The Biden administration has issued a national security memorandum to update policy guidance for the US government’s implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime to boost non-proliferation compliance and enhance allied security.
These updates reflect a renewed US commitment to non-proliferation while advancing the president’s goals of strengthening allied defence capabilities, bolstering the US defence industrial base, streamlining defence trade and deterring adversaries. These policy changes will help the United States advance shared defence objectives with close allies, including the implementation of AUKUS while maintaining a strong leadership role in non-proliferation and export control policy.
Since the Missile Technology Control Regime’s (MTCR) formation by the G7 nearly four decades ago, its membership has grown to 35 countries. The MTCR was developed to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation by limiting exports of missile delivery systems.
In 1992, the MTCR expanded its focus to include the proliferation of missiles for delivering all types of weapons of mass destruction. The MTCR has been, and continues to be, one of the most successful multilateral non-proliferation regimes in effect today and a crucial element of the post-Cold War global non-proliferation framework.
As the United States continues to advance the objectives of the MTCR established in 1987, it will consider how the strategic environment, advancements in missile technology and access to technology exports have evolved since 1987.
The national security memorandum directs inter-agency efforts to provide increased flexibility for case-by-case review and facilitate support for certain MTCR Category 1 military missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and space launch vehicle (SLV) systems to specific partners with robust export control systems.
While this support will encompass a wide range of activities consistent with MTCR guidelines, it will explicitly exclude transfers of complete production facilities that encompass all capabilities necessary to independently produce a category 1 system.
The memorandum establishes that the MTCR is not intended to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs, provided these do not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
To support the US Space Priorities Framework and promote international cooperation in space, and in accordance with the MTCR guidelines, transfers of MTCR Category 1 SLV-related commodities, software and technology will be considered on a case-by-case basis for select and vetted partner space programs, whether governmental or commercial.
The memorandum reaffirms the MTCR as an essential mechanism and emphasises opposition to missile programs of concern. It maintains a general policy of not supporting the development or acquisition of MTCR Category 1 military missile systems (excluding SLVs) by non-MTCR partners, in line with US commitments under MTCR guidelines.
The United States will also work to stem the flow of advanced dual-use technology or expertise to unauthorised parties, including end users and end uses that pose an unacceptable risk of diversion to programs and activities of concern.
Additionally, the United States will use the MTCR, other multilateral non-proliferation regimes and US non-proliferation and export control laws, regulations and policies to address regional proliferation challenges, disrupt proliferation networks and counter efforts to circumvent non-proliferation controls globally.
In implementing the MTCR, the United States will work to ensure the regime keeps pace with advancements in missile technology and prevents the transfer of technologies that would threaten the United States, its allies, partners and other nations.