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Celebrated Australian strategist Hugh White has once again issued a call for the nation’s leaders and policymakers to prepare for a world following the end of American hegemony, but what that looks like remains to be seen.
Australia’s relationship with its various “great and powerful friends” has always reflected the geopolitical circumstances of the day. At Federation, dependence on the British Empire was understandable. Australia was a small, sparsely populated nation, geographically isolated and located alongside far larger regional neighbours.
As British power declined during the Second World War, Canberra turned increasingly towards Washington. ANZUS formalised that shift, establishing the United States as Australia’s principal strategic partner.
For much of the Cold War, Australia was far from a passive beneficiary of the Western order. The doctrine of Forward Defence saw Australian forces deployed throughout the region, from Korea and Malaya to Indonesian Confrontation and Vietnam. The underlying logic was straightforward: Australia’s security depended upon actively shaping its wider strategic environment alongside its allies.
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War changed the foreign and domestic calculation, with successive governments pivoting away from the concept of Forward Defence, in favour of the largely “continental” focus of the Defence of Australia.
The late Cold War gave rise to the Defence of Australia doctrine, shifting attention towards continental defence, the northern approaches and the sea-air gap. In the strategic environment of the 1970s and 1980s, this made considerable sense. China had not yet emerged as a global power, Indonesia was not considered a strategic adversary, and American military power remained overwhelmingly dominant.
But geopolitics, like the tides, ebbs and flows.
Over the past four decades, Australia has moved through several distinct strategic eras. The end of the Cold War produced an era of extraordinary Western confidence, followed by the post-9/11 wars, China’s remarkable economic and military rise, Russia’s return to revisionist geopolitics and the gradual fragmentation of the US-led international order.
For a time, Australia benefited enormously from a strategic arrangement that appeared almost uniquely favourable: American power underpinned regional security while China’s rise fuelled Australian prosperity.
That equilibrium has now broken down.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated that major conventional conflict remains possible in Europe. Continuing instability in the Middle East threatens global trade, energy markets, and political cohesion. China has emerged as the principal strategic competitor to the United States, while India and Indonesia are becoming increasingly consequential powers. At the same time, the growing relationships between Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran demonstrate that security challenges can no longer be neatly divided between regions.
Successive Australian governments have recognised this changing environment. Defence white papers, strategic updates and reviews have progressively shifted the language away from continental defence towards concepts such as “shape, deter and respond”, deterrence by denial and the need to contribute to regional security.
Yet Australia’s strategic posture has often changed more slowly than the world around it. Much of Australia’s force structure, capability acquisition, logistics and industrial capacity still reflects assumptions inherited from the Defence of Australia era. The nation has spent decades rhetorically moving beyond that framework without entirely escaping its influence.
At the same time, Australia’s dependence on the United States has become both more important and more complicated.
There is no realistic strategic future in which Australia does not benefit from American strategic “top cover”. The United States remains the only power capable of projecting sufficient military, technological, and intelligence capability across the Indo-Pacific to balance China. Initiatives such as AUKUS and increasingly integrated allied forces only reinforce the importance of the alliance.
But alliances, like geopolitics, are not static.
The second Trump administration has reinforced concerns about the predictability of American leadership and the increasingly transactional nature of US foreign policy. This does not necessarily mean that Washington is abandoning its allies, nor does it signal the end of ANZUS. It does, however, highlight an uncomfortable reality: alliances are ultimately expressions of national interest rather than permanent substitutes for national power.
Australia, therefore, needs to move beyond the false choice between strategic dependence and strategic independence. Importantly, the objective should not be to replace the United States as Australia’s principal ally, nor should Australia retreat into a new form of isolationism or dogmatic self-reliance. Instead, Australia must become more capable of acting independently within an alliance framework.
Uncomfortably for some, that means building the military mass, industrial resilience, munitions stockpiles, infrastructure and sovereign capabilities necessary to make Australia an increasingly consequential contributor to regional deterrence.
