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Many commentators and analysts have sought to blame the disruptive Trump administration, or the increasingly provocative actions of Beijing, for the declining level of Australia’s security in the region. However, neither the US nor China are to blame, we are, and now the chickens are coming home to roost.
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At the end of the Cold War, Australia like much of the victorious, US-led "free world" bought into two comforting myths, first the victory of the US meant the "end of history" and the era of great power competition had forever been relegated to the pages of antiquity, and, as China continues to grow, it will shake off authoritarianism and become more liberal.
Far from Francis Fukuyama's promise of the "end of history", across the globe the US-led liberal-democratic and capitalist economic, political and strategic order is under siege, driven by mounting waves of civil unrest, the impact of sustained economic stagnation across the West, concerns about climate change and the increasing geostrategic competition between the world’s great powers.
Adding further fuel to the fire is the global and more localised impacts of COVID-19, which range from recognising the impact of vulnerable, global supply chains upon national security as many leading nations, long advocates of 'closer collaboration and economic integration', grasp at the lifeboats of the nation-state to secure their national interests.
Ironically, it is often these same nations and their respective media and strategic policy communities that have levelled intense, seemingly unrelenting criticism against the disruptive, bombastic US President, Donald Trump for acting in a similar way, promoting 'America First' policies – actively emphasising a return of US jobs and critically, a scaling back of US participation in costly, foreign conflicts.
This policy shift in Washington has seen myriad hostile responses from traditional 'allies' of the US, nations that have become dependent upon the overwhelming and unrivalled economic, political and strategic might of the US for their security, all of whom have seen such actions as an attack upon their "right" to live under what has become known as 'Pax Americana' or, the American Peace.
Australia, in this instance, is no different.
While the nation's geographic isolation, encapsulated by the 'tyranny of distance', has provided Australia with a degree of protection from the major, epoch-defining and empire ending conflagrations of the 20th century, the economic, political, societal and strategic challenges of the 21st century hit far closer to home.
Nowhere is this more evident than across the Indo-Pacific as an emboldened Beijing continues to punish Australia for pursuing a global inquiry into the origins and China’s handling of COVID-19, while also leveraging the comparatively diminished presence of the US military in the region to project power and intimidate both Japan and, critically, Taiwan.
Recognising the perfect storm of factors impacting Australia's economic, political and strategic predicament, Peter Hartcher in a piece for The Sydney Morning Herald, titled 'Trump and China force Australia to secure its defence closer to home', details the problem with consistently deferring to what is described in psychology as an "external locus of control".
Hartcher explains the predicament Australia finds itself in: "When Australia entrusted its national survival to the United States decades ago, it wasn't counting on Donald Trump. Whoever wins the US presidential election next week, the US alliance remains Australia's strategic Plan A. But the election of the self-described 'very stable genius' four years ago has pointed up the danger inherent in betting the nation's existence on any one country.
"At the same time, Xi Jinping's China presents Australia with the stark reality that it confronts a big, hostile power that respects no country's sovereignty but its own. Together, these facts have pushed Australia to start work on a Plan B. What's the plan? To bring together as many other countries as possible to 'balance' against China's power."
Prudent policymaking means accepting real responsibility for our security
Australia's relationship of dependence upon great powers has been the status quo and foundation of the nation's strategic policy since Federation, from the British Empire and the US following the Second World War, Australia has served as a loyal deputy, operating under the assumption of "I scratch your back, you scratch my back" that saw the nation drawn into costly engagements.
While the Commonwealth has moved to reassure both the Australian public and its alliances around the world with the announcement of the $270 billion 2020 Defence Strategic Update and supporting 2020 Defence Force Structure Plan.
Despite this new paradigm of "Shape, Deter, Respond", the evolving global and regional power trends mean that Australia's policymakers will need to do more in order to respond to the comparative decline of our primary security benefactor.
That is not to say that Australia should forgo its relationship and role within the Australia-US alliance, rather that the nation needs to be prepared for the eventuality that the US may be, at least temporarily, limited in its ability to directly support or provide the umbrella of tactical and strategic freedom the nation is used to, and prepared to actively defend and promote its sovereignty.
However, Hartcher speaking to ANU emeritus professor Hugh White, explains, "Or, as ANU professor emeritus Hugh White put it, 'we no longer repose our trust in America alone, and if America fails us then we will look not to ourselves but to our Asian neighbours'.
"White is sceptical that Australia's Plan B – or its enhanced Plan A as the Defence Minister prefers it – can work as a credible military strategy to deter Beijing's domineering behaviour. Especially if Australia's own forces are inadequate."
As quoted by Harthcher, White writes in Australian Foreign Affairs, "In the world of power politics, how much help you can expect from an ally depends a lot on how much the ally can expect you to help them.
Again, this approach advocates a return to the tried and true method of deferring to an "external locus of control" and is reinforced by comments made by Defence Minister Linda Reynolds to Hartcher:
"The Defence Minister, Linda Reynolds, prefers to call Australia's new strategy 'an enhanced Plan A'. Australia has nourished relationships with a wide range of Asia-Pacific countries for decades, she points out, so that's not new. But 'we are strengthening them in new ways'.
"'We are shaping the region in favour of respect for sovereignty and the rules-based order – it's the most consequential realignment since World War II,' she tells me. 'We are actively, assertively working for stability in the region'.
"The plan is to put together what I've earlier described as 'a posse of other deputies and like-minded nations who want to keep the peace'. To which Paul Keating said: 'Good luck with that'."
