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China’s new defence white paper, China's National Defense in the New Era, has shifted the rising superpower’s focus to developing a force structure and system of systems capable of supporting its ambitions towards the Indo-Pacific and its national interests, providing a clear message – we’re the new king.
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Building on the lessons learned through the observation of Western military forces – mainly the US and, to a lesser extent, western European nations since the end of the Cold War, China has sought to leverage its growing economic wealth to modernise, recapitalise and expand its military capabilities in support of its growing national interests and ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.
In particular, the increasing focus of Western nations on a combination of next-generation capabilities, including low-observability, advanced sensor suites and 'data fusion', information sharing and the concept of 'systems-of-systems', speed and lean command structures and modernised concepts of operations (CONOPS) that have evolved as a result of lessons learned during engagements in southern Europe and the Middle East, have informed both the Western and Chinese modernisation programs.
China's new defence white paper (DWP) – China's National Defense in the New Era – identified the need for China to modernise, recapitalise and expand the growing superpower's military capability with an eye on developing a leaner, meaner and future-focused force structure and system-of-system capabilities to better support the economic, political and geo-strategic ambitions of the Chinese political leadership.
"In the new era, to meet the strategic demands of national security and development, China’s armed forces firmly implement the missions and tasks entrusted by the CPC and the people. They endeavour to provide strategic support for consolidating the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system, safeguarding national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, protecting China’s overseas interests, and promoting world peace and development," the white paper explains.
'Safeguarding National Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests'
China's territorial interests and ambitions in the Indo-Pacific are well documented and have been the source of much concern for many regional nations, including Australia – repeated hostile action in the South China Sea and recent joint operations with the Russian Air Force that brought the nations into direct confrontation with the Republic of Korea Air Force serve as potent reminders.
The new DWP is quick to reaffirm China's approach to the Indo-Pacific and its commitment to expanding its interests in the region: "China’s armed forces defend important waters, islands and reefs in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea, acquire full situation awareness of adjacent waters, conduct joint rights protection and law enforcement operations, properly handle maritime and air situations, and resolutely respond to security threats, infringements and provocations on the sea.
"China’s armed forces conduct air defence, reconnaissance and early warning, monitor China’s territorial air and peripheral air space, carry out alert patrols and combat takeoff, and effectively respond to emergencies and threats to maintain order and security in the air. Aiming at safeguarding national unity, China’s armed forces strengthen military preparedness with emphasis on the sea. By sailing ships and flying aircraft around Taiwan, the armed forces send a stern warning to the 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces."
Supporting these ambitions is the continuing development of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and China's strategic missile forces – which are designed to serve as both sword and shield – with the increasing power projection-focused developments of both the PLAN and PLAAF based on the growing aircraft carrier and amphibious warfare fleets, ballistic missile and attack submarines, and fifth-generation combat aircraft, including the planned reveal of the Xian H-20 stealth strategic bomber.
Meanwhile, the increasingly capable integrated system-of-systems forming China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) anti-ship and anti-air cruise and ballistic missiles deployed to reclaimed islands in the South China Sea and in the depth of mainland China as tactical and strategic force multipliers serve as the basis of China's continued push into the Indo-Pacific.
Improving combat effectiveness – streamlining command and control
A core focus of China's military modernisation has been a focus on streamlining the nation's Soviet-modelled command and control infrastructure and systems – this has been one of the priorities of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has sought to reform the Chinese political and military apparatus – in order to maximise political loyalty and tactical and strategic effectiveness.
This restructuring has installed President Xi as the 'Commander-in-Chief' (CMC) of the Chinese Armed Forces, which is clearly articulated in the DWP: "The reform in the leadership and command system is a significant measure in response to the call of a modern and specialised military capable of fighting and winning wars in the information age, aiming to improve the operational effectiveness and development efficiency of the military.
"Adhering to the general principle of ‘the CMC exercising overall leadership, the TCs responsible for military operations and the services focusing on developing capabilities’, the PLA endeavours to enhance the CMC’s centralised and unified leadership and its functions of strategic command and strategic management."
Structural changes – size, force structure and composition
Further supporting the command and control reorganisation at the senior command levels is the modernisation and restructuring of the PLA's overall force structure. This has resulted in a dramatic reduction in size – with 300,000 personnel cut to keep the total active at 2 million – with a focus on: "Reform measures have been taken to transfer more officer positions to non-commissioned officers and civilian staff, downsize the leading organs at all levels by reducing their subordinate sections, leadership hierarchies and staff, and streamline the institutions and personnel in arts, sports, press, publication, logistical support, medical facilities, depots, and educational and research institutes."