Australia has previously adapted to the decline of one great and powerful friend and the rise of another. The challenge now is to maintain the closest possible relationship with the United States while preparing for a world in which American power remains indispensable, but can no longer be assumed to be uncontested, unlimited, or entirely predictable.
The alliance will remain central to Australia’s security. But dependency cannot be Australia’s strategy.
Australia’s future security will depend on becoming a more capable, resilient, and strategically useful ally, one able to shape its own region, contribute meaningfully to collective deterrence and withstand the inevitable ebb and flow of global power.
Highlighting this reality in a new call to Australia’s policymakers is vaunted strategist, Hugh White, in a piece for The Australian titled, “Australia’s leaders must start preparing for a world without American dominance”, in which he asserts: “This is not an easy time for those who make Australian defence and foreign policy. They must decide how Australia should prepare to make its way in a world and region very different from those they took for granted 25 years ago.”
It’s the end of the world as we know it (and I feel fine)
At the core of this challenge for Australian policymakers is the inescapable realisation and thesis argued passionately by White: America’s period as the unilateral and unrivalled global hegemon is over, and the institutions, norms and “rules of the road” enforced on the world by the United States are now dead and decomposing.
Before we dive in too much further, it is reasonable to say that White has long championed the narrative that America’s time is done and that Australia’s policymakers and public should not only accept and understand this, they should plan accordingly, now to be fair, White has been arguing this since at least the period around the release of the 2009 Defence White Paper, and has long championed a more restrictive, psuedo-isolationist defence and strategic policy.
Against this backdrop, it is easy to understand White’s framing around the current predicament faced by Australia’s policymakers, however not content with this positioning, he provocatively argues further, “We must now prudently expect that well before the middle of the century, and perhaps within just a few years, America will no longer play a significant strategic role in Asia and it will no longer be Australia’s ally. In a multipolar world, India and China will be by far the strongest countries in Asia, with Indonesia quite possibly becoming a third regional great power.”
This reality, White argues (correctly for once in my opinion), will result in some costly and dramatic choices to be made by Australia’s policymakers, when we find ourselves living in a world “framed by the power and ideas of our great English-speaking allies, nor in a region dominated and made safe for us by their strategic primacy. For the first time since Europeans settled this continent, we will face the world and our region without a great and powerful friend. This really is the end of the world as we know it.”
For White, the nation’s lazy policymaking and lacklustre response to the rapidly deteriorating regional and global balance of power stems from the fact that the majority of the nation’s policymakers (both elected and public service) came of age during the historic aberration that was the unipolar moment post-Cold War and were inescapably shaped by the narratives of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington.
However, the reality is, that world (as we have established) is now dead and decaying before our eyes and because of the comforting myths we have convinced ourselves of, like a surly teenager, we’re reluctant to be roused from our cozy slumber while there is a thunderstorm brewing on the horizon.
White illustrates this saying, “Most of them came of age in the 1990s, when American power was at its height, and they are reluctant to abandon the slogans of that happy time. They still speak of America as essential to Asia’s security and Australia’s irreplaceable ally. And though they continually warn that Australia’s strategic circumstances are more threatening than at any time since World War II, they remain distinctly upbeat. They strive to convey an impression that everything will turn out well despite the looming dangers. They certainly do not behave as if they really believe, as their dire warnings suggest, that a major war with China could break out within a few years.”
“Nor do they seem to take seriously the possibility that China will replace America as east Asia’s leading power,” White adds.
This naive worldview ultimately has dramatic consequences for Australia as the world around us continues to evolve and deteriorate, especially if Australia fails to adapt and respond to the challenges, and importantly opportunities presented by the shifts now reshaping the regional and global balance of power more broadly.
White adds, “As a result, Australia is drifting through the most radical, and potentially the most threatening, transformation in our strategic circumstances since European settlement with no clear idea of what is happening or what we should be doing about it.”
