iscover
As the saying goes, “The king is dead, long live the king” and nowhere is that a truer statement than in the case of the international “rules-based” order, which is in its final death throes before our eyes.
Well, 2026 has started off with a bang, no pun intended.
The daring American raid on Venezuela and successful capture of socialist dictator Nicolás Maduro has well and truly set a cat among the pigeons, with the reinforcement of Thucydides’ statement attributed to the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue of History of the Peloponnesian War, that “The strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must”.
For many, this overt and largely unexpected US raid has served to only reinforce preconceived ideas about the intentions and pseudo-imperial ambitions often attributed to the American president.
Meanwhile, for others, it has served as an abrupt shock and confronting wake-up call about the state of the post-Second World War, global “rules-based” order and its undergirding international law, which has undeniably been under continued and both overt and covert assault since at least the mid-2010s.
Further still, others have attempted to frame the raid and its immediate aftermath, including statements that America would administer the Latin American nation and, critically, its oil supplies until such time a successor can be identified and “judiciously” confirmed as the sole driving force behind the pseudo-annexation.
As with all things, the truth is somewhere in the middle of these various claims, but more importantly, it reinforces an inescapable reality for every nation: the old world order is dead.
This new reality has long been hinted at, but now, it appears that the nail is firmly in the coffin and all nations must adjust accordingly, Australia especially.
Reinforcing this is the director of Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Defence Strategy Program, Mike Hughes, in a piece titled Australia in a disordered world, in which he articulated the need for Australia to have a more realistic strategy for confronting the increasingly disordered world.
Hughes stated, “Everything Australia has achieved – prosperity, stability and strategic freedom – has been underwritten by a great power that shared our values. First it was Britain, then the United States. But with the second Trump administration, that arrangement is now uncertain – and there is no replacement.
"What we do know is that the period in which US power underwrote the liberal democratic principles that have shaped global norms since 1945 is over. A historical aberration at an end,” Hughes detailed further.
Historic aberration is at an end
It goes without saying that the world we know, namely that of the post-Second World War order led by the United States, is inescapably a historic aberration, with the competition between nation states and their precursors, the great empires and kingdoms of history, the norm of human nature.
Few nations have benefited quite as much as Australia has from this historic aberration, enjoying world-leading living standards, economic prosperity and stability (even if that is increasingly declining at a per capita level) and societal and political cohesion and stability to become the envy of the world.
However, the increasing unpredictability of the United States, coupled with the increasing assertiveness and overt ambitions of the People’s Republic of China, places Australia firmly in between a rock and a hard place as we seek to balance our economic and security interests in a world where the norms of the past eight decades can no longer be guaranteed.
Hughes detailed the implications of this predicament, adding, “We must avoid the trap of false equivalence. The socio-cultural convulsions afflicting the US may make it unreliable, but it is China that is unmistakably threatening. The US undermines confidence; China seeks to undermine the system itself. The US is drifting to an unknown destination; China has spent decades enacting a plan to reshape global norms to privilege authoritarianism.”
Of particular concern is the fact that Beijing’s ambition is not limited to regional influence or economic advantage.
Rather, under Xi Jinping, China openly articulates a vision of “great changes unseen in a century”, an unambiguous phrase that signals confidence in the decline of Western dominance and the rise of a Sino-centric international system.
This ambition is supported by significant economic scale, political discipline and a willingness to use state power in ways liberal democracies often constrain themselves from doing.
In particular, China’s suite of global initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilisation Initiative are framed as inclusive alternatives to Western-led institutions.
In practice, they embed norms that prioritise regime security, political non-interference in authoritarian governance, and deference to Chinese interests. These frameworks are not neutral; they are instruments designed to normalise coercion, weaken universal human rights standards and dilute the agency of smaller states.
Beijing has been particularly crafty in their framing of the ambition and designs for the region, seeking to minimise and couch their own imperialist agenda in more altruistic language and marketing, effectively “sanitising” its image as Hughes claims, while actively continuing to undermine the international order.
But it isn’t doing this alone, with Hughes detailing, “Colluding with other authoritarian states – most notably Russia, through their no-limits partnership – China works to dilute the liberal principles that have underpinned global prosperity and stability since 1945. And it seeks to be the leader in technologies that will be foundational to global power in the coming century, in part by plundering our intellectual property and leveraging the naivety of our universities.
He added, “China’s undertaking of the largest military build-up since World War II, combined with its egregious behaviour, stokes fears over its ambition to reshape the global order at others’ expense.”
By presenting China’s rise as both inevitable and morally justified, the CCP reduces internal constraints on external confrontation. This matters because states that believe history is on their side tend to take greater risks.
Equally, the success of this narrative, particularly among the Western economic, strategic and political elite has paved the way for other rising nations, including India, Brazil, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and others to leverage the same tactics to further legitimise their own ambitions, designs and claims in the eyes of the non-Western international community.
So what comes next?
Beyond the ’international rules-based order’
If the fallout from the American raid on Venezuela is to formalise a new world order where “might makes right”, then Australia will rapidly find itself lacking in the Indo-Pacific, particularly if the norms of the preceding 80 years can no longer be guaranteed.
Hughes hinted at this, saying, “The Western rules-based order, though imperfect, was the most effective system yet devised for mitigating great power excess and protecting the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. Anchored by liberal democratic values, it offered transparency and predictability.
