to, Australia continues to be caught in a state of arrested development when it comes to developing a truly sovereign defence posture and doctrine. Now while the rhetoric, particularly since the 2016 Defence White Paper, has shifted, the reality is that materially, little appears to have changed.
Reinforcing this, Roggeveen added: “There is no indication of any such movement in Australia, as recent speeches by Defence Minister Richard Marles and Opposition defence spokesperson James Paterson illustrate. Here’s Marles, launching the 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS) last week: ‘…there is no effective balance of power in the Indo-Pacific absent the continued presence of the United States’.
“And here’s Paterson responding to the NDS: ‘…it is impossible to imagine a coalition big or powerful enough to support our core national interests – like the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific – without the US as part of it. So while I respect and understand why many Australians are confounded by the rhetoric and sometimes policies of the Trump administration, the idea that we can make our way safely in the world without them is absurd’,” he added.
For Roggeveen, these statements are based in what could be charitably described as faulty assumptions, particularly in the aftermath of the Middle East conflict and the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which have raised significant questions in allied capitals around the world.
These factors have, of course, only been enflamed by the mercurial, transactional and often unnecessarily confrontational “diplomatic” style of US President Donald Trump, which has become more prominent in his second administration, as the world continues to trend towards the increased multipolarity and a diminishing relative power and position for the United States.
Now this hasn’t been the fault of President Trump nor has it been something that has happened relatively quickly, rather it is an evolution that does in large part date back to (at least) the mid-2010s, with successive events and confrontations serving to hasten the rise of a multipolar and competitive global world order.
With these factors in mind, it is important to understand that front and centre to Roggeveen’s analysis is the Australian belief that the United States will always be there to defend us and our interests, something he alluded to in the previous comments.
Detailing this, Roggeveen added: “But this misses the point: whether the United States will maintain a balance of power in Asia and help Australia ‘make our way safely in the world’ will be decided by America, not anyone else. Australia doesn’t get a say. It cannot materially affect American calculations on these questions.”
He added: “Canberra cannot conjure up a vital US national interest where none exists. Either the security of Asia matters so much to America that it is willing to keep defending Australia, or it doesn’t. Australia can’t want the alliance more than the Americans themselves want it.
These points are further reinforced by the “powerful voices in the US itself have doubts about the need to confront China, starting at the very top of the administration. The fact that the US has again chosen to go to war in the Middle East should also reinforce doubts about US capability and resolve in Asia. On the other hand, senior Trump administration officials continue to talk up America’s commitment to Asia, the US has offered its prized nuclear-powered submarine technology to Australia, and it is expanding its military basing options in the Philippines and Australia.”
Roggeveen argued with other analysts that it is not necessary to definitively answer whether Washington would come to Australia’s aid in a crisis. Rather, a degree of humility is required. Even policymakers confident in the alliance, including Defence Minister Richard Marles and opposition figure James Paterson, are being urged to recognise that “a small degree of doubt” about US resolve should be enough to avoid “betting your entire defence strategy” on that assumption.
Hedging our bets
The argument is not about abandoning the alliance but about hedging against risk. Australia has done so before. The shift towards defence self-reliance in the 1980s occurred without undermining ANZUS, demonstrating that greater independence and strong alliances are not mutually exclusive.
Critics suggest that over the past decade, Canberra has moved away from that balance, instead doubling down on deeper integration with the United States through expanded basing arrangements and high-profile capability acquisitions, despite the alliance already being “in excellent health”.
It is worth recognising that based on these assumptions, such decisions risk appearing like “a solution looking for a problem” while overlooking what Roggeveen described as a “worryingly narrow view” of Australia’s strategic options.
Roggeveen argued: “Somehow, over the course of the last decade, Australian governments convinced themselves that self-reliance within an alliance context was no longer enough. Australia needed to base US forces on its soil and buy American nuclear-powered submarines to secure its relationship with Washington. It was a solution looking for a problem because the alliance was already in excellent health.”
Rather by focusing overwhelmingly on US support, both major parties are accused of underestimating the country’s own capacity. Australia’s geographic advantages, a vast continent buffered by oceans, combined with a strong economy, capable institutions, and a proven military tradition, are cited as evidence that a more self-reliant defence posture is achievable.
As one line of argument put it, the question should not be why Australia must depend so heavily on others, but rather: “why assume that Australians are incapable of solving the problem of independent national defence?”
He went on to add: “But quite apart from that strategic judgement, it is also dispiriting to see such a lack of self-confidence and ambition in the two major parties. Australia has a huge continent to itself and is separated from its only plausible enemy by thousands of kilometres of ocean.”
The underlying message is not one of isolationism but of recalibration, maintaining the alliance while rebuilding confidence in Australia’s ability to act independently if required.
So is it time for some more self-respect?
Final thoughts
The escalating conflict in the Middle East in 2026 should serve as the circuit breaker Australia didn’t realise it needed, a stark reminder that our economic, strategic and political foundations are far more fragile than we’ve been willing to admit.
Fuel price shocks driven by disrupted sea lanes, a distracted United States tied up in proxy conflicts, and growing pressures at home all point to the same conclusion: Australia has been too comfortable for too long, effectively outsourcing risk in a world that no longer absorbs it on our behalf.
If that sounds familiar, it’s because the reality hasn’t changed. Australia needs a genuine wake-up call, and we need it now, not later, because the consequences of inaction will fall squarely on the next generation.
The Indo-Pacific is no longer some distant “neighbourhood”. It is the global engine room and the primary arena for strategic competition, where both emerging and established powers are moving faster, thinking more strategically, and acting with clear intent.
Yet Australia continues to operate on outdated assumptions, drifting from one election cycle to the next while the world accelerates around us. That drift carries real risk: without a fundamental reset, we face becoming a wealthy bystander, secure on the surface, but increasingly irrelevant when it comes to shaping our own region.
Turning that around means treating sovereignty as a practical task, not a slogan. It requires building genuine economic and industrial depth beyond a quarry-and-farm model, developing credible hard power capable of deterrence and influence, and securing the supply chains and critical technologies that underpin national resilience.
This is not about stepping away from allies. It is about having the capability, weight and independence to act in Australia’s interests when it matters most. The pressures we face are not hypothetical, they are already here. Incremental change will not be enough.
The next decade will determine whether Australia is a serious strategic actor or simply an object of competition. The choice is ours, but it must be made now and backed by decisive action.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
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