It is important to recognise that in no way should Australia abandon important alliances and relationships with regional partners, particularly increasingly important economic and strategic partners throughout southeast Asia, rather we need to take more direct responsibility for our own economic, political and strategic security rather than continuing to as Hartcher states, engage in "learned helplessness".
No reason to give up on the Aus-US relationship, but incentive to grow our role
The nation's approach to strategic policy continues to be heavily based upon the formalisation of the Defence of Australia (DoA) policy as identified in the 1986 Dibb report and then enshrined in the subsequent 1987 and 1994 Defence White Papers in particular, with tweaks made in every Defence White Paper to date.
This largely isolationist policy focused entirely on securing the sea-air gap as a strategic "buffer zone" for Australia, enabling the reorientation of Australia’s strategic and broader defence industry posture, which now serves to leave the nation at critical crossroads as the region continues to rise.
While successive Australian government's have sought to evolve the Defence of Australia doctrine and the nation's critical strategic partnership with the US, the very premise of the doctrine continues to inform the foundation of Australia's strategic policy to this day.
This new geo-strategic reality is best explained by Paul Dibb himself: "We are now in a period of unpredictable strategic transition in which the comfortable assumptions of the past are over. Australia’s strategic outlook has continued to deteriorate and, for the first time since World War II, we face an increased prospect of threat from high-level military capabilities being introduced into our region."
To its credit, the government's new $270 billion plan as identified in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the Force Structure Plan, unlike many others before it, puts its money where its mouth is. It articulates what the Prime Minister describes as budgetary certainty and supports the ambitious, 'big-ticket' defence acquisition and modernisation programs identified in the 2016 Defence White Paper.
Building on this, the new strategic plans and the associated force structure identify some drastic departures from previous doctrine, something Geoffrey Barker explains, "Particularly impressive is the clear alignment and logical consistency between the revised strategic appreciation and the planned 10-year, $270 billion investment program, which includes long-range (possibly hypersonic) missiles, to improve the lethality of the Australian Defence Force."
It is also true to say that while the new policy identifies and responds to the "rapid deterioration in Australia's strategic environment" over the past decade or so, it fails to adequately adjust the size, shape and structure of the ADF accordingly – particularly as the US continues to flirt with isolationism and the qualitative advantages traditionally enjoyed by the US and its allies dwindle.
In recognising this now brutally apparent reality, is the Defence of Australia doctrine, which abdicated Australia's forward presence in the region, enough to ensure that Australia's diverse array of economic, political and strategic interests are protected during a period of mounting geo-strategic competition?
Economic interests and sovereignty need to be accounted for
Australia's dependence upon China is by now well known, particularly as the nation scrambles to adjust to blatant threats of economic coercion in the aftermath of Prime Minister Scott Morrison calling for an independent and international inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 following its cost of life and continuing impact on the global economy.
COVID-19 also served to dramatically highlight the lack of true economic sovereignty and resilience within the national economy, as well as the impact the nation's limited economic diversity has upon national security.
Hartcher comes to the conclusion some prominent members of the Commonwealth government have come to, when he articulates: "Indeed, Australia should embrace a full work program of measures to protect its democracy from Xi's efforts at influence and interference. The Morrison government has only just started to enforce its foreign interference laws – the investigation into NSW Labor politician Shaoquett Moselmane is its first such effort.
"Other vital measures await. These include tightening Australia's absurdly ramshackle political donations laws, introducing security screening for new MPs and senators, and developing a national resilience agenda.
"Australia's vulnerability to China for critical medical supplies has been newly exposed, for instance. So, too, its over-reliance on China as an export market."
This point is further enhanced by a poignant and timely question raised by Senator for NSW, retired Major General and long-time advocate for a holistic National Sovereignty Strategy, Jim Molan, AO, DSC, who recently told Sky News: "The point that I make is that if we need to put $270 billion over the next 10 years into defence, what other parts of our society, of our nation do we need to address to match whatever this $270 billion is going to buy us in the end?
"The basis for our national security is the economy. The problem I have is how does a government know risks it is taking by not funding certain aspects of national security, if it doesn’t know what we absolutely need?"
Building on these points, Hartcher adds, "Australian activism is an indispensable element in its own defence; Australian competence in planning and building would be even better. Luck can not break a naval embargo; hope intercepts no incoming missiles.
"Whichever candidate wins the US election next week, Australia cannot return to its long posture of learned helplessness."
Your thoughts
Australia is defined by its economic and strategic relationships with the Indo-Pacific and the access to the growing economies and to strategic sea lines of communication supporting over 90 per cent of global trade, a result of the cost-effective and reliable nature of sea transport.
Indo-Pacific Asia is at the epicentre of the 21st century’s era of great power competition and global maritime trade, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade flowing through the South China Sea and the strategic waterways and chokepoints of south-east Asia annually.
For Australia, a nation defined by this relationship with traditionally larger yet economically weaker regional neighbours, the growing economic prosperity of the region and corresponding arms build-up, combined with ancient and more recent enmities, competing geopolitical, economic and strategic interests, places the nation at the centre of the 21st century’s “great game”.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.
Australia is consistently told that as a nation we are torn between our economic relationship with China and the longstanding strategic partnership with the US, placing the country at the epicentre of a great power rivalry – but what if it didn’t have to be that way?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of shaking up the nation’s approach to our regional partners.
We would also like to hear your thoughts on the avenues Australia should pursue to support long-term economic growth and development in support of national security in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
