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Much of the conversation about China’s rise has been dominated by how far behind the eight-ball much of the US-led alliance is. Concerningly, this has been challenged by an overconfidence in this seeming lack of preparedness, something analyst Ross Babbage has shed increasing light on.
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Former defence department official Ross Babbage has penned a thought-provoking analysis of the challenges arrayed against Australia and its allies as they seek to confront an increasingly belligerent and coercive Chinese government.
Babbage’s piece for the Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies, titled “Ten questionable assumptions about future war in the Indo-Pacific”, articulates 10 critical assumptions that need to be considered by the nation’s political and strategic leaders and critically discussed with the nation’s key allies.
Babbage places particular focus on areas of traditional dominance the US-led alliance network has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War, namely technological advantages across the various domains, the alliance networks, doctrine and operational concepts perfected through interventions and conflicts in the Middle East and southern Europe.
These factors are increasingly undermined by China's growing capabilities in these areas as well as the regime's willingness to leverage the full spectrum of state-based power, to establish a synthesis of traditional and 'grey zone' capabilities to undermine the traditional advantages enjoyed by the West, while allowing the leaders to believe they retain the advantage.
In the first part of this short analysis series, we took a closer look at the role hubris is currently playing in the public, political and defence planning conversations responding to the rising challenges of Beijing's regional ambitions.
As a refresher, the first five of Babbage's 10, troubling assumptions about future conflict in the Indo-Pacific include:
- Assumption Number 1: The Chinese way of war is similar to the West’s;
- Assumption Number 2: The West is currently in a ‘competition’;
- Assumption Number 3: China is not a serious rival because its defence spending is a quarter the size of the United States’ defence budget;
- Assumption Number 4: Beijing’s initiation of a major war against the Western allies would be so risky that it is very unlikely to happen; and
- Assumption Number 5: The West has superior strategies, operational concepts and forces.
Shifting focus, we will now take a closer look at the final five assumptions identified by Babbage as he seeks to stimulate conversation and debate to help Australian and allied political and strategic leaders think outside the established doctrine and dogma to respond to the full spectrum of state-based power now leveraged against the region.
Assumption 6: A major war will be geographically confined
Perhaps drawing on the experience of the mainland US and to a lesser extent Australia during the Second World War, much of the current economic, political and geo-strategic consensus that the homelands of both the US and Australia in particular will be spared from the ravages of potential conflict, with Japan and South Korea in the firing line akin to France and Britain's roles during the early 1940s.
For Babbage, this assumption is critically flawed and embodies the hubris currently characterising the debate, explaining this, Babbage explains, "There is a tendency by many in the United States and the other Indo-Pacific allies to assume that the kinetic effects of a major war in the Indo-Pacific would be confined to the sea, land and air space in the western Pacific and that allied homelands would be spared direct attacks.
"This assumption is demonstrated by the fact that nearly all allied military bases and key elements of support infrastructures are highly vulnerable to even simple, low technology attacks.
"Were a major conflict to erupt with little notice, many strategic assets would probably be damaged or destroyed by the kinds of surprise ‘assassin’s mace’ strikes that have long been championed by Chinese strategic leaders. Any presumption that the United States and its allies would be immune from such attacks would be heroic."
Expanding on this, Babbage raises an important point, something that both the disastrous bushfire season and impact of COVID-19 have revealed for Australia in particular, but more broadly other allies, that homeland resilience and strategic asset protection deserves serious consideration and response.
"The post-World War Two habit of assuming that allied homelands will be immune from attack, short of a major nuclear exchange, is no longer valid. Homeland resilience and strategic asset protection deserves more serious attention," Babbage explains.
Assumption 7: A future war in the Indo-Pacific will probably be short
Many of the conflicts the US and its allies have been involved with since the end of the Cold War have been highly mobile, rapid and extremely short for the opposing forces as technological, command and control and information dominance enabled the allies to enact their will without serious hindrance.
It is important to identify, however, that these operations were conducted largely against second tier powers fielding peer and near-peer platforms, without the supporting command and control, administrative and logistics infrastructure, hardly a dedicated, well armed, equipped and motivated force similar to what China is currently building.
These differences are identified and explained by Babbage, who states: "This Western predilection is driven in part by its almost universal focus on advanced technology conventional forces, mostly manned by full-time personnel.
"Western militaries have a driving interest in planning any war to be fast-moving, clinical, militarily decisive and short. When arguing the case for new military systems before congressional or parliamentary committees, there is a strong tendency to over-emphasise the technological superiority of particular systems and underestimate the much more diverse political, ideological, social, economic and other forces that often coalesce to force Western militaries to struggle in drawn-out quagmires."
Turning his attention to China's response and close study of the West's way of war, Babbage explains, "The Chinese, by contrast, prepare extensively for a future war to be extended, multidimensional and very complex.
"They have vast military reserve and paramilitary formations, they have moved many strategically important military assets underground, they have hardened strategic communication systems and they have developed large reserves of fuel, spare parts and even food.
"They have also propagated a powerful nationalistic narrative, built formidable information control mechanisms and taken steps to prepare the Chinese population psychologically for a long struggle.
"The Western allies need to ensure that their time frame assumptions are soundly based. Failure to give adequate attention to combat endurance and broader national resilience undermines allied deterrence and war-fighting capacities."
Assumption 8: It is sufficient for the West to plan for a single-phase kinetic conflict rather than a conflict continuum
Building on the basis of Assumption 7, the West's almost ingrained fear of being bogged down in a tactical and strategic quagmire similar to that experienced by both the US and Soviet Union in Vietnam and Afghanistan, combined with the overwhelming force embodied in 'shock and awe' as wielded against Iraq is a serious sticking point for Babbage.