This reform focus is designed to increase the combat effectiveness and overall lethality of the PLA and expands to the tactical and strategic restructuring of the PLA to include:
- Reorganising ground troops – The previous 18 army groups have been reorganised into 13 new ones – "all major combat units of the PLA follow a group 'army-brigade-battalion system'", which is defined to reinforce the combat capability of the arms, reduce the command hierarchies and combine the troops at lower levels and is designed to improve "the capabilities for precise, multi-dimensional, trans-theatre, multi-functional and sustained operations, so as to build a new type of strong and modernised land force".
- Power projection focus for navy – The DWP has increased the focus on the dual "defence of the near seas" and "protection missions on the far seas" responsibilities of the PLAN – the modernisation and restructuring of the PLAN is specifically focused on improving its capacity for "missions on the far seas, and improving its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counter-attack, maritime manoeuvre operations, maritime joint operations, comprehensive defense, and integrated support, so as to build a strong and modernised naval force".
- Tactical and strategic capacity for air force – The DWP identifies five air force commands and a single airborne corps and focuses on the integration of key air and space capabilities within the broader context of co-ordinating offensive and defensive capabilities – this is also marking the PLAAF's transition from a territorial air defence force toward both offensive and defensive operations. Finally, this extends to further developing "its capabilities for strategic early warning, air strikes, air and missile defence, information countermeasures, airborne operations, strategic projection and integrated support, so as to build a strong and modernised air force".
These force structure and CONOP modernisation programs also extend to the 'strategic forces' of the PLA and include the network of A2/AD networks, the tactical and strategic nuclear forces, electronic, cyber and space warfare, and the research and development programs for next-generation systems and capabilities, including:
- Maintaining nuclear and precision strike capabilities – The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) plays a critical role in supporting China's national sovereignty and security – PLARF incorporates China's nuclear missile, conventional missile and support forces and extends support and missile base forces. Additionally, this extends to maintaining "the strategic requirements of having both nuclear and conventional capabilities and deterring wars in all battlespaces, the PLARF is enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counter-attack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernised rocket force".
- Focus on developing next-gen capabilities – A new type of combat force within the broader PLA force structure, the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), focuses on developing new combat capabilities, including: "supporting forces for battlefield environment, information, communications, information security and new technology testing. In line with the strategic requirements of integrating existing systems and aligning civil and military endeavours, the PLASSF is seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernised strategic support force".
Maintaining a constant state of capability evolution
The DWP recognises that technology has long served as both a tactical and strategic force multiplier for the West, and the US and its key regional allies, including Australia – with next-generation technologies and the fifth-generation transformation serving as the latest iteration of the West's pursuit of military dominance.
In response, the Chinese government has focused on promoting innovation in defence science and technology and military theory – this includes a focus on developing leading-edge, disruptive technologies to serve as tactical and strategic force multipliers for the PLA in support of China's economic, political and strategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.
This concerted effort builds on China's pursuit of developing strategic high-tech products like the Tianhe-2 supercomputer and combines with the growing focus on developing modern, revolutionary military doctrines and CONOPS as part of the PLA's role in fighting and winning conflicts on behalf of the Chinese people – building on this, China is focused on countering the technological advantages of the US and its allies to introduce new platforms across the PLA.
"China’s armed forces are optimising the overall composition of weaponry and equipment, co-ordinating the efforts of all services and arms in this regard, promoting the balanced development of main battle equipment, information systems and support equipment, with a view to comprehensively raising standardisation, serial development and interoperability," the DWP said.
"Old equipment is being phased out, and a system created that mainly comprises new and high-tech weaponry and equipment. Type 15 tanks, Type 052D destroyers, J-20 fighters and DF-26 intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles have been commissioned."
Building on this, China has sought to develop powerful power projection capabilities across the multi-domain battlespace.
Questions for Australia
Despite Australia’s enduring commitment to the Australia-US alliance, serious questions remain for Australia in the new world order of President Donald Trump’s America, as a number of allies have been targeted by the maverick President for relying on the US for their security against larger state-based actors, which has seen the President actively pressuring key allies, particularly NATO allies, to renegotiate the deals.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will provide unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the broader US alliance structure and the Indo-Pacific more broadly in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