Can we still depend on the United States?
To White’s eyes, the United States has a huge role to play in this level of naivete exhibited by Australian policymakers and the public by extension, because it has also failed to account for and respond to the rise of the multipolar world, in particular the emergence of China as the world and the region’s pre-eminent economic, political, and strategic counterbalance to the US as the hegemon.
But China isn’t alone in this emerging role, as we now understand, the re-emergence of Russia under Putin (with varying degrees of success), the rise of India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, and other emerging and established nations across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and central and South America, all of which in aggregate serve to rival the United States and its post-World War II economic, political and strategic order with growing confidence and capability.
White argues this, particularly from America’s failed efforts, saying: “they [America’s policymakers] know that China’s economy has overtaken America’s and they know that its maritime forces are now a match for America’s. They can see the lessons that Ukraine teaches about US resolve, and they know how little in practical terms America has done to respond to China’s challenge in Asia over the past 15 years. They understand the fragility of America’s posturing on Taiwan.
“At some level they recognise that America’s isolationist shift has deep roots in the global power shift, which means it no longer needs to dominate Asia to remain secure at home. So despite what they say, they surely understand that America simply will not be the power they keep saying it will be: “the indispensable power.”
Ultimately, for White, this means, “we have to find a way to get on with China as the world’s strongest power, our biggest trading partner and a leading power in our region”.
Bringing us to the perennial question among Australia’s strategic policy community and more broadly among our political leaders: Can Australia depend on the United States to serve as the bedrock of our strategic policy, and if we can’t, what does the alternative look like?
White argues, “There is thus a big and growing gap between what our leaders feel they have to say and what they are slowly and reluctantly coming to understand. This gap is revealed in the muddled, evasive speeches and statements in which they occasionally try to explain what they are doing ... In statements such as these, they acknowledge the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar global order but expect America to lead just the same. They admit that Trump’s America is different but say our US alliance is unaffected.”
He goes further, saying, “They trumpet the US alliance as the irreplaceable bedrock of our security, but at the same time speak of the vital need to build new alliances in the region. They talk a lot about strategic balance while still wishing and hoping that America will keep dominating the region.”
Preparing for two possible futures
Canberra’s strategic planners are guided by three fundamental convictions that shape every major decision about Australia’s place in the Asia-Pacific region. They recognise that America’s influence in the region is ebbing while China’s is rising inexorably. They understand that Australia must maintain the friendliest possible relations with China. Yet, paradoxically, they believe that preventing China from replacing America as Asia’s dominant power is absolutely essential to Australia’s security and prosperity.
These foundational ideas frame two possible futures that Australian policymakers are actively preparing for.
The first, and the scenario Australia’s policymakers fervently hope for, envisions America remaining a significant Asian power despite its relative decline. In this optimistic interpretation, other regional powers, along with allies further afield, would coalesce around Washington to counterbalance Beijing’s growing clout. Australia would sit at the heart of this coalition, making our alliance with America more strategically valuable than at any point since the Second World War.
Canberra’s diplomatic strategy, therefore, emphasises deepening defence partnerships across Asia and beyond, while military planning focuses on strengthening our capacity to fight alongside America and regional partners if conflict with China erupts.
White details this frame of reference, saying, “Within the world view framed by these ideas, Canberra sees two broad scenarios. The one they much prefer and believe more likely is that America, though diminished, will remain a key Asian power. In this scenario, as US power recedes, other countries in the region, and even beyond, will step forward to help America to balance and limit China’s power and influence.”
This deterrence-through-coalition approach remains the preferred pathway, and has only gained further currency given the recent push by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney to develop a cohesive, “middle power strategy” to mitigate the relative decline of the United States both globally and within the Indo-Pacific region.
