Shadow MINDEF poses critical question: Is Australia ready for the Indian Ocean competition?

During the Cold War, Australia’s defence relationship with the Indian Ocean was comparatively limited, despite the importance of maritime trade routes. Strategic attention was often concentrated on south-east Asia and the Pacific, while the Indian Ocean was viewed largely through the prism of British and American naval power.

Facilities such as the joint naval communication station at Harold E Holt in Western Australia and the growing significance of HMAS Stirling reflected Australia’s supporting role within broader Western maritime strategy.

However, over the past two decades, Australia’s strategic outlook has shifted dramatically. The rise of China as a major naval power, the increasing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific, instability in the Middle East, piracy in the Horn of Africa, and growing great power competition across the Indian Ocean have elevated the region’s significance in Australian defence planning.

The Indian Ocean is now recognised not merely as a transit route, but as a strategic battlespace linking Australia to Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Senator Paterson’s speech firmly situated itself within this newer strategic framework.

Senator Paterson’s speech at the Indian Ocean Defence Summit, titled “Australia in the Indian Ocean – Is Australia Ready?”, is both a warning and a strategic argument: warning that Australia is dangerously exposed to a deteriorating regional environment, and arguing that the nation must urgently reorient its defence posture around maritime security, long-range deterrence, and resilience in the Indian Ocean.

While framed as a critique of the Albanese government’s defence management, the speech also reflected a broader evolution in Australian strategic thinking, one increasingly centred on the Indian Ocean as a primary theatre of geopolitical competition rather than a secondary flank.

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The speech repeatedly emphasised the vulnerability of Australia’s maritime trade network. Senator Paterson noted that “over 99 per cent of our trade by volume travels by sea”, moving through chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, Lombok Strait, Sunda Strait, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz.

By referencing recent instability in the Middle East and disruptions around Hormuz, Paterson sought to demonstrate how quickly external shocks can affect Australian fuel prices, supply chains and economic stability.

This argument reflected a deeper strategic concern increasingly shared across Australian defence circles: that Australia’s greatest vulnerability is not invasion, but coercion through maritime disruption.

In Senator Paterson’s framing, freedom of navigation and secure sea lines of communication are not abstract naval concepts, they are prerequisites for Australia’s national survival as a trading island nation. His warning that the closure of chokepoints closer to Australia, “especially if they were disrupted simultaneously”, would have severe consequences is intended to reinforce the urgency of deterrence.

Western Australia is therefore portrayed as the centrepiece of Australia’s future defence posture. Senator Paterson highlighted facilities, including HMAS Stirling, RAAF Learmonth, the Naval Communication Station Harold E Holt, and the Special Air Service Regiment at Campbell Barracks, as examples of infrastructure critical to securing Australia’s interests in the Indian Ocean.

Implicitly, Senator Paterson argued that Australia’s strategic centre of gravity is shifting westward, away from the traditional east coast focus that dominated much of the post-war era.

This strategic geography directly underpins Senator Paterson’s defence policy arguments, particularly regarding submarines. The speech’s most severe criticism is reserved for the government’s handling of the Collins Class life-of-type extension program. Senator Paterson uses the recent auditor-general’s report to argue that delays, indecision and mismanagement have jeopardised one of Australia’s most important deterrent capabilities.

The significance of the Collins Class in this context is central to understanding the speech. Australia’s submarine force has long been designed around sea denial and intelligence collection across the Indian Ocean and maritime south-east Asia.

Senator Paterson argued that the submarines are critical to deterring any adversary seeking to coerce Australia through blockade or disruption of maritime chokepoints. His warning that “the only resource more scarce in the Defence portfolio than money is time” encapsulated his broader thesis that Australia is running out of strategic time faster than it is building capability.

At the same time, Senator Paterson strongly reaffirmed support for AUKUS and the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Declaring himself “an AUKUS true believer,” he presented the program as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to fundamentally transform Australia’s strategic weight in the Indo-Pacific.

The speech reflected a growing bipartisan consensus that nuclear-powered submarines are uniquely suited to Australia’s geography because of their endurance, stealth and ability to project power across the Indian Ocean and wider Indo-Pacific.

Nevertheless, the speech also revealed significant concern about whether AUKUS can be delivered quickly enough to avoid a dangerous capability gap during the late 2020s and early 2030s. Paterson therefore advocates supplementary deterrent capabilities to hedge against delays.

Most notably, Senator Paterson reinforced his proposal to investigate the acquisition of the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider, arguing that long-range stealth strike aircraft could provide a credible deterrent against maritime coercion and blockade.

This is strategically significant because it points towards an emerging Australian defence concept focused on long-range strike and denial capabilities. Paterson also referenced long-range drones, ballistic missiles and hypersonic systems, suggesting a broader shift away from a purely defensive posture towards one capable of imposing substantial costs on adversaries at distance.

In effect, the speech advocated an Australian version of anti-access and area denial strategy tailored to the Indian Ocean and maritime south-east Asia.

The speech also functioned as a political attack on the government’s defence spending trajectory. Senator Paterson argued that the Albanese government is attempting to implement AUKUS while maintaining what he characterises as a “peacetime budget”.

By citing independent analysts and pointing to cuts or delays in programs such as additional F-35 squadrons, missile defence systems, military satellites and frigate upgrades, he contended that broader Australian Defence Force capability is being hollowed out to fund submarines.

His endorsement of Opposition Leader Angus Taylor’s commitment to raise defence spending to 3 per cent of gross domestic product reinforced this argument and signalled where Coalition defence policy is likely heading: towards substantially higher defence expenditure, accelerated rearmament and a more overtly deterrence-focused force posture.

Ultimately, Senator Paterson’s speech reflected a major transformation in Australian strategic thinking about the Indian Ocean. No longer viewed as a peripheral theatre, the region is presented as central to Australia’s economic security, strategic freedom and national resilience.

The speech argued that Australia must urgently adapt to an era in which maritime coercion, great power competition and regional instability are no longer distant possibilities but immediate strategic realities.

Stephen Kuper

Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.