This planning focus of a single, overwhelming 'kinetic phase' of conflict leaves the allies at a serious strategic and tactical disadvantage, similar to the lack of planning experienced by the British, French and German armies during the First World War, which saw these armies fall victim to a lack of preparedness for a protracted conflict.
Babbage explains, "As argued earlier, almost all Western preparations for a future major war in the Indo-Pacific involve heavy investments in advanced, highly networked, combined arms military capabilities designed for intensive kinetic conflict.
"The dominant allied view is that if Western forces can track all hostile forces in the theatre and strike them very rapidly, while maintaining a controlling presence in and around the first and second island chains, opposing forces will soon be defeated."
Expanding on this, Babbage states, "The strong implication is that if the PLA suffers heavy losses in a conventional force exchange, the Chinese regime would then sue for peace. The logic of these assumptions is highly questionable and needs to be assessed against the Chinese Communist Party’s history of suffering heavy losses in conventional battles against the Kuomintang, the Japanese Imperial Forces and the United States and its allies in Korea and then in each case fighting on to win either a complete or partial victory."
Further to this, Babbage explains the Chinese model of war, as a fluid, continuum which leverages and directs the full spectrum of state-based power to turn the tide of kinnetic conflict: "In contrast to the dominant Western view of major war, the Chinese concept is a multi-layered continuum that parallel’s Mao Zedong’s model of revolutionary war. Mao argued that if communist forces are to fight a major war with powerful advanced technology opponents they must ensure that the conflict is protracted."
Assumption 9: Non-military capabilities will be peripheral in future major war
Again, building on the concepts established in Assumptions 7 and 8, Babbage is clear in articulating the often underestimated impact of full spectrum state-based power as a pivotal shaper to nation state dynamics and power projection.
Babbage explains, "The discussion above makes clear that the United States and its western Pacific allies are making rapid progress in developing and fielding very strong ‘tool kits’ for conducting advanced conventional military operations.
"The main problem here is that these capabilities are likely to be fully effective only in the first kinetic layer of a future major war. The West’s capabilities to deter and win in all of the other layers of such a struggle are much more limited."
The West's traditional view of war and peace as separate entities is something not shared by revisionist powers like communist China and Vladimir Putin's Russia, this empowers these nations to be almost in a permanent state of 'total war' preparing the public and industry for the possibility of conflict, as the West's binary view continues to hinder preparedness and resolve before a shot is ever fired.
"As discussed above, both sides have powerful capabilities to fight in the first kinetic layer and each side is likely to suffer heavy combat losses. In the second and third kinetic layers of a major war, Beijing might receive substantial support from Russia and possibly from Iran and North Korea," Babbage says.
"Together with its own mobilised society this may be sufficient for the Chinese regime to sustain effective resistance against the West for an extended period. Most importantly, it may make feasible Beijing’s goal of fostering deep war-weariness and a climate of collapse in allied capitals."
Adding to these points, Babbage states, "By contrast, the West’s preparations for an extended and draining conflict are comparatively limited and with some rare exceptions they do not extend far beyond their national defence organisations. Should the West focus more attention on these non-military elements, it does have the potential to mobilise powerful instruments that could be used to apply great pressure on Beijing, including by isolating China from its distant suppliers."
Assumption 10: The West has the best structures for planning, preparing and commanding next-generation warfare
While the advantage of direct combat experience is firmly on the side of the US-led alliance network, particularly following the decades of conventional and counter insurgency operations throughout the Middle East, southern Europe and central Asia, these conflicts have also left the forces weary, battle tired and the concepts tested, with little innovation as a result of their overwhelming success.
China has closely studied the methodology, the techniques and the platforms which give the West such an unrivalled advantage, however one thing often overlooked by Western military planners is, as Babbage explains: "For a start, the United States and other allied armed forces have had no experience of fighting a major power opponent since 1951."
This fact levels the playing field somewhat, as both potential sides of the conflict lack the direct experience and lessons of a major power conflict, something Babbage expands upon: "The very concept of a major war that could be fought against a superpower rival over an extended period is far removed from their recent experience of expeditionary wars fought far from allied homelands against non-conventional opponents. In consequence, the allies have largely neglected the hardening, dispersion and protection of their key personnel and systems."
Adding further challenges, Babbage believes that the costly, bloated, cumbersome acquisition bureaucracies of the Western allies hindering their ability to rapidly respond to capabilities, platforms or other technology fielded by an adversary.
"The allies are also burdened by capability acquisition systems that are mostly slow, cumbersome and difficult-to-manage. Except in unusual circumstances, a new capability requirement for aircraft, ships or tanks typically takes 20-40 years to deliver into service. These long time frames render the allies vulnerable to the comparably fast-moving acquisition systems of the PLA and some other authoritarian state militaries," Babbage explains.
Of particular concern for Babbage is the lack of any consistent, central planning authority in Western nations, particularly as the capability is leveraged so extensively by Beijing as it surges toward implementing its tactical and strategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.
"In the United States and its allies there is no array of similarly focused organisations. No Western ally currently has a centralised planning and command organisation for combating China in the political and hybrid warfare space. And their planning and preparations for long duration operations are also limited and poorly coordinated. Much remains to be done," he explains.
Your thoughts
Australia is defined by its economic and strategic relationships with the Indo-Pacific and the access to the growing economies and to strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.
Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the 21st century’s era of great power competition and global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and choke points of south-east Asia annually.
For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century’s “great game”.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.
Australia is consistently told that, as a nation, we are torn between our economic relationship with China and the longstanding strategic partnership with the US, placing the country at the epicentre of a great power rivalry – but what if it didn’t have to be that way?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation’s approach to our regional partners.
We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