He explained further saying, “The US, acting as a largely benign hegemon, underwrote global stability after 1945. This framework enabled unprecedented economic growth, helping transform nations such as South Korea from among the poorest to among the richest. Former adversaries – Germany, Japan and Italy – rebuilt into economic powerhouses and became some of the order’s strongest advocates.”
Yet for many of the world’s emerging powers, these systems, structures and organs are the lingering hangover of the 18th and 19th centuries respectively, and much like their Chinese counterparts, reflect narratives of humiliation, grievance and Western imperialism.
Slights that must be rectified, forcefully if necessary, are something Australian and other Western leaders are at great pains to overlook or outright ignore both at home and abroad.
Trump’s America, however, seems to not only acknowledge this reality, it seems to accept it and the ramifications on US grand strategy and its position in the world, prompting the response we saw in Venezuela.
Or more simply put, America is now acting almost solely in its own national interest. If the interests of allies and partners overlap with these decisions, then good, if they don’t, then too bad. America’s interests come first for America’s leaders.
Another way of looking at this is to accept that we are now seeing how the sausage is made, not merely seeing the finished product on store shelves and this harsh, abrupt introduction to real politik is almost too much for many with a “refined” or “civilised” palate to stomach.
But ironically, Australia has been the canary in the coal mine for this shift for some time, despite our paid-in investment in the post-Second World War global rules-based order.
Hughes articulated this, saying, “Australia’s experience is a sobering reminder. After signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Beijing in 2014, Canberra believed the relationship to be positive and manageable. But by 2017 it was evident that, while we pursued cooperation, the CCP was interfering in our politics, targeting our critical infrastructure, engaging in cyberwarfare and weaving false hostile regional narratives to undermine our standing with our neighbours.”
“When we acted to protect our sovereignty – and assisted partners who drew inspiration from our example – China responded with economic coercion, arbitrarily detained our nationals and sought to export its authoritarian values into our political system with 14 political demands. That was a CCP restrained. A Sino-centric order would enable far worse,” he added.
However, China isn’t the only great and middle power Australia will increasingly have to compete with.
Our path forward
It is important to note that Hughes remains committed to the Australia–US alliance (please note his analysis was before the Venezuela raid) and recognises that the relationship remains the foundation of Australia’s engagement in the world; however, he recognises that Australia will need to step up its game.
Hughes highlighted this, quoting recent comments from Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong that “the rules of the old global order were fading while new ones remained unwritten. If Australia wants a say in shaping that emerging order, we must invest far more in the tools of power that give us a voice: defence capability, diplomacy, development partnerships and resilience. If we don’t help define the rules, others will”.
Australia is as previously mentioned, facing a myriad of challenges – economic, political, societal, demographic and technological – all of which are, to some degree or another, being faced and, critically, weaponised by partners and potential adversaries alike.
Critically, Hughes articulated that Australia can no longer assume that the international system will protect it by default.
Nor can it avoid choices by balancing indefinitely between competing powers. If Australia wishes to shape the emerging order, rather than be shaped by it, accordingly, we must invest in defence, diplomacy, economic resilience and national resolve, and it must do so with bipartisan clarity about the costs involved.
Disorder does not eliminate choice but it narrows and focuses it. Australia’s challenge is to recognise the world as it is becoming, not as it once was, and to act accordingly.
Hughes added, “Australia continues to operate on assumptions from the old order, where globalisation wasn’t weaponised. That world is gone. We must abandon the illusion that economics and security are independent domains; they never were. China and Russia understand this. The West is only now adapting.
“Ultimately, Australia needs a national conversation, buttressed by bipartisan consensus and involving the media, business, academia and civil society, about the world we now inhabit: one defined by contest, coercion and diminished certainty. Disorder is upon us. The question is whether Australia helps to shape it or is shaped by it.”
Perhaps, as part of this, we should identify our own objectives, our own ambitions and our own non-negotiables and start running our own race, putting ourselves first.
The old order is dead. Long live the new world order.
Final thoughts
For far too long, Australia has depended on “she’ll be right”. Well, in the face of the range of risks and challenges facing the nation, “she won’t be right”, and we need to accept that.
Building Australia’s weight as an independent power, with the economic heft, diplomatic clout and military capability of a great power isn’t just a lofty aim. It’s fast becoming a necessary expression of our sovereignty.
It’s a statement that Australia is prepared to take full responsibility for its own security and to play a leading role in shaping a stable, prosperous Indo-Pacific.
For too long we’ve been boxed in: dependent on China’s markets, tied to the American alliance and caught between larger players in a contest we don’t control. It doesn’t have to stay that way. As the world hardens into competing blocs of authoritarian and democratic systems, Australians deserve an honest, clear conversation about who we are and where we’re headed.
That conversation must include the Australian people, the ones who’ll carry the cost, bear the responsibility and ultimately defend the decisions taken in their name.
Real progress relies on transparency, collaboration and trust between government, industry and the public. It means rebuilding confidence in a shared national mission, one that strengthens our economy, secures critical industries and hardens the nation against economic coercion.
A strong, diverse and self-reliant economy is the bedrock of national power. It’s also our most reliable defence against external pressure, no matter where it comes from.
At the same time, we need a clear-eyed understanding of our ambitions. Are we satisfied being a shrinking “middle power” or are we ready to step up as a genuine regional leader, a nation that shapes events rather than simply responds to them?
Because without decisive investment in capability, innovation and self-reliance, we risk sliding into stagnation. We risk accelerating a kind of “managed decline” and with it the slow erosion of our strength, prosperity and independence.
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
