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While much has been made about the growing numbers of US Marines rotating through Darwin as part of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D), let’s be realistic, Australia shouldn’t rely on 2,500 Marines to do the heavy lifting and provide the strategic deterrence the nation requires in a period of renewed power competition.
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The Indo-Pacific's geographic realities, combined with regional capability developments, have served as the driving force behind Australia's pursuit of a modern, networked and hardened army capable of conducting a range of operations – with amphibious operations and power projection capabilities serving as a core responsibility.
However, developing such capabilities requires significant investment in personnel, materiel, doctrine and commitment, it equally requires support from subject matter experts, which has prompted Australia to draw on experience from amphibious warfare experts in both the UK Royal Marine Commandos and the US Marine Corps.
The US Marines also serve as America's first responders in the Indo-Pacific and one of the premier amphibious operations and power projection forces in the world – building on this, the US Marines have been pivotal to America's 'Indo-Pacific Pivot' since it was announced by former president Barrack Obama, and have come to play an important role in Australia's future defence planning.
This position has resulted in a growing US Marine presence in the Northern Territory, culminating in the recent record deployment of 2,500 Marines as part of the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) and serves as a potent reminder of the unique relationship between the US and Australia as the regional geo-political, economic and strategic paradigm continues to evolve.
The pivotal role of MRF-D within Australia's strategic planning is reinforced by Defence Minister Linda Reynolds following the recent deployment of 2,500 Marines as part of the force, saying, "This milestone demonstrates the enduring nature of the Australia-US alliance and our deep engagement with the Indo-Pacific region.
"The Marine Rotational Force-Darwin improves interoperability between Australian and US defence forces, and enhances our ability to work together with regional partners in the interests of stability and security in the Indo-Pacific."
Despite the record level of US Marines in Darwin and a growing sentiment within Australia's political and strategic policy communities that enhancing the defence basing, infrastructure investment and hardening of northern Australia, particularly Darwin, as a key strategic asset critical to the nation and allies' long-term ambition and plans for the Indo-Pacific.
However, what these factors, when viewed in combination, fail to recognise is that a small number of Marines is inconsequential when compared with the potentiality of forces and capabilities that would be arrayed against an allied force, which effectively negates the deterrence provided by the forward-deployed Marines.
This is not to disregard the importance of the Australia-US relationship and the presence of the Marines and other US service personnel who have fought beside Australians since the First World War, it is simply a case of Australia cannot continue to expect the US to carry the heavy lifting in the region, because there may come a day when Washington has to choose between Darwin or Sydney and Honolulu or San Francisco.
Responding to the limits of American power
Australia's political and strategic leaders and public have to accept the very real limitations of America's power, particularly in the face of a peer competitor unlike its predecessor, the Soviet Union.
Further compounding this is the increasing inconsistency in US foreign policy under President Donald Trump and its implications for the post-Second World War global order, namely strategic partnerships like NATO and direct strategic partnerships like the ANZUS treaty, which further served to underpin the long-term strategic security and prosperity of these nations well into the early 21st century.
This has been exemplified by the recent withdrawal of the US from parts of Syria, which has resulted in an emboldened Turkey attempting to re-establish itself and its sphere of influence within the confines of the former Ottoman Empire at the behest of the equally mercurial Turkish President Recep Erdogan, raising important questions for many nations, particularly Australia.
Recognising this, Dr Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute spoke to Defence Connect, saying, "I think that we need to avoid conflating a withdrawal by Trump from Syria with a US pullback globally. It’s tempting to do so, and Trump talks about ending US commitment in what he calls ‘endless wars’, but a vital strategic relationship such as US-Aus is different from a discrete expeditionary deployment by the US into a conflict in the Middle East."
While ANZUS, the Cold War-era treaty signed between the US, Australia and New Zealand in 1951, remains a central pillar of Australia's long-term strategic planning, it is critical to recognise that the primary economic, political and strategic competitor, China, is an entirely different opponent to that of the Soviet Union.
China, unlike the Soviet Union, has the economic capacity, political vision – despite internal security challenges – to directly challenge and in some cases out compete even the mighty, previously unmatched industrial, political and strategic capability of that great beacon of democracy the US, placing Australia at a critical juncture and precipice.
In response, Dr Davis believes that no matter the long-term impact of President Trump's commitment to limiting America's entanglement in foreign conflagrations, Australia needs to be prepared to take greater responsibility for its national security in the Indo-Pacific, outlining a number of key points for Defence Connect.
"We need to burden share to a much greater degree than before, and accept that we can no longer base our defence planning on the assumption that in a major military crisis or a period leading up to a future war, the US will automatically be there for us. In fact, if we want to avoid that major military crisis, we have to do more than adopt a purely defensive/denial posture, and be postured well forward to counterbalance a rising China or to be able to assist the US and other key allies, notably Japan, to respond to challenges. We can’t be free-riders," Dr Davis explained to Defence Connect.
"That means that our defence strategy, based around an emphasis on ‘air-sea gap’ needs urgent and comprehensive review, and the objective should be to consider how Australia can play a more forward and robust role in the Indo-Pacific region alongside the US and other key partners.
"That then has implications for a) ADF force posture; b) force structure and capability development beyond the 2016 IIP; and c) future levels of defence spending above the nominal 2 per cent GDP figure alluded to in DWP16. It also has huge implications for readiness, mobilisation and force sustainment. We must assume that we are going into a more dangerous and contested future that will have a higher operational tempo than in the past, with dramatically reduced warning times – and I think Dibb is correct – we are in ’strategic warning’. I’d go so far as to say it’s possibly a ‘pre-war period’."
Your thoughts
The nation is defined by its relationship with the region, with access to the growing economies and to strategic sea-lines-of-communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.
Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.
For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger, yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century's 'great game'.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.
Shifting the public discussion away from the default Australian position of "it is all a little too difficult, so let’s not bother" will yield unprecedented economic, diplomatic, political and strategic opportunities for the nation.
Rear Admiral Kevin Scarce also issued a challenge for Australia's political and strategic policy leaders, saying: "If we observe that the level of debate among our leaders is characterised by mud-slinging, obfuscation and the deliberate misrepresentation of the views of others, why would the community behave differently ... Our failure to do so will leave a very damaging legacy for future generations."
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia's future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation's approach to our regional partners.
We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
