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As the United States military pivots to fighting its next war in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia, too, needs to radically refocus its defence strategy.
Watching the United States lose interest in the war in Ukraine and being the tent pole that holds up the NATO alliance may be alarming to some, but its pivot to face the looming threat of conflict in and around the waters of the Pacific Ocean certainly makes sense.
It’s a vast stretch of water and (and some small but remarkably vital) land that the US has many historical links to, and the US is, after all, a Pacific nation.
Sure, it’s an Atlantic one, too, but there is no threat to the US lurking in the waters of the eastern seaboard of North America. To the west, however, across the expanse of the Pacific, is the threat of China and North Korea, and China, in particular, may well have the lead in preparing for conflict in the waters of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
There can be no doubt the US$150 billion spend that Congress has just approved is aimed firmly at refocusing the US military away from a land war in Europe, to an amphibious, island-hopping campaign that is less about massed armoured formations and more about massed autonomous units turning the Taiwan Strait into what one senior US military figure called an “unmanned hellscape” for the Chinese armed forces.
Alongside that is investment in long-range fires for all arms, increased shipbuilding and maintenance capacity, air superiority, and any number of new, yet to emerge technologies, all making America’s military fit for this particular purpose.
It’s a pivot that makes sense, but where does Australia fit into this renewed focus on a region that is far closer to home, and what lessons can we take away from the US pivot?
Awkward AUKUS
This is a question that matters because, traditionally, our alliance with the US has been a large part of our defence strategy. Essentially, if someone were to come at us, the plan was to hold out until Uncle Sam rode to the rescue and the Marines rolled onto our beaches while the USN and USAF played merry hell with whoever had been foolish enough to make the move in the first place.
Worryingly, recent events have shown that the US is now more interested in putting America First rather than maintaining its status as a guarantor of world peace. It remains difficult to imagine the US failing to act on our behalf entirely – we hold some very vital US defence infrastructure on our shores – but the image of the cavalry charging in just in time has become somewhat tarnished of late, and certainly far more transactional. We must now wonder, what would such assistance cost us as a nation?
However, at the same time, while America may have become less reliable as a defence partner, Australia remains firmly bound to the US by the AUKUS agreement. We’re helping boost US shipbuilding capacity, we’re buying submarines, and waiting for new boats to be built before we can buy them too.
But is that still the right move, in a world that has become remarkably more uncertain since Scott Morrison first announced the AUKUS alliance to a stunned Australian populace?
Albert Palazzo, former director of War Studies for the Australian Army and currently adjunct professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at UNSW, thinks it is very much not.
“Without properly considering other options, successive federal governments have intensified this policy with the AUKUS agreement and locked Australia into dependency on the US for decades to come,” Palazzo said in a recent piece for The Conversation.
“A more imaginative and innovative government would have investigated different ways to achieve a strong and independent national defence policy.”
According to Palazzo, AUKUS is not only costly, but also a surrender of Australia’s sovereignty. Along with “under-gunned surface warships, such as the Hunter frigates,” it’s all a move in the wrong direction, with the right direction being what the US has already realised – uncrewed systems.
A uniquely Australian hellscape
Palazzo believes in the concept of taking the “strategic defensive”, which is nothing new, but which is perfectly suited to Australia’s requirements. Australia, as a middle power doesn’t require the power projection of other nations. Sure, we will support our allies overseas – and do it well – but we’ve no interest in acquiring carrier battle groups or establishing the kind of expeditionary forces such as the United States Marine Corps.
The strategic defensive, Palazzo said, “doesn’t require a state to defeat its attacker. Rather, the state must deny the aggressor the ability to achieve their objectives”.
“The strategic defensive best suits ‘status quo states’ like Australia.
“The people of status quo states are happy with what they have. Their needs can be met without recourse to intimidation or violence.”
All the Australian military really needs to do, and do well, is defend ourselves, and a small fleet of Virginia Class boats really doesn’t bring a lot to the table in that regard. Sure, they can be somewhere for a long time, but they fall short of being everywhere when absolutely needed – especially if they are drawn far from our shores in support of US policy elsewhere. And for the cost outlay that AUKUS requires – which, to be fair, does bring a lot of other technology benefits alongside the boats themselves – Australia could handily stock up on weapons more suited to taking advantage of our unique island position.
“Long-range strike missiles and drones, combined with sensors, provide the defending nation with the opportunity to create a lethal killing zone around it,” Palazzo said.
“This is what China has done in the East and South China Seas.
“Australia can do the same by integrating missiles, drones and uncrewed maritime vessels with a sensor network linked to a command-control-targeting system.”
With such a technology mix capable of turning any maritime approach to Australian shores a hellscape that we control, it frees up our crewed units to operate more aggressively or further abroad if needed. Crewed/uncrewed teaming could be a force multiplier, and for a nation with a population the size of Australia’s, anything that ups our punch should be considered a vital part of our strategic outlook.
At the heart of Palazzo’s take on the strategic defensive, however, is the fact that it can be achieved with an entirely sovereign capability, free of dependence on possibly unreliable allies.
Palazzo concludes his argument on a positive note, observing that “it’s not too late to rethink”.
“By adopting a different military philosophy as the guide for its security decision making, Australia could manage its security largely on its own.
“This only requires leaders with a willingness to think differently.”
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