I don’t doubt those shortfalls.

In 2013, the Defence Material Organisation published a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan. It highlighted the need for Australia to upskill our naval construction workforce for the Future Submarine program, cognisant of the needs of other shipbuilding programs that would be running concurrently.

In 2015, RAND Corporation undertook a Defence-funded study, Australia’s Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise: Preparing for the 21st Century. It dealt with the workforce profiles of every shipbuilding program on Defence’s then current and future project ledger.

That we don’t have a pipeline of architects, engineers, project managers and technicians flowing into the program is squarely the fault of Defence and the federal ministers exercising political supervision over Defence.

The Australian article also alludes to multiple programs seeking access to workers in the same workforce pool. Again, this is the absolute fault of Defence.

Defence could not have architected a worse organisational outcome if they tried. What we should have had is one competent Australia shipbuilder (ASC) sustaining a Swedish-designed Collins, building French-designed submarines and building British-designed frigates, all serviced by a common ASC workforce. Instead, we have an Australian shipbuilder, French shipbuilder and British shipbuilder in a salary battle for competent workers.

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In its Competitive Evaluation Process bid documents, Naval Group agreed to partner with ASC, leveraging off their workforce and supply chain. Defence rejected that proposal and created an ASC workforce competitor in the process.

In the Future Frigate tender, the government prohibited either of the two established Australian shipyards, ASC and Austal, from taking the lead in the program. Defence created another ASC workforce competitor in the process.

It’s no different in Western Australia either. We used to have Austal. Now we have Austal and CIVMEC working across Offshore Patrol Vessels and patrol boat builds with a single workforce pool.

The whole thing is one big unnecessary shipfight. Peter Dutton needs to look at how all of this was orchestrated – and then fire some of those at the helm. Next time I meet with him, I’ll be telling him so.

When the captain of a ship runs aground, the captain loses his command. When admirals, or former admirals, run a shipbuilding program aground, they should lose their command too. 

If the new Defence Minister doesn’t straighten out this mess quickly, then he, too, will be part of the problem.