2026 National Defence Strategy – what’s changed? What’s still missing?

On deterrence, NDS26 clearly expanded the architecture established in NDS24. NDS26 implicitly suggests that Australia has recognised that it has already moved from a posture of basic deterrence (non-specific adversary, non-specific threat) towards one of general deterrence (specific adversary, non-specific threat).

NDS26 also moved further towards recognising a strategy of integrated deterrence (coordination of all instruments of national power) – through its emphasis on sovereign industrial resilience, civil preparedness, supply chain security, workforce mobilisation and the coordination of national instruments of power – without explicitly naming it.

NDS26 also developed the logic of general deterrence more substantially than its predecessor. Persistent shaping activities, alliance integration, industrial preparedness, force posture initiatives and grey-zone competition are all treated as enduring features of the strategic environment rather than crisis-specific activities.

The isolated introduction of Flexible Deterrent Options language in the Japan section further suggested a growing awareness of graduated signalling and escalation management requirements. The inclusion of strategic communications also implicitly broadened the deterrence posture beyond purely military capability.

The central conceptual gap, however, remains unchanged. NDS26 still treats deterrence as a largely undifferentiated strategic objective framed primarily through denial. The document does not distinguish between general and immediate deterrence (specific adversary, specific threat), nor does it articulate the distinct planning imperatives associated with each. This omission becomes more significant given NDS26’s sharper assessment of the strategic environment as one increasingly characterised by fracture, rivalry, disorder and coercion.

The requirements of immediate deterrence – crisis communication, mobilisation, threshold signalling, escalation management, and the credible demonstration of consequences to an adversary actively considering aggression – remain largely absent as explicit planning considerations. As the probability of short-warning crises increases, the absence of a clear immediate deterrence framework becomes more consequential.

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The second critique – the relationship between a focused force and a balanced force – is partially addressed in practice but not resolved as a force planning determinant. NDS26 doubled down on the integrated, focused force construct while simultaneously hedging against its limitations.

Expanded investment in current-force capability, preparedness, Reserve growth, theatre health (NDS26 terminology for regional operational sustainability), missile defence and related enabling capabilities through the 2026 Integrated Investment Program collectively broaden the force’s operational utility beyond a narrowly specialised denial posture.

This becomes particularly significant in the context of persistent grey-zone competition, where coercion, maritime constabulary activity, influence operations, infrastructure protection, regional engagement, cyber resilience and domestic support tasks require a much broader spectrum of capabilities than long-range strike alone can provide.

These additions suggest an implicit recognition that Australia still requires elements of balance, adaptability and concurrency management. NDS26 identified simultaneous demands – deterrence in the northern approaches, border security, grey-zone competition, regional stabilisation and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief – without fully explaining how a force still managing significant workforce pressures will address them concurrently.

This tension is particularly acute for Army. Air Force and Navy face demanding but broadly defined operational problems – denial in known theatres against identifiable adversaries with understood capability trajectories. Army faces a categorically different challenge: the tasks it may be called upon to perform, the geography in which it will perform them, and the partners alongside whom it will operate are all substantially uncertain. Addressing these issues requires adaptability, breadth and the kind of force structure flexibility that the focused force does not adequately address.

Overall, NDS26 is strategically more coherent than NDS24 and reflects a more serious appreciation of preparedness and national resilience. Nevertheless, the failure to distinguish explicitly between basic, general and immediate deterrence remains unresolved and arguably more urgent given the sharper strategic environment NDS26 itself described, while the focused versus balanced force tension has been ameliorated to some extent, the need for balance is still lacking as a force structure determinant.

John Harvey is a former Air Marshal in the RAAF and has a PhD in computer science from UNSW Canberra. His postings have included Chief Capability Development Group, F-35 project manager, director Military Strategy and director Air Power Studies Centre.

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