An early test for the Sino-Russian ‘no-limits’ deal

In early February, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing as part of an effort to further strengthen bilateral relations.

The pair signed a “no limits” partnership, releasing a statement, which among other things, affirmed joint opposition to NATO expansion in eastern Europe.

Just weeks later, President Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompting some observers to presume Chinese consent and support for the move.

However, to the surprise of many, President Xi’s public response has been ambiguous, with the Chinese dictator neither condemning nor openly endorsing President Putin’s actions.

Beijing has even offered to mediate and has extended aid to affected civilians.

According to Richard McGregor, senior fellow, east Asia, at the Lowy Institute, China is “turning diplomatic cartwheels” to keep the war from “damaging its global standing”, while also preserving its partnership with Moscow.

He notes the regime has been “subtly shifting its language” to distance itself from the Kremlin’s military campaign in Ukraine, but at the same time, has echoed Russia’s broader geopolitical rhetoric, particularly condemnation of US intervention.  

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McGregor references recent remarks from China’s foreign affairs spokesman, Zhao Lijian, who spread Russian propaganda — accusing the US of secretly operating biological weapons labs in Ukraine.

“Throughout, Beijing has not backed away from its core position, that Moscow has ‘legitimate security interests’ in Ukraine. And like Moscow, state media in Beijing has labelled the US ‘an empire of lies’,” McGregor writes.

But is Beijing’s hedging strategy sustainable?

McGregor claims President Xi is “squirming under pressure” from the US and its like-minded international partners.

In remaining ambiguous, he adds, China is struggling to “reconcile the irreconcilable”.

He points to recent comments made by former US government official and head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Evan Feigenbaum, who argues “facts on the ground” in Ukraine “flatly contradict” China’s supposed sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This tension, McGregor observes, suggests Beijing may have been “taken aback” by President Putin’s aggression, despite meeting with his counterpart amid military mobilisation along the Russia-Ukraine border.

This poses an internal dilemma for President Xi, who is seeking an unprecedented third term as leader.

“Xi neither needs nor wants any instability at such a sensitive moment. His many enemies have learned to shut their mouths in recent years lest they feel their leader’s wrath,” McGregor writes.

“But if the situation deteriorates in Ukraine and the conflict slides into a full-blown insurgency, Xi’s critics will have a stick to beat him with.

“After all, Xi and Putin have met nearly 40 times since 2012. For Xi not to have read the room and realised that Putin was readying a full invasion represents a failure on his part, and that of the Chinese system.”

As such, McGregor suggests that in return for the potential damage on President Xi’s reputation both within China and abroad, he may invoke the “no limits” agreement to guarantee Russian support for China’s economic and military ambitions.

“It is an unsentimental partnership but not a flash in the pan, and one which both countries have judged holds great value on multiple levels,” McGregor observes.

“Russia exports arms, energy and farm products, such as wheat, to China. China sends consumer goods in the other direction.

“Most importantly, both have an overriding interest in hobbling US power around the world, and in the European and Asian spheres in particular.”

Ultimately, China may demand Russian support in the event of a confrontation with Taiwan.

“They have already been running a parallel diplomatic strategy for years, according to which China allows Russia to take the lead in the Middle East, while Moscow buttresses Beijing in Asia,” McGregor writes.

But according to the Lowy Institute analyst, the Sino-Russian partnership is far from ironclad.  

“Russia is by far the junior partner to a much larger China, the reverse of when the two countries were revolutionary comrades-in-arms in the 1950s,” he adds.

“Beijing, for its own part, is finding itself hitched to a highly aggressive and unstable Russian leader, with little apparent ability to influence his actions.

“Beijing has also been courting Europe to split it from the US, with some success. Its position on Ukraine has instead sent this initiative into reverse, prompting renewed trans-Atlantic bonding and demands from Brussels and other capitals that China withdraw support from Russia.”

McGregor says he expects China’s patience to wane if the Russia-Ukraine war drags on.

“If the conflict is still raging in six months, Beijing might not settle for a subtle re-positioning. Instead of taking fire for Moscow, it might start thinking of ways to put pressure on it as well,” he concludes.

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