iscover
From the get-go, the ambitious plans for the Royal Australian Navy to acquire a fleet of “large optionally crewed surface vessels” (LOSVs) to boost the fleet’s firepower were contentious, now following the cancellation of the program, one must ask, can we just get the basics right first?
As an island nation, where the economic prosperity and stability, national security and even the most granular elements of its way of life is utterly dependent on the unrestricted and uncontested access to the global and regional maritime commons, the Royal Australian Navy represents the frontline for the nation’s defence and national security.
Recognising this importance, the government’s 2024 Independent analysis into Navy’s surface combatant fleet placed the future of the Royal Australian Navy and, in particular, the surface combatant fleet firmly under the microscope as the fleet underwent a comprehensive modernisation and expansion to complement the capabilities set to be delivered under Pillar 1 of the trilateral AUKUS program.
Much of the focus was placed on the scaling back of the much maligned Hunter Class frigates (we will come to them shortly, I promise) from nine to six vessels and, of course, the decision to expand the Navy’s surface combatant fleet with the proposed acquisition of the general purpose frigates.
At the core of this effort was the design and expected delivery of an “enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet”, with the document’s foreword establishing the following: “Navy equipped with a major surface combatant fleet twice as large as planned when we came to government – and with more of these new surface combatants in the water and operational sooner.”
For many, the findings of the analysis was a breath of fresh air, while for others, it left a lot to be desired, but by far, one of the most ambitious and, perhaps, surprising developments was this recommendation: “Acquire six large optionally crewed surface vessels (LOSVs) with 32 vertical launching system cells, providing enhanced lethality through additional multi-domain strike capacity and directly increasing survivability, lethality and endurance.
“This investment will increase distributed fleet lethality with a lower cost and crewing impact. These vessels will rely on Aegis Baseline 9 or later, which is the combat system planned to be operated by the Hunter Class frigates from delivery, and by the Hobart Class destroyers post-upgrade,” the government’s analysis articulated.
As mentioned, this proposal came as quite a shock. A willingness to pursue such an unproven, experimental platform rather than addressing concerns (often very public ones about the existing fleet plans and individual platforms) and just getting the basics right at a time when our naval capabilities are only going to become more important.
That was until recently.
Highlighting this is Matthew Knott of The Sydney Morning Herald, in a piece titled ’Dead in the water’: Navy’s flagship ‘drone ship’ program in doubt, in which he articulated the equally surprising cancellation of the Navy’s proposed LOSV fleet, saying, “A centrepiece of the Albanese government’s push to modernise the navy – a fleet of large, heavily armed warships that can operate with or without sailors on board – has been thrown into doubt after the United States military dumped its plan to develop the vessels.”
A brain fart or something more considered?
From the get-go, the idea of beefing out the surface fleet’s hull numbers and missile capacity seemed like a pretty sound principle, particularly if it was going to follow the same train of logic that resulted in the world-leading development of the Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat as a collaborative combat aircraft or loyal wingman for crewed aircraft.
However, the maritime environment, coupled with the complexities baked into the proposal identified in the surface fleet review, has, like similar projects across the Western world and in particular, the United States, which had embarked on its own comparable program and was long viewed as a partner for Australia’s program.
In particular, it was expected that Australia could benefit from the economies of scale and the de-risking associated with entrenching ourselves into a US Navy program of record and could conceivably also accelerate the delivery of the platforms. Alas, that was not to be the case when the US Navy effectively scuttled its own LOSV program in 2025.
Speaking to UNSW Canberra researcher and senior lecturer in maritime strategy, Doctor Richard Dunley, Knott’s analysis reinforced this, with Dunley saying, “The universal assumption was that Australia would piggyback off the US vessel. I find it very difficult to see how Australia could do this on our own.”
“I keep expecting to hear that it’s dead, and I was surprised to see it feature in this year’s national defence strategy,” Dunley added.
These comments were echoed by Dunley’s colleague, Jennifer Parker, a former naval officer, who told Knott: “I think we will end up abandoning the idea of large optionally crewed vessels and move to unmanned medium-sized surface vessels in line with the US.”
Bringing us to the surprise decision announced by the UK in recent weeks, and the proposal of a “hybrid fleet” where traditional large, crewed platforms like their own Type 26 frigates and Type 31 general purpose frigates, alongside the existing Type 45 destroyers and their planned replacement, Common Combat Vessel, would operate with a fleet of uncrewed vessels of varying size, payload and capability.
At the high level, current plans identified and articulated by the UK government’s Defence Investment Plan identified the need for the Type 91 serving as a missile barge, leveraging a mix of integrated and containerised missile systems, alongside the Type 92, a specialist anti-submarine sensor platform, designed to enhance the capability and range of the Type 26 anti-submarine warfare frigates.
Finally, rounding out the hybrid fleet vessels are Type 93, an extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle developed from the existing Excalibur program and similar in mission profile/s to Australia’s own Ghost Shark designed and delivered by Anduril, and Type 94, a “picket” vessel that incorporates a range of “sophisticated” radar systems providing long-range threat and target detection, acquisition and tracking for the wider force.
While it is still early and largely untested days for the proposal, it seems in losing one partner, Australia may have gained another partner with which to share the costs, the risk and potentially the spoils if we stick to our guns. However, all of this hinges on still largely unknown, unproven systems and increasingly constrained budgets.
So with this in mind, doesn’t it make sense to just get the basics right?
Getting the basics right
By now it is well established that the projected capabilities earmarked for the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet, particularly the split between Tier 1 and Tier 2 platforms, are wildly confusing the capabilities we have and need. At the high level and most obvious level is the level of firepower available for the “Tier 1” Hunter Class frigates and the “Tier 2” evolved Mogami Class frigates.