However, behind closed doors, Australian ministers acknowledge a darker possibility. They concede, reluctantly and quietly, that America might ultimately fail to sustain its position and withdraw from Asia altogether. While they assess this outcome as unlikely, they cannot dismiss it entirely. Should it occur, Australia and other Asian nations would face an existential challenge: how to contain Chinese hegemony without Washington’s protection or military backing.
This contingency has profound implications for Australian strategy. Diplomatically, Canberra must lay the groundwork now for building a regional coalition capable of counterbalancing China independently of American support. Militarily, Australia must develop defence capabilities that allow us to contribute meaningfully to collective regional deterrence while simultaneously defending ourselves without relying on the US alliance.
White argues, “They believe that if it happened, then the nations of Asia would have no choice but to step up together to balance and deter China without America as the only way to avoid falling under Chinese hegemony. They think Australia must be prepared to play a leading part in that collective effort.”
In essence, Australia is betting primarily on America’s staying power while quietly constructing insurance policies against its departure. It’s a delicate diplomatic tightrope, maintaining cordial relations with Beijing while preparing for the possibility that we may need to stand against Chinese dominance alongside regional partners, with or without America at our side.
Expanding on this, White states, “That means our diplomacy should also lay the groundwork for building a regional coalition without America to contain Chinese influence and deter Chinese aggression. And it means that our defence forces should be able to contribute to collective regional deterrence of China and also defend Australia independently, without US support, if China tries to use force against us.”
Final thoughts
Australia’s greatest strategic vulnerability has never been a lack of geography, resources, or trusted allies. It has been our dangerous culture of complacency, the assumption that our isolation would shield us from conflict and that larger allies would always carry the greater burden when crisis struck.
That assumption is rapidly becoming obsolete. We must accept it.
The strategic environment sustaining that comfortable illusion is disappearing rapidly. Great-power competition has returned to the centre of global affairs, extending far beyond traditional military domains. Economics, technology, energy, critical infrastructure, telecommunications, and supply chains are now instruments of national power.
For Australia, the battlefield of strategic competition increasingly encompasses our factories, ports, power grids, and financial systems.
This transformation coincides with another fundamental reality: America’s relative power in the Indo-Pacific is declining. This is not catastrophe; it is the strategic context we must now navigate. Rather than clinging to inherited assumptions about American primacy, Australia must recognise this shift as both challenge and opportunity.
The Indo-Pacific is becoming our region in unprecedented ways. The question is whether we will shape its emerging order or simply endure decisions made by others. Australia faces a defining choice.
We can continue relying upon favourable geography, global markets and the expectation that allies will ultimately rescue us. Or we can deliberately build the comprehensive national power necessary to protect Australian interests in a far more contested world.
The consequences of our decades-long economic transformation demand action. As manufacturing migrated offshore and supply chains became progressively dependent upon global markets, Australia became extraordinarily efficient in benign circumstances but dangerously vulnerable when those circumstances deteriorate. A modern economy cannot sustain strategic independence without sovereign industrial capacity, secure energy, resilient supply chains and technological innovation. These are no longer luxuries; they are necessities.
Australia must rebuild advanced manufacturing, expand critical industries, secure reliable energy and strengthen infrastructure. Our extraordinary mineral and energy reserves should become foundations for a comprehensive industrial economy, not merely export commodities. We must invest in technological innovation and develop the sovereign capabilities that underpin genuine strategic autonomy.
Most critically, defence, foreign policy, trade, industry, energy, infrastructure, and economic policy must integrate into a coherent whole-of-nation strategy. National security cannot remain confined to Defence headquarters. It is increasingly determined by economic strength and resilience.
Great-power competition already defines our strategic environment. The choice before Australia is whether we will shape that order through deliberate preparation and national resolve or simply endure consequences determined by others.
Australia possesses extraordinary advantages. We still have the freedom to choose our path. That freedom will not last forever. The time to build the sovereign national power that protects Australian interests is now, while we retain the agency to shape our own destiny in an Indo-Pacific that increasingly belongs to us.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below or get in touch at
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