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Australian Defence Force soldiers must be given greater initiative, authority and capability to respond to drone threats over Australian bases.
That’s the conclusion reached after the recent Senate estimates committee meeting held in Canberra on 29 October.
From the discussion, Australia faces the revelation that agencies are still working out whether Australian Defence Force personnel even have legal authority to neutralise drones during incursions at on-country bases.
The warning signs forbidding entry or drone overflight at Defence bases have apparently been revealed as empty and unenforced bluff.
“I want to note and welcome the government’s introduction of new legislation to deal with this issue of drone incursions on Australian bases. Subject to an appropriate parliamentary inquiry, the opposition is strongly supportive of bringing this legislation forward in a timely way,” Senator James Paterson said, speaking at the Senate estimates.
“It’s critical that our men and women on our bases have both the capability and the legal authority to safely bring down any drones that are coming over our bases.
“We obviously need a much more robust way of protecting our people, and the things they’re working on, than closing the blinds.
“My understanding … is that it is legally unclear whether ADF members had the authority to bring these drones down in these recent incidents, including at RAAF Williamtown, therefore, they were not able to be brought down.
“(In addition) it was not legally clear that the commanding officer of these bases could issue an order to a defence member to bring these drones down … If it’s not legally clear, then clearly regulatory or legislative change was necessary.
“This is not a new issue that’s just cropped up this week or this month or this year. It’s been going on for some time … When these incidents first started escalating in the early 2020s.”
Problem not going away soon
Additional regulatory changes have been made to Defence bases under legislative reforms, while drone-related security incidents continue to climb.
Senate estimates questioned the correct statistics regarding drone-related security incidents, with it revealed that there were 204 incident reports of unmanned aircraft system security incidents in FY2025–26 and 141 incidents in FY24–25 as well as 42 incident reports to date this year.
It’s clearly an upward trend with 56 incident reports in FY23–24 and only 19 in FY22–23.
“We’ve had a series of responses (to the drone incursions), including regulation that was put in place at the end of last year that provided an additional sort of framework and powers,” said Meghan Quinn PSM, Secretary Department of Defence, speaking at the Senate estimates meeting.
“They have some gaps in them because the regulation can’t override certain aspects of legislation. It was clear at the time, when the regulations were being worked through, that it would provide some cover but not full cover because we needed to work through the legislative process. The legislation package that’s before Parliament has been in gestation for quite some time. It’s a complex piece of legislation.
“It’s important that we take the opportunity to get it right, to modernise aspects, not just on the security side but also on the capability development side.
“We have worked as expeditiously as possible to have that package ready for government, and, as you say, it’s been introduced for consideration this week. We have also been working, separate to that, with other regulatory authorities to increase our capabilities, including with CASA, in particular, for them to be able to delegate some authorities to the Air Force to be able to take some activities. So there have been active considerations.
“It’s not the case that this is recent. The department and government have, under government instructions, been working on this for a matter of months and years.
“(Authority to engage drones) depends on the modality and method of engaging with drones, and it depends whether they’re in the air, over airfields or the ground-based operations. So it is a complicated regulatory architecture that we’re operating in because the legislation, across different aspects, were not drafted with the knowledge of uncrewed aerial systems.”
Elsewhere a solution
We can draw some parallels from drone defence of military bases in Ukraine (although the country is at war and has different circumstances).
It’s understood that Ukrainian commanders have both a responsibility and the relevant authority to defend their personnel and military bases against hostile drones, in what could be described as a bottom-up approach rather than Australia’s top-down absolute authority.
At the individual level, Ukrainian personnel can reportedly act immediately in self-defence or to protect another’s life, with a requirement to report their actions to their immediate commander afterwards.
Of course, this is overlaid with a commander level of authority for organising wider protection at a unit or base level. Commanders can reportedly establish warning and defence zones or make decisions on the use of weapons within applicable orders and legal requirements. Importantly, defensive action does not necessarily require prior warning or fresh approval from higher command during a sudden attack or incident – potentially protecting valuable reaction time.
This reportedly feeds into the larger air defence command structure where local and volunteer air-defence protection is incorporated under Territorial Defence commanders who can oversee air defence operations and electronic warfare systems that require caution.
In contrast, from the Senate estimates inquiries, it appears that ADF personnel defending military infrastructure are allegedly relegated to passive observers of an increasing threat. Put on hold until further instructions or legal clarification arrives while unidentified drones operate overhead.
Instead, wouldn’t it be more sensible to empower the people closest to the threat to make timely, informed decisions? Purely by ADF training and selection, we cannot expect our soldiers to be unqualified or untrustworthy for the job.
Final thoughts
The drone incidents cited during the recent Senate estimates meeting were a lightning rod, highlighting a crucial defensive weakness in the nation’s national security.
Let’s turn that weakness into a catalyst for an adjusted rethink of Australian military base security.
Australia can draft as much new legislation as it wants and purchase or build multiple layered air defence systems, but at the end of the day, we must have a soldier ready and willing to pull that trigger without hesitation or fear of blame.
At the bare minimum, Australia must give its trained personnel the nation’s trust to use their own initiative to act when it matters.
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