Now yes, there is an argument to be made about the sensor suites and the “whole package” providing a measurable difference in the capability being delivered to the Navy, and it is a fair point to make. But having the world’s best sensor suite, with a limited effector payload, for both defensive and offensive operations effectively limits the platform’s utility and survivability.
This ultimately comes back to what is an inherently faulty model of thinking about how our surface combatants will be deployed and, potentially, who and what they will be deployed against, particularly if one takes the modernisation and expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy into account.
For background, In the case of the Hobart Class, with a displacement of approximately 7,000 tonnes and a 48-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS), it is optimised for air defence using the Aegis Combat System and SM-2/SM-6 missiles. However, it is outclassed in firepower and VLS capacity by destroyers such as China’s Type 055, which displaces around 13,000 tonnes and carries 112 VLS cells for a wide range of missiles, including HHQ-9 surface-to-air, YJ-18 anti-ship, and CJ-10 land-attack missiles.
Meanwhile, the Hunter Class frigates, with a proposed full-load displacement exceeding 10,000 tonnes at full load, are designed as large multi-role warships emphasising anti-submarine warfare. Equipped with a 32-cell Mk 41 VLS, advanced CEAFAR2 radar, and the potential to integrate Tomahawk cruise missiles, the Hunter Class offers flexibility but lags significantly in VLS capacity compared to larger vessels such as the Type 055 and Sejong the Great Class and is significantly under-armed when compared to the Arleigh Burke and Maya Class, respectively.
Critically, while comparable to the now cancelled US Navy Constellation Class frigates (7,300 tonnes fully loaded, 32 VLS cells), the Hunter Class dwarfs Japan’s Mogami Class (5,500 tonnes, fully loaded) and South Korea’s Daegu Class (3,600 tonnes, fully loaded), which are lighter and more focused on regional operations. Meanwhile, Russia’s 22350M, with similar displacement and up to 64 VLS cells, emphasises greater missile capacity and offensive versatility.
At the core of this faulty premise is the expectation or understanding that Australia’s ships will ALWAYS be part of a larger, allied task group, so our allies, particularly the US, don’t really care if we don’t bring much “kinetically” to the fight, something that we can no longer take for granted or as a given.
Accordingly, it must be accepted and understood that Australian surface combatants may in fact have to fight on their own and against opponents who possess numerically superior levels of firepower, thus it follows that our individual surface combatants should be as lethally equipped and survivable as possible, rather than being expensive, hybrid constabulary-naval vessels.
Or put more simply, we need to get the basics right.
There is a place for USVs
Now none of this is to minimise or diminish the role and prospective role of uncrewed surface vessels in the Royal Australian Navy’s future composition, in fact, quite the opposite. The success of USVs in both combat and support roles in the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea demonstrate that fact definitively.
But as is often the case in Australia’s defence planning, capability definition and acquisition, we must avoid them being viewed as a silver bullet solution to all of our maritime challenges. Rather the central pillars of the nation’s maritime capabilities, the destroyers (yes, I count Hunter as a destroyer as well), the frigates and the current and future submarine capabilities need to be as capable as possible.
Only then can the complementary and force multiplying capacity of autonomous and uncrewed surface and underwater vessels in their totality be fully leveraged. Half-cooking the crewed components of the fleet will only serve to limit the efficacy of the uncrewed fleet and vice versa, so getting the mix right is of paramount importance.
Doing so would serve to enhance the delivery of the integrated, focused force and Navy’s role in it, while also enhancing the development and delivery of distributed lethality in a more acceptable “bang-for-buck” ratio than what is currently being proposed under existing plans.
Final thoughts
Ultimately, Australia finds itself at a strategic crossroads. For decades, we have enjoyed the benefits of geography, stable alliances and an increasingly interconnected global economy, allowing many Australians to assume that prosperity and security are constants rather than conditions that must be protected.
That assumption is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
The reality is that Australia is one of the world’s most trade-dependent nations, with our economy, energy security and access to essential goods fundamentally reliant on free and secure maritime trade.
As David Uren’s analysis demonstrated, the overwhelming majority of Australia’s imports and exports transit the Indonesian archipelago, making the security of our surrounding sea lanes not simply a defence issue but an economic and national survival imperative.
This is why getting the fundamentals right matters. While emerging technologies, autonomous systems and innovative concepts of operation will undoubtedly shape the future battlefield, they cannot compensate for deficiencies in the core capabilities upon which Australia’s security ultimately depends.
Surface combatants, submarines, combat aircraft and the people who operate them remain the backbone of credible deterrence, and they must be equipped and structured to fight and prevail independently if required while remaining fully interoperable with our allies and partners.
The shift from a balanced force to a focused force has undoubtedly sharpened priorities, but it has also exposed an uncomfortable truth: Australia still lacks a clearly articulated understanding of what it expects the Australian Defence Force to achieve independently in a crisis. Until that question is answered, capability decisions will continue to risk being driven by budgetary pressures and technological optimism rather than strategic necessity.
No one has ever suggested that preparing Australia for an era of renewed great power competition will be cheap, politically convenient or easy. It will demand sustained investment, difficult choices and a willingness to accept short-term costs in exchange for long-term national security.
Yet the alternative is far more costly.
If Australia is unwilling to invest seriously in its own defence, resilience and sovereign capability, we should not expect others to shoulder that burden on our behalf. Deterrence begins with credibility and credibility begins with demonstrating that we are prepared to defend ourselves.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
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