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Have Beijing and Moscow fooled Western democracies into yielding ground in the tussle for geopolitical supremacy?
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Both China and Russia are flexing their military might on the world stage, making no attempts to conceal expansionary ambitions.
China continues to undermine Taiwan’s territory integrity, with no end in sight to breaches of the air defence authorisation zone (ADIZ) by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported breaches of the ADIZ almost every day in January and at least three times this month, flagging intrusions by offensive platforms, including Shenyang J-16 strike fighters and Shaanxi Y-8 transport aircraft.
These reports have only heightened fears of a looming clash, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) openly touting its plans to absorb the independent democracy.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin has mobilised well over 100,000 troops along its border with Ukraine ahead of what many fear is an imminent invasion.
Is this show a strength a reflection of the nations burgeoning influence in the geopolitical arena?
According to Dr John Lee, non-resident senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre, this “apparent confidence” has infected the mindsets of Western powers, taken as evidence authoritarian states like China and Russia are “ascendant” while democracies are viewed as “weak, confused and in disarray”.
But Lee stresses this could not be further from the truth, claiming China and Russia have a “far more precarious road ahead”.
Lee begins by addressing the notion that Beijing and Moscow’s authoritarian rule lends to more stable governance.
“It is seductive reasoning, Democratically elected leaders have limited time in power, must balance different and competing interests, and cannot pursue objectives in a single-minded manner,” he writes.
“In contrast, dictators can focus on using more elements of national power to achieve permanent ends.”
But in reality, Lee continues, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have a weaker grip on the reins of power than many would expect.
“The actual situation is much more awkward and intractable for Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. They seem to have become allies in their stand against the world’s liberal democracies,” he writes.
“Both have identified themselves as the embodiment of Russian and Chinese nationalism respectively and, in the process, conflate threats to their personal power as a danger to their countries. In this sense, they are on a similar path.”
Lee notes both Xi and Putin resent the spread of democracy in their backyards, fearing the trend would inspire dissent and new call for accountability.
This is evidenced by the resources poured into quashing anti-government sentiment in the region and propping up allied powers.
“Russia is forced to use stretched resources to prop up corrupt and oppressive regimes in Kazakhstan and Belarus,” Lee adds.
“China cannot allow liberal institutions in a thriving Hong Kong or accept cultural self-determination in Xinjiang and Tibet. As a result, Beijing spends more on internal security than on the People’s Liberation Army, the lion’s share of resources going towards suppressing these two restive regions.”
Moreover, China and Russia’s displays of aggression towards Taiwan and Ukraine, respectively, could end up further undermining Xi and Putin’s leadership.
“Moscow’s moves have revived anti-Russian nationalism in a country of almost 45 million people with the second-largest land mass in Europe. If Russia invades, Finland and Sweden may well join NATO and the collective security organisation will gain a renewed and increased sense of purpose,” Lee observes.
“In Asia, Beijing’s belligerence means the goal of peaceful Taiwanese unification is further away than ever and a broad militarised front is coalescing around and against China. If Beijing were to use force against Taiwan, the benign environment China needs to continue its rise evaporates with existential dangers for Xi and the Communist Party.”
According to Lee, this suggests Xi and Putin are “not as good at statecraft as many believe”, but have succeeded in convincing Western democracies that they’re gaining an upper hand.
“This is where the advanced democracies must wear significant blame,” he writes.
“To maintain their personal hold on power, Putin and Xi need to continually point to evidence of success against the democracies they mock and demonise.
“It is not in our interest to make them look like strategic geniuses or normalise their coercive behaviour.”
Lee laments the Western counters to previous acts of aggression from China and Russia, pointing to Europe’s response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.
“Europe, and Germany most of all, became unnecessarily dependent on Russian gas even though Putin’s intentions have been clear for almost two decades,” he notes.
“Western Europe’s refusal to take more responsibility for its own defence has emboldened Putin and made the former more vulnerable to coercion and too reliant on de-escalation rather than deterrence.”
Lee concedes China is a “more complex problem” but partly as a result of Western decision making.
“Even before Xi, Chinese leaders were allowed an easy ride. China is given substantial access to advanced markets while the most important parts of its economy are off limits to the world,” he adds.
“Massive state-sponsored theft of technology and know-how is still tolerated. Until recently, there was little appetite to respond to growing Chinese aggression in disputed maritime regions.
“Feckless or short-sighted actions by democratic nations have helped convince China there is little downside to behaving this way. And it has led to the false but self-defeating assessment that Xi is fundamentally undeterrable.”
Lee says the West should leverage more geopolitical capital in seeking to dissuade China and Russia from taking “assertive action”.
“These countries relentlessly assess relative strengths and know the advanced democracies still enjoy huge advantages, notwithstanding their sneering rhetoric against us,” he continues.
“From key technologies and innovations to finance and markets, the power is still with the US and its allies. In East Asia, there is much to do militarily in terms of doctrine, development, and deployment – with not much time to do it.”
But according to Lee, the West is “heading in the right direction”, adding that the struggle is “far from a lost cause”.
A key to success, he argues, is a “permanent change in psychology”.
“It is a fact many non-democracies can be our friends and partners, but our most serious rivals are autocratic. It is important to see Russia and China as they see us,” he writes.
“Co-operation is sometimes possible but democracies must accept they are already engaged in a comprehensive material and normative competition.
“This means always identifying and using leverage, imposing costs and a willingness to absorb harmful measures against us. Deterrence will otherwise fail.”
Lee concludes by stressing that democracies should spend less time focusing on their flaws and more time heralding their strengths.
“Look more carefully beneath the surface and it will become evident our political systems, economies and societies are more resilient and adaptable than Russian or Chinese alternatives,” he notes.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia's political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch with
Charbel Kadib
News Editor – Defence and Security, Momentum Media
Prior to joining the defence and aerospace team in 2020, Charbel was news editor of The Adviser and Mortgage Business, where he covered developments in the banking and financial services sector for three years. Charbel has a keen interest in geopolitics and international relations, graduating from the University of Notre Dame with a double major in politics and journalism. Charbel has also completed internships with The Australian Department of Communications and the Arts and public relations agency Fifty Acres.
