Revamping Australia’s Pacific strategy

A new security agreement was recently signed between China and the Solomon Islands, which reportedly includes Chinese commitments to deploy “police, armed police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces” personnel to the Solomon Islands.

This would build on existing security ties between the nations, with China recently sending liaison officers and anti-riot equipment to train the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force in public order.

The security agreement also reportedly provides China with greater maritime access to the island nation by facilitating, with the consent of the government, ship visits, logistical support and stopovers.

The deal has been met with fierce criticism from Australia and the United States, wary of China’s growing presence in the region.

The security pact has taken centrestage during Australia’s federal election campaign, with the federal Labor opposition accusing the Coalition government of neglecting its Pacific partnerships and paving the way for a bolder Chinese posture.

So, how can Canberra rebuild relations with its Pacific neighbours to reduce the likelihood of similar arrangements in other nations.

According to Mihai Sora, project director, Australia-PNG Network at the Lowy Institute, ramping up financial aid would not be enough to bolster Australia’s relations with the Solomon Islands and other Pacific partners.

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He notes Australia has spent more in Solomon Islands than China, with the Regional Assistance Mission costing $2.6 billion, while available data on China’s aid contribution suggesting just $50 million was committed in 2019.

“Increasing our aid budget will certainly deliver better development outcomes for Solomon Islands and the rest of the Pacific. But it will not buy Australia more influence,” he writes.

“The security deal is about fulfilling a political need for Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, not about a security need for the people of Solomon Islands.

“Fixating on how much aid money was or was not spent misses the point.”

Sora argues Australia should instead reconsider how it engages with Pacific Island countries, calling for a revamp of the approach under the “Pacific Step-up” program.

“Recent developments in Solomon Islands demonstrate that the Pacific Step-up has not delivered the influence we expected,” he writes.

“This is because the step-up and ties with China deliver different things to Pacific countries.”

Sora acknowledges the program’s contribution to Pacific countries’ health, gender, education, governance, disaster response and economic development priorities, but flags untapped opportunities.

“[Australia] can be more creative, build new partnerships and expand the depth of these achievements,” he adds.

Sora points to China’s investment in the development of large-scale infrastructure and trade, stressing economic security is “among the most pressing concerns for the region”, particularly off the back of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“Pacific countries justifiably prioritise addressing basic needs and maintaining livelihoods – wealth inequality and youth bulges across the region put stresses on social cohesion and contribute to instability and tensions in communities,” he continues.

Sora welcomes initiatives to create migration pathways into Australia, like the proposed Pacific Engagement Visa, which could strengthen both people-to-people links and deliver mutual economic benefit for Australia and the Pacific.

Sora also suggests enhancing democratic institutions across the region to preserve the rights of Pacific communities and improve governance.

This, he claims, would help drive “better-quality public policy”.

“Support for civil society strengthens local voices in their pursuit of political and social reforms in their local contexts,” he adds.

Moreover, Sora calls on Australia to explore opportunities to work with the US, Japan, New Zealand, Britain and France to deliver cyber security and digital connectivity infrastructure in partnership with Pacific countries.

Sora highlights soft power opportunities for Australian policymakers looking to improve public sentiment in the region.  

He references Telstra’s purchase of the Pacific’s largest telecommunications provider, Digicel, which could improve access to social media, information, government services, global markets and cultural links.

Broadcast media, he adds, could also disseminate information to remote communities and increase public engagement in national political and social issues.

“A greater Australian media presence throughout the region, as well as more support for Pacific journalists and local media content production, would improve Pacific literacy in Australia and support a vital pillar of social and cultural development in Pacific countries,” Sora writes.

Additionally, investment in sporting collaboration could build cultural connections.

Sora also notes the importance of education programs in building ties with the community, stating that in addition to tertiary scholarships, scholarships at secondary level and more teacher exchanges could deliver social benefits.

“Building stronger connections with the Pacific is not something that our politicians alone can do, no matter how many times they meet with regional counterparts,” Sora adds.

“In fact, experience shows leaders-level meetings can sometimes be counterproductive to improving ties. Nor is it something that any single government department can do alone – especially after years of budget cuts to Australia’s diplomatic service under successive governments.

“The Pacific Step-up has undoubtedly delivered improved relations for Australia in the Pacific. But its resources have been spread thin across a vast range of activities.”

Sora concludes by stating the step-up program should evolve into an Australian Pacific strategy involving international partners, federal and state government agencies, and business and community groups.

“Now is the time for Australia to reconsider its relationships with the region and to understand what we want from the Pacific. But, more importantly, it’s time for Australia to understand what the Pacific really wants from us,” he writes.

“That is why a new strategy should be underpinned by principles of genuine partnership with the region, promoting economic independence, global connectivity, and a shared understanding of regional collective security.”

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