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With a growing recognition that Australia’s naval capabilities are underprepared and “under gunned” in light of a rapidly evolving regional threat environment, does a fleet of general-purpose frigates provide the solution to beefing up Australia’s naval strike power?
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As the Royal Australian Navy prepares to receive the first Arafura and Hunter Class vessels this decade, and in light of growing commentary about the growing need for greater versatility, firepower and capability, the evolving regional and global dynamics have raised the question, can a fleet of ocean-going corvettes ease the operational burden on high-end warfighting platforms and expand the range and power of the Navy?
For the first time in the nation’s history, Australia’s prosperity, security and way of life is intrinsically linked to the ambition, stability and direction of its Indo-Pacific neighbours. This new paradigm echoes the environment America found itself in during the mid-19th century, which was best explained by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in his 1890 work The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, which outlined that “whether they will or not, Americans must now begin to look outward. The growing production of the country demands it”.
Australia’s geographic location and the vast distances required for the Royal Australian Navy to transit in order to patrol across our northern approaches and through economically critical sea lines of communication necessitate a vessel larger and more heavily armed than the 80-metre, 1,640-tonne Arafura Cass offshore patrol vessels, yet smaller and not as complex as the 146.7-metre, 7,000-tonne Hobart Class destroyers or the 149.9-metre, 8,800-tonnne Hunter Class frigates.
Australia is not alone in facing this challenge of fielding a mix of major surface combatants. Both the US Navy and the British Royal Navy have in recent years commenced programs to develop and field a less-specialised, general-purpose vessel that is capable of independent long-range deployments, while also bringing a degree of high-end warfighting capability to broader task groups.
While both nations operate fleets of high-end, specialised warships, like the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke Class destroyers and the Royal Navy’s future City (Type 26) Class frigates, their respective corvette-to-frigate programs have yielded results, with both the US Navy and Royal Navy preparing to field the Constellation and Inspiration Class ships, respectively.
Britain’s Arrowhead-based Inspiration Class
In the Royal Navy’s case, the Type 31 Class of general-purpose frigates, based on the Babcock Arrowhead 140, will provide the Royal Navy with a class of highly capable warship that sits in between the River Class OPVs and the City and Daring Class vessels, expanding the range and capability of the Royal Navy, without taxing the limited number of large, high-end surface combatants.
The Royal Navy plans on acquiring five vessels for itself, with an additional two for Indonesia and three for Poland, respectively, providing these smaller navies with comparatively high-end warfighting capabilities in a relatively compact package — these vessels weigh in at 5,700 tonnes, with a range of 9,000 nautical miles at 16 knots, and the pre-fitted capacity for up to 32 strike-length MK-41 VLS cells, a 57mm main gun and a core complement of 100, compared to the 177 of the existing Anzac Class frigates or 180 for the Hobart Class destroyers and Hunter Class frigates.
Additionally, the platform has wide growth margins for future mine countermeasures, undersea surveillance and manned/unmanned teaming options leveraging four large multi-mission bays for the launch and recovery of autonomous systems — this additional flexibility, combined with the increase in capability provided by additional modularity built into the design.
From a cost perspective, the UK has signed a fixed price contract with Babcock for the Type 31 frigates for £1.25 billion, or roughly AU$440 million per frigate before certain weapons systems and other equipment. The total project cost is currently budgeted for £2 billion, allowing for £750 million in government-fitted equipment, resulting in a full unit price of £400 million, or roughly AU$700 million per frigate.
The modular nature of the design provides a comparatively quick building time when compared to the vessels like the Hobart Class, with the UK cutting first steel on the first of the Inspiration Class in 2021 and all five of the Royal Navy¹s frigates contracted to be fielded by 2028.
America’s Constellation class
Named in honour of one of America’s most storied warships, the USS Constellation, this new class of general-purpose frigate, based upon the Fincantieri FREMM frigate, is similar to the vessel that was presented by the Italian company for Australia’s multi-billion SEA 5000 Future Frigate program — delivering a vessel with specific design parameters set by the US Navy to fulfil roles similar to that of its British counterpart.
From the earliest stages of conceptualisation, the US Navy articulated that “The FFG(X) will normally aggregate into strike groups and large surface combatant (destroyer, cruiser) led surface action groups but also possess the ability to robustly defend itself during conduct of independent operations while connected and contributing to the fleet tactical grid” — building on these two “core missions” the US Navy wants the Constellation Class to be capable of:
- Destroying surface ships over the horizon;
- Detect enemy submarines;
- Defend convoy ships;
- Employ active and passive electronic warfare systems; and
- Defend against swarming small boat attacks.
The US Navy has plans to acquire an initial fleet of 20 Constellation Class vessels, which weigh in at 7,291 tonnes with a range of 6,000 nautical miles at 16 knots, incorporating SPY-6 (V)3 radar systems and Baseline 10 Aegis combat system, with a similar armament to the Inspiration Class: 32 Mk 41 VLS cells, 16 canister launched over-the-horizon weapons, and a 57mm main gun, with a significantly larger crew complement of approximately 200.
Cost wise, the first vessel cost US$1.28 billion, with the second vessel slated to cost US$1.05 billion, with long-term price ambitions of between US$850–$950 million per unit cost. Construction wise, the US cut steel for the lead vessel USS Constellation in 2022, with the vessel expected to be delivered by 2026.
Easing the burden on high-end platforms
Platforms like the Inspiration and Constellation Class vessels aim to be cheaper, easier to build en masse vessels that can provide the US Navy and Royal Navy, respectively, with greater coverage in important areas of operation without falling back on “high-end” warfighting capabilities like the Arleigh Burke, Daring or City Class vessels — this additional tactical and strategic freedom also expands the umbrella provided by these nations.
Additionally, the growing number of “cheap” and “plentiful”' platforms provides additional resilience in the event of high-intensity, peer competitor conflict scenarios, freeing up the high-end platforms to conduct strategically important operations, while enabling these cheaper platforms to provide a plug and play capability in a range of scenarios, ranging from long-range, maritime merchant marine escort operations, through to integration into larger allied task groups.
This flexibility provides interesting avenues worth consideration for strengthening Australia’s maritime capabilities, while maximising interoperability with allied partners without compromising key high-end warfighting capabilities outlined in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update.
Lessons for Australia’s future strategic planning
Australia’s position and responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific region will depend on the nation’s ability to sustain itself economically, strategically and politically. Despite the nation’s virtually unrivalled wealth of natural resources, agricultural and industrial potential, there is a lack of a cohesive national security strategy integrating the development of individual, yet complementary public policy strategies to support a more robust Australian role in the region.
Contemporary Australia has been far removed from the harsh realities of conflict, with many generations never enduring the reality of rationing for food, energy, medical supplies or luxury goods, and even fewer within modern Australia understanding the socio-political and economic impact such rationing would have on the now world-leading Australian standard of living.
Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic, economic, diplomatic and military capability serves as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia. As events continue to unfold throughout the region and China continues to throw its economic, political and strategic weight around, can Australia afford to remain a secondary power, or does it need to embrace a larger, more independent role in an era of increasing great power competition?
Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch
Stephen Kuper
Steve has an extensive career across government, defence industry and advocacy, having previously worked for cabinet ministers at both Federal and State levels.
